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Italy became one of the major exporters of arms by the early 1980s,
behind only the United States, the Soviet Union, and France.
Although its position was later overtaken, it remained one of Europe's
main producers and suppliers, without the presence of pronounced
military and foreign policy ambitions at the state level. The military
industries grew as a result of Italy's close association with other
Western and in particular the American defence establishment
beginning in the late 1940s. The Italians had access to some of the most
advanced military technology through co-production and licence
arrangements with its senior allies. By the 1970s, the defence area
became the fastest growing sector of the Italian economy when markets
were exploited mainly in the Third World.
Although about two-thirds of the industry was state-owned,
Italian businessmen acted independently in selling arms through
Italian trade networks which thrived with very little government
direction or intervention. The absence of government assistance
actually appeared to favour the export of Italian weapons, because the
lack of interest in the sector also meant that Italy maintained perhaps
the most lenient export legislation in the West. As the industry
expanded, manufacturers availed themselves increasingly of
representatives of the foreign trade ministry, the secret services and
military attaches abroad in the promotion of Italian war equipment.
And as Italy came into the circle of the world's major economic
powers, its politicians attempted for a time to adopt the defence
industry as a tool of international prestige. However supporters of the
industry did not resolve the contradiction between the low priority
Italy continued to give to defence and foreign policy, and the success of
the country's industrialists in supplying arms to areas of tension. As
business began to decline sharply in the late 1980s for Italy's defence
firms, industrialists turned to the possibility of reconversion programs.
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Introduction
The Italian defence industry was relaunched after the Second
World War with almost completely new foundations, with almost
no indigenous technology, very little domestic demand, and almost
no ideological support for sustaining a military sector. By the 1980s,
it had attained the dimensions of other major secondary arms
sellers, and for a time had export sales surpassing all of the
European suppliers except France.
Nonetheless the Italian defence industry has received little
attention and even Italians express disbelief at the size of their arms
exports. The sector gained little publicity because unlike other
suppliers, the Italian defence industry did not expand in response to
national military or foreign policy aspirations. It thrived as an
extension of Italy's foreign trade, largely detached from a society
which did not hold military strength or diplomatic ambitions in
high esteem.
In short, in the highly political field of arms transfers, the
Italians have stripped moral and political associations from the
trade. This did not stop the recipients from using the weapons for
political causes, however. Italians were involved in making
countries like South Africa militarily self-sufficient in some areas,
in arming nations at war in Africa and the Middle East and
sometimes their enemies, in building the arsenals of countries like
Libya which sometimes targeted the territory of Italy itself, and in
encouraging the acquisition of ballistic missiles in the Arab world
and in Latin America.
Despite the lack of public support for the industry during its
expansion, it was linked closely with the political and military
establishments in Italy, but most often on the level of the "secret" or
as one writer put it, the "subterranean" Italy. The distance between
the industry and Italian political circles is an interesting aspect of the
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sector's development. In other countries with strong defence
industries, such as France or the United States, the government is
an eager client and supporter of military production. Governments
of these countries defend this sector of industry despite high costs
and unfavourable market conditions because it is envisaged as an
essential element of national strength and a source of employment.
This has allowed defence companies to enjoy continued support
despite the fact that they have chronic flaws unknown in any other
economic phenomenon, exacting extremely high prices, delays in
production, and other demands.
After the Second World War, the Italian government
begrudgingly accepted rearmament and the renewal of the defence
industry at the behest of the United States, in exchange for economic
assistance. During this time there was widespread rejection of the
national glorification of the military under Fascism. Further, Italy
housed both the seat of Catholicism and the largest Communist
party in the West. There were strong undercurrents of pacifism
from these two cultures in Italy; anti-militarism was probably one of
the few areas of agreement between the opposing Christian
Democrat (DC) and Italian Communist (PCI) parties.
Postwar Italy produced both^the most ideologically charged
political system in the West, andAthe most apolitical heads of state in
international affairs. While engaged in a seemingly perpetual
standoff at the domestic level, Italian leaders were not convinced of
the dangers of the East-West conflict at large or interested in their
own defence needs for most of the postwar period. The Italian
military in turn reacted to American domination by becoming
increasingly passive and ineffectual in its national defence
responsibilities, while tending toward isolationism and corruption.
Both the military and political circles, preoccupied with internal
struggles, were unable to assert a distinct Italian profile abroad.
Co-existing with the oft-cited Italian "immobilism" at state-
level foreign affairs in the postwar period is an active network of
international relations in a broader sense. It is not the apparent
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inefficiency of state institutions that makes Italian politicians
relatively inactive in foreign matters: it is because they largely
deferred to another "class" of Italian leaders with greater mobility
and a long experience in exploiting Italy's potential abroad. Italy's
industrialists carried out "the substance" of the nation's foreign
relations, cultivating a vast network abroad and assuring a lifeline
for Italy in energy and trading partners. The larger firms even have
their own offices for cultivating and maintaining foreign relations
links.
Italy's foreign relations...comprise much more than the
activity of its government organs. While security
remains the principal goal, and foreign policy does not
have the glamour it could have, the survival of Italy as
a social, economic and political system depends also on
the direct transnational relations of a multitude of
groups, companies and individuals, with the outside
world..."a sort of autonomous set of foreign relations
outside the Foreign Ministry."1
Not only does the government not discourage this, they actively put
their functionaries at the service of the businessmen's interests.
A combination of factors encouraged the rise of military exports
in particular. Italy had close contact with the United States; it was
generally considered the most dependable and even obsequious
NATO ally. This allowed Italians access to the most sophisticated
technology and also overshadowed a potential individual political
identity abroad. The low political profile for a time allowed Italians
to penetrate a wide variety of markets particularly in the developing
world, because their lack of political pretensions made agreements
with ex-colonial governments easier to reach. These relationships
intensified as Italy's economy became increasingly geared toward
exports and reliant on foreign raw materials. Ties which began
normally with energy-related deals grew into wider trade
^arl Kaiser, Le relazioni transnazionali, Fabio Luca Cavazza and Stephen
R. Graubard, eds., II caso italiano (Rome: Garzanti, 1974), pp. 400, 415.
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interdependence with many countries, which brought many outlets
for Italy's weapons manufacturers.
Italy took the advantages offered by its association with one of
the superpowers and turned its secondary position and close links in
the Third World into strikingly profitable opportunities. Writes
one of Italy's defence industry specialists, "Once again, we see the
absolutely unique position of the Italian case, a country belonging to
the First World with one foot in the Third, capable, in this setting, of
exploiting advantages from both conditions."1
Simultaneously, however, Italy's successful foreign trade was
transforming its status among the major industrialised countries.
By the 1970s Italy resembled its senior allies in material standards.
In addition it faced new security responsibilities in the increasingly
explosive Mediterranean. Italy's political and military leaders
sought greater public legitimacy at home and acceptance in the
upper circles of Atlantic leadership. They experimented with new
foreign policy roles, including a tougher attitude toward the
Americans on sensitive issues, and a major humanitarian aid
program in the developing world. At the same time, Italian leaders
recognised that the Italian defence industry reinforced Italy's image
among other major arms supplying countries, and began to reassess
the sector's value from a primarily commercial phenomenon to a
possible extension of the Italian state.
As a consequence of the lack of national support for the
industry, nearly every study of this sector in Italy must be prefaced
by a caveat about the necessity of approximating figures. Official
sources such as the Ministries of Defence, Trade and Foreign Affairs
do not release comprehensive statistics. In the few official
documents released by Italian state sources, officials often use
estimates made by independent researchers in Italy, or more often
figures from foreign sources, such as the Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) or the Arms Control and
1Fabrizio Battistelli, Armi: nuovo modello di sviluppo? (Turin: Einaudi,
1980), p. 258.
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Disarmament Agency (ACDA) of the American State Department.
Even statistics that by law should be made public, and even facts that
are not politically or militarily sensitive, habitually are left
unreported. The government is either unwilling or unable to give
an accurate picture of the defence sector; in the meantime the
industry and its exports have grown into a major responsibility of
the state as Italy's economic power increases and its foreign stature
brings its greater political responsibilities.
The principal responsibility clearly lies with the
government, because the government is the sole source
of internal demand as well as the body which releases
licences for export. The executive is therefore perfectly
able to give us the fundamental dimensions of the
production of armaments in Italy. But it does not do
this, not even during "historic" opportunities such as
the Conference on the Defence Industry in July 1984,
sponsored by the military itself. The industries, both
public and private, are not any better: anyone who has
tried to study this sector has a long story to tell about
incomplete data, unavailable budgets, unanswered
questionnaires. One should also mention the Central
Institute for Statistics, whose records on foreign trade
are completely useless for the problem in question,
since they do not have a category designed to record
exhaustively the transfer of war materiel.1
Large portions of the trade, especially in small arms, remain
completely undocumented. One researcher estimated that only
about a third of the trade from Italy was recorded.2 The various
underworld organisations in Italy are known to deal in arms and
arms transfers. While this field is probably not as prominent as the
drugs trade, Mafia transfers are thought to be on a very large scale,
mostly with destinations in the Middle East. Coverage of
^DeAndreis and Alessandro Liberati, "L'Industria bellica italiana e le
esportazioni di armamenti," L'ltalia e la corsa al riarmo (Milan: Franco Angeli,
1986), p. 263
interview Archivio Disarmo, Rome, March 1988.
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underworld involvement in arms is poor and I did not explore this
link during my research visit in Italy.
Nevertheless the defence industries are monitored by a
number of sources, on all points of the political spectrum.
"Conservative" groups include the armed forces study insitute, the
Centre for Advanced Defence Studies (CASD), and Istituto Studi e
Ricerche Difesa (ISTRID). Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), which
often is engaged in studies for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
publishes a yearbook on Italian international and security affairs.
Active groups funded by the political left in Italy include the Centre
for the Study of International Politics, CESPI (PCI); Istituto di
Ricerche per il Disarmo, lo sviluppo e la pace (IRDISP) (Radical
Party); and the Archivio Disarmo, whose director published the only
comprehensive study of the industry. Some of the most
authoritative researchers monitor the industry and maintain data
libraries on an independent basis.
Some of these groups collaborate freely among themselves, but
all are forced to share sources. Researchers' estimates of the defence
industry's net turnover, employment level and other data show
limited variations. Study of the aeronautics industry is facilitated by
the existence of a large number of journals and other
documentation that, by contrast, is very scarce in other fields,
especially land-based equipment. Besides deriving estimates from
the available export figures and procurement budget of the Italian
armed forces, researchers can elaborate data taken from reports of
the Association of Aeronautics and Electronics Industries, and from
financial statements published by some of the larger companies
involved in defence.
Information for this study of the Italian defence industry has
been culled from the yearbooks of the Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute, the Military Balance, Jane's Defence
Weekly and Defence Review, and other journals. The Italians
produce a number of journals, notably Rivista militare, Difesa oggi,
and Informazioni difesa. Tracing the trade in arms from other
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Italian sources is much more difficult. Daily newspapers cover the
trade to a certain extent, but since nearly every Italian newspaper is
owned and controlled either by one of the political parties or one of
the large private firms, coverage is not complete. Falco Accame, a
retired naval admiral and former secret services official who now
campaigns for greater controls on the Italian arms trade, claims that
Nigrizia, a journal published by the Documentation Institute (IDOC)
in Rome covering developments in the Third World, is the only
place that still will publish the harshest revelations of the Italian
military trade. Newspapers such as Corriere della sera have
gradually phased out his articles. Mino Pecorelli, the editor of the
journal Osservatore politico which exposed the arms trade and
other controversial topics in Italian politics, was assassinated in
1977.
Because of the political polarisation in Italy, most Italian
studies are approached with a pronounced partisan viewpoint.
When sources close to the government or industry itself are
involved, quantitative dimensions of the industry are often
construed in order to give a particular picture of the industry. In the
existing studies, there has been a tendency to analyse the sector as a
primarily economic or a primarily military-industrial phenomenon.
I have attempted to shed light on the successes of the Italian
industry as a reflection of Italy's unique approach to the
international order.
CHAPTER ONE
Italy's Adherence to theNorthAtlantic TreatyOrganisation:
Political Rehabilitation and theDecline of theMilitary
Introduction
At the time that Italy was offered membership in NATO after
the collapse of Fascism, there was a deep divide between what the
Americans hoped to derive from Italian membership, and what the
Italians themselves hoped to gain from the alliance. For the United
States, the suppression of the vital Communist movement in Italy
was paramount; for Italy, the economic and political rewards of
cooperation with the world's advanced societies was the prime goal.
The Americans armed Italy against the Communist threat both in
its internal and external forms. Italy yielded all responsibility for
military decisionmaking to the Atlantic Alliance, and in turn
received a steady stream of American-made equipment and
assistance in relaunching its economy. A fusion of these two
aspects - the military and the economic - was to be the military
industry. The idea of building strong national armed forces
bolstered by a domestic arms industry was never an aspiration in
postwar Italy, but by 1949 the Italian defence industry was already
able to export on a modest level to the Third World. Here as in
other areas of Alliance cooperation, economic aspects of military
manufacturing were of the highest concern to Italy.
Italy's Entrance into NATO:
The Christian Democrat Alliance with NATO
against the Italian Communists
Italy's leaders, headed by Christian Democrat Alcide De
Gasperi, at first vacillated over the option of joining a military
alliance linking Italy's future to the West, but later fought a keen
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struggle for acceptance among Italy's future allies. The option of a
neutral Italy outside the rapidly cristallizing superpower blocs
appealed to many elements of Italian society, especially in the
Vatican and the Christian Democrat party (DC), including for a
short time, De Gasperi. But because of Italy's economic state, the
prospect of arming a neutral defence posture independently was
unimaginable. Italian leaders were compelled to find ways to
reverse the economic devastation that followed World War II.
Although Italy was hesitant about making a military alliance the
foundation of its postwar reconstruction, many considered
inclusion in the collective Western effort for reconstruction the
most attractive option. Assuring the support of the United States
became a necessity.
By far the strongest country in economic terms, it
was generally considered the ultimate repository of
such fundamental Western values as parliamentary
democracy, the market system, and a society based
upon individual freedom and individual merit.'
The Christian Democrats then set about making Italian
membership in NATO appear as the only natural choice for postwar
reconstruction. This would offer the immediate effects of
mitigation of the harsh peace treaty clauses, which countries such as
Britain were determined to apply, as well as continuing economic
aid. In the longer term, inclusion in the Atlantic Alliance offered
Italy a chance to be included in the economic revival of Europe, as
the Marshall Plan proposal had promised, and to hand over its
defence burden to a more powerful and prosperous patron.
' Giovanni Agnelli, "The Strategic Role of the Western Business
Community," in Kenneth Myers, ed., NATO: The Next Thirty Years (London:
Croom Helm, 1980), p. 256.
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The "objectivity" of these conditions were
emphasised with force, to demonstrate the
inevitability, and therefore also the presumed
apolitical nature of the choices being made. The
foreign and military policy of the De Gasperi
government was presented as that which would
have advantageous returns that no other solution
could offer. In the privileged relationship with the
USA, we would have had the certainty of acquiring
the necessary military and economic aid to reinforce
that which had already been obtained during the war
and continued to flood into the country in
anticipation of the peace treaty.2
This scelta di civilta, or "choice of civilisation" as De Gasperi
depicted it, underscored the divisions in Italian society that had
been dramatised by a narrow Christian Democrat victory over the
Italian Communist Party (PCI) only a year before the signing of the
NATO treaty. The ideological rifts dividing Europe came alive in
miniature as Italians voted on their choice of postwar government.
The United States had launched an aggressive campaign to
include Italy within its sphere of influence. The decision to invite
Italy to join the alliance had not been unanimous among the future
allies. Britain was still hoping to keep Italy in a position of
subordination and to prevent spreading American military aid too
thinly. Italy's limited ability to contribute to the Alliance, as well as
the earlier hesitations of its leaders, cast the Italian commitment in
doubt.
Some of Truman's advisers initially opposed Italian
partnership, among them George Kennan, who thought that
extending the Alliance to fit Italy beyond the strictly Atlantic area
would heighten Soviet fears of encirclement, and that NATO
would encourage a "preoccupation with military affairs to the
2Enea Cerquetti, Le forze armate italiane dal 1945 al 1975 (Milan:
Feltrinelli, 1975), p. 61.
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detriment of economic recovery and of the necessity for seeking a
peaceful solution to Europe's difficulties."3
But the advice of other factions within the State Department,
led by John D. Hickerson, influenced the Truman administration to
target Italy as an important element of the alliance. The main
concern of the Americans was - and remains today - Italy's possible
evolution into a Communist-ruled country. Immediately after the
war, the Communists appeared to be a formidable power in Italy.
Palmiro Togliatti, the PCI's founder and leader until his death in
1964, had lived in exile in Moscow between 1926 and 1944, and was
one of the foremost figures of the international Communist
movement. The partisans squads, which included a high
proportion of Communists, had emerged as Italy's only war heroes,
having proved their endurance, leadership skills and commitment
to their country.
All of the advisors surrounding Truman seemed to be
unanimous in their concern about Italian Communism, even those
who did not initially favour extending the Atlantic Alliance. In a
message to the Secretary of State in March 1948, a month before the
Italian elections, Kennan wrote:
Top priority is of course due to effort to improve our
basic military reserve position at home. As far as
Europe is concerned, Italy is obviously key point. If
Communists were to win election there our whole
position in Mediterranean, and possibly in western
Europe as well, would probably be undermined....For
these reasons I question whether it would not be
preferable for Italian government to outlaw
Communist Party and take strong action against it
before elections. Communists would presumably
3George Kennan, Memoirs (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1967), pp. 402-410,
quoted in Lawrence Kaplan, Robert W. Clawson and Raimondo Luraghi, eds.,
NATO and the Mediterranean (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources,
1985),p. 150.
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reply with civil war, which would give us grounds
for reoccupation Foggia fields or any facilities we
might wish. This would admittedly result in much
violence and probably a military division of Italy; but
we are getting close to the deadline and I think it
might well be preferable to a bloodless election
victory, unopposed by ourselves, which would give
the Communists the entire peninsula at one coup
and send waves of panic to all surrounding areas.4
Kennan's advice was passed over in favour of more indirect
intervention in the elections. The Italian vote was heavily
influenced by the US. Americans of Italian origin, many of whom
sent remittances home, barraged their relatives with an aggressive
postal campaign urging Italians to "vote for freedom." Even more
decisive for most Italians was the fact that Congress threatened to
withhold desperately needed food supplies and aid for
reconstruction if Communists were included in the government of
Italy. A clause in the law S.2202 which emanated from the Marshall
Plan speech stated that assistance would be withdrawn in the event
that circumstances arose that compromised US interests.5
The United States continued to counter the possibility of a
leftist Italy with military measures as well. Allied supervision of
Italy lasted officially until 1953, although many troops were
withdrawn at the signing of the Peace Treaty in 1947. Besides the
continuing presence of American units on Italian territory, the
American Navy was poised to fulfill the "Truman Doctrine" which
had kept Turkish and Greek Communists at bay. Truman implied
that the US would respond to a Communist victory in Italy with
4Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume III, 1948 (Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 849.
5 "E il terrore dei russi fondo la dinastia dc," La Repubblica, 12 April 1988.
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"what measures would be appropriate for the maintenance of peace
and security."6
The victory of the Christian Democrats had the double effect of
setting Italy on a path toward economic and political rehabilitation,
and barring their Communist rivals from the highest echelon of
Italian government. Although the domestic reverberations of
foreign policy have been considered among the main reasons for
fidelity of Italy's ruling class to NATO, De Gasperi had worked
under a sort of truce with the Communists, who had been present
at every stage of the political reorganisation of Italy. The
Communists and Christian Democrats were soon polarised by the
mounting pressure from the United States, especially following the
Truman Doctrine speech.7 De Gasperi later rebuffed American
requests to curb the Communists further.8
The First Postwar Rearmament in Italy
Restoration of the Italian Armed Forces
The military side of the alliance had little appeal for Italy. The
idealization of warfare by Mussolini's generation had brought Italy
to ruins, and the main concern of the anti-Fascist politicians was to
discourage the possibility of a military dictatorship arising in Italy.
PCI members were active in early attempts to set political guidelines
for the new military establishment. Several served successively in
the capacity of war undersecretary: Mario Palermo from June 1944
to June 1945 under the Bonomi governments, Pompeo Colajanni
with the Parri and De Gasperi governments from June 1945 to
6Public papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S Truman 1947-
1949. (Washington: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records
Service, 1963-1964), p. 510, cited in NATO and the Mediterranean, p. 140.
7James Miller, The United States and Italy (Chapel Hill and London:
University of North Carolina Press, 1986), pp. 225-226.
8Norman Kogan, The Politics of Italian Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger,
1963), p. 131.
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February 1947, and Franco Maranino with the De Gasperi
administration until May 1947. 9
The Army had been the main symbol of prestige for the Fascist
regime. After the fall of the Fascist regime in 1943 and the
surrender to the Allies, most of the military turned against
Mussolini. Nonetheless the armed forces failed to become identified
with the reorganisation and rejuvenation of Italian society. Top-
ranking generals had preferred to flee south with the King rather
than confront the German invasion. The Air Force, itself a creation
of Fascism, retained associations with prominent pre-war aviators
who had built it into an ambitious force. The Navy was the only
branch of the armed forces to remain largely intact after the war
with a fairly positive public image.
Nonetheless the Allies opposed a purge of the former military
leadership and dissolved the partisan squads. Even if many top
members of the armed forces had been identified with Mussolini,
the Americans could count on their anti-Communist sentiments.
People also remembered how dangerous the ex-
officers had been in 1919-1920; better to keep them in
the army, out of harm's way. This argument served
also against any talk of a "purge." Politicians of both
Right and Left supported conscription: the Right
wanted lots of soldiers, the Left, echoing Engels,
somehow thought that conscripts would be less
likely to fire on demonstrators. By 1948, with the
advent of the "cold war," the army came to seem a
good deal less pointless. Troops might be needed to
help Allied forces in the Balkans, or to suppress a
Communist rising at home. For these purposes a
disciplined "professional" force was essential: any
nonsense about a "nation at arms" or a "partisan
army" would simply play into Communist hands.
Some 3,700 ex-partisans were, in fact, allowed into
9Arrigo Boldrini and Aldo D'Alessio, Esercito e politica in Italia (Rome:
Riuniti, 1974), p. 17.
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the army after the war, but they included only 125
officers (one lieutenant colonel and thirteen
captains; the rest were lieutenants). So the army was
rebuilt more or less on the old structure.10
By 1946 the military academies of all three armed forces were
reopened under allied supervision.11 In February 1947 the
ministries of War, Navy and the Air Force were united in the single
Defence Ministry, with the goal of unifying command and
bureaucracy. No attempts were made to make former officers of the
Mussolini regime accountable for their part in the war, even
though top-level officers had been investigated and condemned
publically after earlier military disasters such as Lissa (1866), Adua
(1896), and Caporetto (1917). Members of the left in Italy look back
on the period with this point of view:
The failure to investigate the events of 1943 appear
today clearly as a choice made in order to spare those
responsible for the national tragedy, preserve the old
military structures and develop an unfettered anti-
popular and anti-partisan campaign, with the intent
of striking down the men and the ideals of the
country's second risorgimento.12
Many elements of the establishment remained rooted in the
pre-war system. Besides the presence of pre-war structures, the
disciplinary code of 1929 remained in force and was reaffirmed in
1965; the military also resorted regularly to the code of military
secrecy dating to 1941.13
Italy's status as a former belligerent faded in the 1950s as the
Cold War set in, but it never attempted to reverse the peace treaty
10Clark, p. 343.
1 ' Giulio Massobrio, Bianco rosso e grigioverde (Verona: Bertani, 1974), p. 63.
12Boldrini and D'Alessio, p. 20.
' ^Boldrini and D'Alessio, p. 27.
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policies which limited the power of its armed forces. With a
political repulsion against military matters and limited economic
means, Italy's government relegated the armed forces to the
background of Italian society.
After the disaster of the Second World War, there
emerged in Italy a collective sentiment of repression
of the political problem of war. From this sprang the
renunciation of the use of force, solemnly confirmed
in the postwar constitution, except in the case of self
defence or defence of the democratic order. This
choice went beyond considerations of other
circumstances. It meant for Italy, as for Germany
and Japan, a radical redefinition of its own interests
and national aspirations.1 4
Pressure for Rearmament
For Italy, the fading role of the military and the minimal
interest in planning for Italian security reflected a change of
priorities. But the military held an increasingly powerful place in
American society, and rearmament in Italy under US direction
proceeded almost immediately. Before the peace treaty was lifted,
the United States had already violated the equipment ceilings with
the delivery of new aircraft, artillery and second-hand tanks and
ships.15 Almost $2 billion in military aid was given to Italy between
1950 and I960,16 including the equivalent of approximately 35,000
freight train cars of materiel.17 This policy was designed to
encourage Italians to take up rearmament on their own initiative,
but the US was continually frustrated over the lack of Italian
' 4General Carlo Jean, "Sicurezza e difesa in Italia," Rivista italiana di
scienza politica, anno XVII, No 3, December 1987, p. 377.
15Cerquetti, p. 97-98.
' t>The Politics of Italian Foreign Policy, p. 120.
' 7 Cerquetti, p. 163.
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enthusiasm for modernising their arsenal. Wrote the American
Ambassador to Italy, James C. Dunn:
When I saw [Italian foreign minister] Count Sforza
just before his departure to Strasbourg, I took
occasion to speak to him about Italy's rearmament
program. I pointed out that Italy appeared to be
lagging behind other countries and said that
although the Italian military authorities were now
giving us some information about their plans for
building up Italian Armed Forces and for the
expenditure of the additional 50 billion lire, Italian
government had still not come forward with
comprehensive production program which would
enable us to discuss Italian aid...I emphasized that in
addition to importance to Italy of rapid buildup in
armed strength, this appeared to be opportunity to
put idle Italian factories and manpower to work, and
I suggested that Italy should undertake an aggressive
selling campaign with her other NATO partners.1 8
Italian reservations were based on fears of aggravating the
internal economy, which was still plagued by high inflation and an
unstable currency. During this time the Italian government
focussed on the renewal of basic industries for civil consumption
and assistance to the agriculture sector. In the meantime the
Americans coaxed the Italians into extending the required military
service in Italy to 18 months in exchange for an additional defence
grant of 150 billion lire.19 The reasons for this support were clear
to all: in 1950 the Minister of Defence Randolfo Pacciardi likened
Italy to Korea, where American war materiel was flooding in as a
"bastion of steel against Communism."20 American officials could
' &FRUS, Volume III, 1950 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1977), p. 1500.
1 ^Cerquetti, p. 98.
20Cerquetti, p. 97.
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sense that within the Italian cabinet, military policy continued to be
approached with a general disbelief in the likelihood of war and a
desire to subordinate rearmament expenditures to other goals.21
Gaps in Italy's responsibilities in alliance strategy and equipment
programs were checked by continued close American supervision,
while the national forces were entrusted with the tasks of checking
developments on Italy's "internal front."
The Italian Armed Forces: Isolation and Freedom of Action
The Period of Subversive Activities
Marginalized within its own society and emasculated by
American intervention, the Italian military latched onto the role of
maintaining internal order with some enthusiasm. There were
strong precedents for this in Italian history. At the time of Italian
unification the Army was called "the iron thread that holds
together the country."22 The Army was pitted against all but the
ruling classes of the country from the time it held Italy together by
force in the fight against peasant "brigandage" (1861-1867).
The Army killed thousands at a popular revolt in Palermo in
September 1868; in 1898, 20,000 soldiers as well as carabinieri and
police were called out to use cannons against unarmed workers
protesting in Milan. In the face of wars with Austria-Hungary (1866
and 1915) and in Libya (1912), on the other hand, the Army's lack of
preparedness was acute. In the more recent memory of Italians,
during the 45 days of General Badoglio's rule in the summer of 1943
the Army was responsible for the constant repression and several




deaths of protestors in Milan, Bari, Florence and Reggio Emilia
lashing out against the remnants of the Fascist leadership. 23 .
The main responsibilities for the "internal policing" of Italy-
fell on the various sections of the Army, rather than the other
forces. One Army subdivision, the carabinieri, took on the role in a
more literal sense than other branches, which probably considered
anti-Communism an unwritten creed of the forces without
translating it into action.
During every Italian war since 1814 the carabinieri had sent
troops, intelligence officers, and military police to the army, but in
peacetime they generally only fulfilled ordinary police functions.24
The ranks of the military police force more than doubled by the late
1940s to 65,000 men. In addition the Guardie di pubblica sicurezza
quadrupled from Mussolini's time to 45,000, with 20 new mobile
units.
It was and is still today the largest police force of any
European state: first in absolute terms, and equal in
percentage of population to those of countries such
as Spain and Greece...Such a deformation of the
armed forces had arisen from the anxieties of the
allies over public order. 25
Beginning in the 1960s, the carabinieri were implicated in a
period of subversive activities which, while supposedly designed to
enhance public order, unleashed a period of confusion in Italy. Not
all of the plots involved the armed forces directly, but most were
inspired by the prospect of a return to a military-style government.
Most of the operations revealed to have been planned between 1964
and 1973 were never fully explained, but none of them proved
23Massobrio, p. 59.
24Richard Collin, The De Lorenzo Gambit: The Italian Coup Manque of 1964
(Beverly Hills and London: Sage, 1976), p. 29.
23 Cerquetti, p. 26.
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strong enough to seriously destabilize Italian society. The general
driving force was a desire to check the liberalising tendencies in
Italy which led to the "opening to the left" in the Italian parliament
in the early 1960s.
Giovanni De Lorenzo, head of the carabinieri and former head
of the secret services, compiled dossiers with personal information
on public figures, and was accused of devising a plan to use the
carabinieri to replace existing political institutions with military
leadership, and to imprison on Sardinia prominent Italians with
supposedly dangerous political tendencies. A directive was issued
to ensure the ability to mobilize at short notice up to 10,000 police
reserves, who witnessed the plan with bewilderment. The creation
of a mechanised brigade under De Lorenzo's personal command
was another branch of the plot. The procurement of hundreds of
M-113 tanks came conveniently at a time of Alliance requests for
modernisation, but many of the tanks were diverted to carabiniere
units not integrated into NATO. The rearmament was generally
approved by the rest of the Army and by the United States, although
the concentration of power in De Lorenzo's hands was unsettling to
most observers.
The acquisition of new armoured cars allowed the
Army to break the monopoly established by the
Navy and the Air Force on the defence industry,
which just in that period was attaining a new
momentum. This decision was moreover looked
upon favourably by the American military and
industrial establishments as well, which hoped to
profit from the rearmament of the Italian army.2&
One theory asserts that the Italian armed forces were not acting
in a political vacuum, inspired by nostalgia for an old order, but that
2^Virgilio Ilari, Le forze armate tra politica e potere (Florence: Vallecchi,
1978), p. 72.
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there were close ties between the ruling parties and the military
throughout the postwar period. According to this argument, the
subversive activity of the armed forces was not inspired by the
conservative forces in Italy, but by its supposed "innovators," the
Christian Democrats. At the time of De Lorenzo's activity, the
Christian Democrats were negotiating the first coalition with the
Socialist Party (PSI) in order to broaden their base of support, but
they wanted the Socialists to comply with the DC concept of the
proposed centre-left government. There is also strong evidence that
at least some of the funding for the operations came from the
Italian confederation of manufacturers, Confindustria, "to fight
what it considered to be an extremely dangerous experiment or
perhaps even the end of the capitalist system in Italy."27
De Lorenzo's schemes, which may have existed solely for the
purposes of intimidation, were never mounted. De Lorenzo
became a neo-Fascist deputy in Parliament after a brief term as a
Monarchist, and was never fully investigated for his alleged anti-
constitutional activity because of his parliamentary immunity.
The Italian Secret Services
The secret services establishment, to which De Lorenzo was
closely tied, was also implicated in a long period of allegedly illicit
activity in Italy. Practices were so widespread that the organisation
was completely discredited and underwent a major restructuring.
The main organ for intelligence in Fascist Italy was SIM
(Servizio Informazioni Militari), which carried out activities as far
away as Albania, Africa, and Spain. The partisan intelligence
service, the SIP, Servizio informazione partigiano, became an
efficient arm of the anti-Fascist cause, of great utility to the allies in
the last stages of the struggle against Germany. After the war,
27Collin, p. 17.
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former SIM officers were condemned for their collaboration with
the German forces, but restructuring after the war occurred on the
foundations of this service.28 The secret services emerged in the
postwar state under the name of SIFAR (Servizio Informazioni
Forze Armate ) on September 1, 1949. Each branch of the forces was
assigned the task of developing its own intelligence service on the
military and technical plane.29 The post of Chief of Defence Staff,
created soon thereafter, coordinated these different functions.
According to one account, the activity of the Italian intelligence
service in the following decades could be divided into three distinct
fields:
coordination with foreign secret services, and in
particular with the American CIA, of which it
adopted in part the same model of political conduct;
widening of the sectors of control on the armed
forces through the creation of files on politicians,
employees of the defence and transport ministries
and of private firms and so on; transformation into a
pressure group at the service of the DC with the
unabashed use of secret funds which were never
audited.30
While De Lorenzo's "filing" of political figures was
widespread, SIFAR appeared to concentrate on sectors of industry,
including employees of the FIAT aviation division and of the state-
run television company RAI. The secret services were also
implicated in the Piazza Fontana bombing in Milan (1969), the Rosa
dei Venti attempted coup (1973), and terrorist attacks at Trento
(1971), Camerino (1972), Peteano, and Brescia among other places.
Plots attempted by the National Front run by Prince Valerio
28Boldrini and D'Alessio, p. 339.
20Boldrini and D'Alessio, p. 340.
30Boldrini and D'Alessio, p. 341.
23
Borghese, a former Fascist submarine commander, also had the
apparent collusion of the intelligence service. In one incident,
Giulio Andreotti admitted that conspirators had actually succeeded
in occupying the Interior Ministry in Rome on the night of 5
December 1970.31 The condemnation of the head of the intelligence
service, General Vito Miceli, for alleged conspiracy with the
Borghese group, was a further blow to the establishment. But even
after public investigations began in earnest, SID continued to work
with considerable freedom from democratic controls. Right-wing
terrorism continued in the so-called "strategy of tension" with the
aim of creating a general feeling of public instability that would
invite the return of a strong military-based regime.
A reform of the Italian intelligence system was finally carried
out in 1977. The largely successful fight against left-wing terrorism,
primarily the Red Brigades, had resulted in a proliferation of
command centres.32 The interior minister and the defence
minister, at the time Cossiga and Lattanzio, carried out the reform
which resulted in the law no. 801 of 24 October 1977. The main
authority for national intelligence was invested in an
interministerial committee (CIS) under the direct control of the
prime minister; another committee (CESIS) handled the technical
functions. The committees were charged with drawing up biannual
reports for review by the Parliament. The former SID was renamed
SISMI (Military Security Intelligence Service), but the Ministry of
Defence replaced the Chief of Defence General Staff as the director of
this organ. Each armed forces service henceforth carried out its
intelligence operations in separate "Intelligence, Security and
Situation Divisions" (SIOS). There was also the creation of an
3 ' Frederic Spotts and Theodor Wieser, Italy: A Difficult Democracy
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 172.
32Ilari, p. 195.
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intelligence wing under the interior ministry, called SISDE
(Servizio per le informazioni e la sicurezza democratica).
The purge of the secret services resulted in the dismissal of
about a third of SISMI's workforce, whilst the internal division,
which had earlier operated with more than 1300 staff, was
temporarily reduced to a few hundred. Suicides of two of the
services' top leaders, Captain Giuseppe Capasso and Major Giuseppe
Chiaravalli, occurred in the ensuing months.33 The renewal of the
secret services establishment did not prevent it becoming embroiled
in further scandals, including the P2 masonic lodge affair, in which
prominent Italians from nearly every profession were accused of
maintaining a secret parallel power structure in Italy.
Not much changed in the transformation from
SIFAR to SID and then to SISMI. There is no doubt
that if there was a desire to create a new organism
which was not conditioned by the past, one would
have had to effect a total change of the officials
assigned to the services, especially the ones coming
from the old SIFAR...Instead, a great many officials
were not touched for several decades and
furthermore, to assure continuity (and loyalty),
wives and children were hired by the service. One
may observe that while the SIFAR relationship [to
other areas of the state]...seemed to be directed
primarily toward the control of national political
life, the link between SID and P2 essentially had the
goal of bringing economic rewards (mostly at the
expense of the state) from activities carried out in the
country. In this light it is easy to understand the
growing attention given by the secret services to the
trade in arms.34
33Ilari, p. 197.
34Falco Accame, "II nostro mercato di morte," Nigrizia, October 1985, p. 35.
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By the early 1970s it was evident that a large proportion of the
top ranks of other branches of the Italian military had neo-Fascist
sympathies. This was highlighted by an incident at the Alliance
level, in which Admiral Birindelli made a Fascist-inspired verbal
outburst at the time of the expulsion of NATO from Malta in 1972.
The extent of American knowledge or backing of the ultra-right
activity is not known, but certainly the plots had been encouraged
by the prevailing determination to eradicate Communism at any
cost. A similar propensity within the Greek system resulted in the
rise of a military dictatorship three years after the De Lorenzo plot.
During the period of subversive activities the secret services
and large sections of the armed forces exhibited the ability to act
independently, and had the cooperation of political forces in
parallel policies to those officially pursued in Parliament. The
Italians were not unusual in having a thick interweaving of ties
between armed forces, politics and industry. But in Italy there was
also a long history of the armed forces using their power to act
against general public sympathies in pursuit of their own aims. The
freedom of action of the military and secret services was naturally
called into play when the military used its channels for promoting
sales of Italian arms abroad (see Chapter 8), when neither the armed
forces or promoting the outcome of wars abroad were issues held in
high esteem by the majority of Italians.
Within the Italian armed forces, in the meantime, the series of
incidents seriously eroded morale and the sense of military mission
within the rank and file, especially as the rest of Italian society
became more open to democratisation of public institutions during
the 1960s. Armed forces officers gave this view of the armed forces
from within the establishment:
The armed forces have assumed a role of defence not
of the nation but of certain political "powers that be,"
be it inside the country or on an international level,
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in conformity, rather than with the principles which
form the basis of the constitution, with the strategy
and the interests of the DC as far as the internal
situation is concerned, and with the adherence of
Italy in the bloc of Western military alliances
directed and controlled by the USA...The concept of
defence is the one most in crisis, among officials
with a certain amount of awareness. This has been a
main factor in what used to be called a crisis of
morale. Whom and what we are defending is the
focus of most of the crises of conscience that we are
now undergoing. That which we were instructed -
the defence of an abstract concept, the motherland -
no longer has any logical or practical meaning.
Many of us are beginning to realize that, in effect, we
are at the service not of the motherland, but of a
fixed system, which incidentally treats us rather
badly.35
Italy's Early Alliance Responsibilities
The UN Trusteeship and the G-91 NATO Fighter
While at home Italian forces were fixed at 12 divisons in 1952
by NATO, Italy did make some limited international contributions
in defence in the early postwar years. In the 1949 the United
Nations requested that Italy administer the transition to
independence of its ex-colony Somalia for a decade. This involved
the dispatch of the Corpo per la sicurezza della Somalia, including
five armoured battalions with artillery, engineering and aviation
units, to supervise the rearmament of the Somali army. The
United States sought to maintain influence in the former area of
Italian domination in the Horn of Africa, and the mission was
given over to Italy presumably under close American monitoring:
35Testimony of Air Force and Navy officials, in Travaglini, Franco, ed. Per
difendere chi? ( Milan: Gabriele Mazzotta, 1976), pp. 66-67.
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It can be expected that Soviet reaction...would be
particularly violent to US trusteeship and that such
an undertaking by the United States would give a
semblance of validity to some of the oft-repeated
Soviet propaganda chargefs] of US imperialism. We
can be sure that, regardless of whatever arrangement
is adopted, the United States will directly or
indirectly pay the principal portion of the cost.36
This first foreign policy task entrusted to the Italians was the
beginning of subsequent active collaboration with Somalia, as will
be discussed later.
By the mid-1950s, Italy was already able to make its first
contribution in the field of equipment to the NATO arsenal, after a
FIAT team won a contest in 1954 to provide the standard light attack
plane for the alliance. The success of the G-91 was a technological
victory at a time when Italy's military establishment was otherwise
undistinguished among its West European allies.
With two thirds of the expenses funded by the Americans and
the use of a British motor, a team of Italians put together a
completely new design ahead of schedule especially adapted to the
new requirements for the aircraft; the competitors were said to have
presented largely derivative models. Nonetheless the French, who
had presented three projects for the test flights at Bretigny, looked
upon the loss of the contest to Italy as a national defeat.37 West
Germany signed a contract to produce the G-91 under licence in
March 1959. About 350 were produced in total. In an interesting
footnote to the story, Austria apparently expressed interest in
acquiring the aircraft and received the head of FIAT, Vittorio
Valletta, in Vienna. The offer for the G91, it was revealed, was to be
36FRIiS, Volume IV, 1949 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1975), p. 530.
j7Giuseppe Gabrielli, Una vita per I'aviazione (Milan: Bompiani, 1982), p.
1
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linked to Italian government help in mitigating the punishment
inflicted on the war criminal Colonel Keppler. Valletta was said to
have turned down the Austrian proposition without even
consulting the Italian government.38
The Jupiter Missiles
Perhaps Italy's most significant early responsibility lay in its
caretaker role of NATO nuclear weapons. Italy had a history of
research in nuclear technology (Enrico Fermi had conducted early
experiments in his native country), and a small research program
continued under the auspices of FIAT's military research and
development program at least until the late 1970s.39 The Navy also
supervised the Center for Military Applications of Nuclear Energy
(Camen) near Pisa, for many years possessing the only nuclear
reactor in Italy.40 Although Italy renounced the possibility of a
national capability similar to the French force de frappe, it was an
acquiescent collaborator in the deployment of NATO's nuclear
weapons throughout the postwar period. In December 1957, in a
hasty response to Sputnik, the United States received Italy's consent
to the deployment of 30 Jupiter ballistic missiles, with a range of
about 2,500 miles, at Gioia del Colle in southern Italy. Italy was the
only Alliance member to agree without hesitation to the
deployment on its national soil.41
In 1959 the Italian armed forces were also caretakers of Honest
John tactical nuclear weapons, and Nike Ajax and Nike Hercules
interceptor missiles. The Italian Navy also carried on its own
nuclear program which brought Italian firms such as OTO-Melara,
38Gabrielli, p. 165.
3 ^ Alan Friedman, Agnelli and the Network of Italian Power (London:
Harrap, 1988), p. 224.
40Ilari, pp 38-39.
4 11lari, p. 37.
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BPD and ELSAG into cooperation with American companies. The
four-year program centred on the modernisation of an Italian
cruiser and resulted in the Giuseppe Garibaldi being the first
surface vessel in NATO capable of launching Polaris missiles. The
Garibaldi retained this distinction, in secret, at least until the mid-
1970s.42 Tests were carried out at the American base at Norfolk.43
The first Italian nuclear-propelled submarine, the Guglielmo
Marconi, came into use in 1959. 44
Why were the Italians eager to accept the deployment of
missiles, when other countries required long deliberations over the
implications of military destabilisation, political reverberations
from non-NATO allies, and continued imposition of American
policy on West European security? Only Great Britain, the Federal
Republic of Germany, Turkey and Italy accepted the deployments;
other NATO nations refused outright.45 The enthusiasm of the
government is in some senses curious since even some elements of
the DC leadership seemed to have tired of Italy's servility to the
Americans.
At the DC national congress in Florence on October 29, 1959,
the national youth delegate accused Antonio Segni (Prime Minister
July 1955-May 1957 and February 1959 to February 1960; President
1962-1964) of having supported Italian alignment with the French
and British at the expense of the Americans several years earlier.46
Amintore Fanfani, who held the premiership four times between
January 1954 and May 1963, and was in the post when the Jupiter
deployment took place, soon emerged as one of NATO's harshest
critics in Italy. In 1967 Fanfani's outburst in the Italian Senate over






American intervention in Vietnam was followed a few months
later by two DC-sponsored conferences to mark the forthcoming 20-
year anniversary of NATO. At both conferences, some DC members
actually supported the withdrawal of Italy from the alliance when
the time came to renew the treaty.47
The internal debates of the political parties on Italy's foreign
stance, often carried on for the purposes of factional struggles, did
not have a major effect on the country's basically firm commitment
to the alliance. At the time of the Jupiter installations the Italians
apparently perceived the prestige of their role in the deployment
worth the costs of continued subjugation to the American military
establishment.
NATO and Nuclear Burdens: Initial Effects in Italy
The submissiveness of the government to NATO directives
has been attributed to the long history of subordination to foreign
rulers on the Italian peninsula, and strong pressures in the Catholic
tradition toward obeying authority.48 But it can also be explained by
the continuing lack of importance given to military matters. For
Italy's leaders the main priorities for NATO membership were still
economic cooperation and political prestige. By 1960 Italy was on
the verge of its "economic miracle;" and as for concerns of political
reputation, the prospect of being entrusted with some of the most
advanced technology in the form of the ballistic missiles was very
appealing to the Italian government. In addition, the DC may still
have been trying to secure its hold on Italian politics by evoking the
powerful link to American patronage. This contrasted with the
continuing opposition of the Communists, who presented a bill
under Togliatti in the Chamber of Deputies in June 1958 attempting
to hold off the deployments.
47Ilari, p. 129.
48/ze Politics of Italian Foreign Policy , p. 130.
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The position of the armed forces is easier to comprehend. The
Navy and Air Force, which had greater contact with NATO than the
Army, accepted the nuclear missiles eagerly. Although Italy had
undergone a rearmament effort after the Korean War, it was still
one of NATO's weakest links. With the nuclear deployments the
services gained a new measure of respect, evidently self-inflated, at
modest financial and political cost.
This conferred a privileged status on us with respect
to the armed forces of other countries, and always in
later periods one looked back with regret upon this
historic moment, idealised as a time of creativity and
of international esteem of the armed forces.49
Unlike the deployment of cruise missiles 20 years later, the
nuclear program of the late 1950s provided the host countries with
some level of responsibility. Under the dual key agreement the
Italians purchased the missiles from the United States and their
cooperation would have been required in order for NATO to use
the nuclear warheads, which remained under American control.50
The text of the Italian-American agreement, however, was not
made public. In addition, when the Southern European Task Force
was installed on the plain of the Veneto with conventional and
nuclear units, its leadership was shared with Italy, after the
organisation of a special Italian brigade to host the Honest John
missiles.51
The integration of Italy into NATO had spawned a group
within the national service with a high degree of loyalty to the
ideals of the Alliance. The Italian Istituto Stato maggiori interforze
^Cerquetti, p. 164.
Paolo Miggiano, "La politica delta sicurezza italiana," Marco De Andreis
and Miggiano, eds., L'ltalia e la corsa al riarmo (Milan: Franco Angeli, 1987), p.
150.
5' Lucio Ceva, Leforze armate (Turin: UTET, 1981), p. 377.
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(Institute for Interforce Chiefs of Staff) was assigned the task after
the Second World War of training the professional forces up to the
level of chief of staff in Italy. But officials destined for the highest
levels of Atlantic service were instructed at Alliance institutions
such as the NATO Defence College.52 This institution, originally
opened in Paris in 1951 by Eisenhower, was transferred to Rome, "as
a reward for [Italy's] pro-American stance"53 after the withdrawal of
France from NATO command.
Italians had begun to travel to Alliance-sponsored exercises
and courses abroad and had contact with their counterparts in
Europe and America. In this context, Italy was seen as a component
of a larger supra-national organisation. Many Italian officers
developed a sense of mission for this wider organisation above
their allegiance to the national military, which had been left largely
untouched on its cumbersome pre-war foundations. The officials of
this "NATO caste" were
characterised by a strong and visceral anti-
Communism and by a limitless admiration for the
American system. Many of these men, mostly
young officials in the middle levels of the military
hierarchy, have followed specialised courses in the
United States, acquiring a good professional
education. There are no figures available on their
numbers, but they are undoubtedly the most
efficient group and the most responsible about their
role in the military apparatus...They have a right-
wing ideology that scorns the outdated nostalgia of
the Fascists...They are, in effect, supra-national
military men, in the sense that their ties to national
structures always pass through the filter of NATO to





The increasing responsibilities conferred upon Italy did not
inspire a commensurate growth in military competence. While
some Italian officers cultivated a great deal of loyalty to NATO,
there was evidently little in the way of original inputs in the early
years. Italy's record as a caretaker of the Jupiter missiles between
1957 and 1962 was characterized by an almost total lack of expertise
in the strategic uses of the force. General Nino Pasti, who held the
posts both of president of the Supreme Armed Forces Council in
Italy and the NATO Supeme Allied Vice-Commander for Nuclear
Affairs, termed the concentration of nuclear weapons in Italian
hands "dangerously stupid."55 In response the publication of an
Army study on Italian military planning in the late 1960s, Pasti
wrote:
Italy was and remains the only country of a certain
importance in Europe which, since it is free from
heavy nuclear burdens and from an excessive level
of pride, either with regard to its particular interests
or its organisations, could have, or rather should
have taken the initiative in guiding the political and
military discussions toward rational, effective and
conciliatory solutions. Instead, the reverse
happened. Once it lost its treasured source of esteem
and respect...Italy did not in the least participate in
the formulation of the new NATO doctrine
beginning in 1963. 56
The lack of independent development in the Italian armed
forces can perhaps be attributed to the fact that they "have always
been the faithful executors of the will of the national ruling class,
and thus of the governments which came out of it, whether they be
55 cited in Fabrizio De Benedetti et al., II Potere militare in Italia (Bari:
Laterza, 1971), p. 271.
56Cerquetti, pp- 242-243.
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reactionary, Fascist or formally democratic."57 In the postwar period
the centre of power in military matters was the remote NATO
leadership, in Washington, Paris and later Brussels. Italy's Centre
for Advanced Defence Studies (CASD) and journals such as Rivista
militare stuck close to the NATO line and did not stir public debate
on strategic issues.58 Some Italians cultivated a great deal of loyalty
to the Atlantic Alliance, but there was little "input" in these early
years at a national level. Wrote American historian Norman
Kogan in 1963:
Since World War II, American scholars have
become aware of the role of the military in foreign
policy, and this awareness has resulted in a spate of
research projects, institutes, and historical and
theoretical analyses. Such an awareness is
completely absent in Italy, for the role of the military
instead of expanding has drastically declined. In the
words of one commentator: "The political weight of
the army in our country is zero," and this judgment,
shared by diplomats, politicians and academicians
with whom I have talked is extended to the navy,
the air force, and the Combined General Staff.
Three-fourths of the military budget goes directly or
indirectly into wages, and the main function of the
armed forces seems to be to lower the
unemployment figures...The history of the Italian
armed forces in united Italy does not confer great
prestige upon career officers or make them
venerated or glorified by the people... In the early
years of Italian unity, the court was surrounded by a
military atmosphere, generals were a mainstay of the
court party, and the armed forces budget was high,
but now this is not so 59
57Massobrio, p. 136.
5®Cerquetti, p. 106.
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In a sense the Italians achieved the desire to gain a sort of
neutrality in military matters. As De Gasperi had wished, Italy
contributed little to the massive rearmament of the West, and did
little to fuel hostilities between the East and West blocs. But this
overall appearance bordering on pacifism was more akin to
"passive-ism" rather than a concerted effort to encourage anti-
military feeling. The Italians meanwhile had other "agendas" in the
field of foreign relations.
Italian Concepts of Foreign Affairs
Senior diplomat Pietro Quaroni expressed the resignation of
many Italians to their place in the postwar order:
The reality is that we, like all the other states of
Europe, have ceased to be independent... and we
are as free to move closer to Russia as Poland is
free to move closer to the United States.60
For the most part, however, Italian leaders felt the benefits to
Italy were worth the costs of subservience to the United States.
From the outset, Italian leaders stressed the importance of the non-
military aspects of the Alliance: political solidarity and above all
economic cooperation. Economic strength is a main component of
the Italian idea of security. Consequently the Italians constructed
their foreign relations with the aim of maximizing economic
maneuverability; their low diplomatic profile afforded them
opportunities that even brought them "closer to Russia" than most
other Western countries. This prevailing view among Italy's
leaders can be traced from De Gasperi's proposal before Parliament
over adherence to NATO, through every generation of postwar
leadership.
60Tarchiani, Died anni tra Roma e Washington, p. 53, cited in The Politics of
Italian Foreign Policy, p. 124.
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De Gasperi rejected the idea that NATO was
necessary to halt potential Soviet military
aggression. He publicly doubted that war was
likely or even conceivable in Western Europe. He
argued instead that Italy had to join NATO to
guarantee continued economic aid and to assure
the continued possibility for Italians to emigrate.
He assured Parliament that such participation
would be no hindrance to trading with the states
of the Soviet bloc and announced that he was
sending an economic mission to Moscow to
negotiate a new trade agreement.61
Italy's lack of interest in the military direction of the Alliance
was spurred also by a realisation that its role was destined to be a
secondary one. In the 1950s Italy was excluded from the Permanent
Group (earlier the Directive and Executive Group), composed of the
US, Britain and France. Its absence from the upper echelon of
Alliance leadership was a sore point throughout the postwar period,
confirmed again in 1989 when the Italian Chief of Defence Staff,
Admiral Mario Porta, was turned down for the chairmanship of a
top NATO military committee.62 As a result, Italian leaders have
always encouraged other aspects of the Atlantic union, a policy
which also corresponded more closely to Italy's plans for its own
national growth.
Economic Priorities
During a visit to the US in February 1956, President Gronchi
underscored Italy's main interest in reinforcing economic
cooperation within the Alliance. A few months earlier, Gaetano
61Norman Kogan, A Political History of Postwar Italy (London: Pall Mall,
1966), p. 55; see also Atti Parlamentari 1948-1949, Senato della Repubblica, 1
Legislatura, pp. 6534-6544.
62Financial Times, 24 April 1989.
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Martino had been appointed as one of the "three wise men" charged
with studying ways of strengthening the non-military aspects of
NATO. Foreign Minister Arnaldo Forlani reiterated Italy's
priorities in 1978 stating that "The most important aspect of our
foreign policy is its incorporation into the European Community,
which itself is largely economic; even military alliances, just to take
the example of NATO, retain their validity only if they succeed in
dealing with problems of economic cooperation."63 The tendency to
see the alliance in economic terms was widespread even within the
military itself; Army and Air Force officers discussing the military
position of Italy in 1976 spoke of the world as divided into "two
great economic blocs, capitalist and communist, [which] formed
powerful military alliances."64
And in the 1980s, when Italy began to exhibit a new military
potential and a willingness to engage its forces abroad, its point of
view was still unaltered. In February 1986, Andreotti, who was at
De Gasperi's side during the adherence to NATO in the 1940s, made
these remarks during a speech at a session of the North Atlantic
Council in Brussels.
We also have a new opportunity to show our
publics and the world at large that the Alliance is
not just an instrument, however necessary, of
military defence. In fact, too often public debate
has concentrated on this particular aspect which,
though constituting the indispensable bulwark of
our security, is only one facet of a complex
mechanism of deterrence; we can neither neglect
nor take for granted the Alliance's much more
essential political dimension. It is this that has
provided the most enduring benefits, in terms of
63Interview with Forlani in La Stampa, May 1978, cited in Spotts and
Wieser, p. 271.
64Per difendere chi, p. 71.
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continental stability and the social and economic
well-being of our peoples.65
This may well have been closer to the original spirit in which
the Alliance was fashioned, although the intentions of figures such
as George Kennan were overwhelmed by more conservative,
militarily-oriented leaders in setting patterns in the postwar West.66
This largely economic rather than ideological concept of
foreign relations led to an interesting evolution in Italy's external
affairs. Political leaders and diplomats sought to reinforce Italy's
solidarity with NATO and the West, and the US in particular. This
gave Italy the continued assurance of belonging to a federation that
largely guaranteed Italy's military and economic security. At the
same time, the unfaltering and often passive loyalty divested the
Italians of a responsible diplomatic role. Their low political profile
allowed them to experiment in independent trade relations which
became crucial for Italy's prosperity. Although the Italians often
aroused the suspicions of the Americans, particularly in business
dealings in Communist China or the Eastern bloc, for the most part
their independent relations went unhindered in the postwar period
and did not parallel the larger political trends.
The Italian Foreign Office, like all its counterparts,
is engaged in promoting business abroad,
maintaining a career corps of commercial
counselors to help in this, and cooperating with
various tourist bodies and trade-promotion
agencies from other ministries and private
organisations. Trade agreements negotiated with
foreign countries are handled in close association
65Giulio Andreotti, "The Alliance's Political Dimension: Time for a Renewed
Commitment," NATO Review, No. 2, April 1986, p. 1.
66see David P. Calleo, "Early American Views of NATO, Then and Now,"
Lawrence Freedman, ed., The Troubled Alliance (London: Heinemann, 1983), p. 9;
FRUS, Volume III, 1948 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), p.
849.
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with the representatives of other ministries and
the firms that will be affected. The extremes to
which the Italian Foreign Office will go to promote
business are somewhat unusual. When the leader
of a large firm makes a foreign business tour, the
ambassador himself acts as guide and host.67
Although the Foreign Ministry generally supports the
expansion of Italian trade ties and is generally staffed by some of
Italy's most capable civil servants, Italian business does not always
welcome public assistance, as historian Norman Kogan writes:
Italian industrialists want to do business without
interference from politicians or moralists, native
or foreign. They are set up to do it. The major
firms have special offices manned by executives
who carry on diplomatic and economic relations
not only with foreign firms but also with foreign
governments and their foreign and economic
ministries. They can work through their own
government ~ or around it if necessary. If
questions of "grand politics" make it inadvisable
for the Italian Government to accede to their
demands, they will simply bypass the Italian
Government, of which they have a low opinion.
They are ready to make deals and do not regard
resistance to the bitter end or the pursuit of
abstract ideals as the way to survival in the
national or international community.68
In the postwar period, this attitude was even extended to the
politically-charged area of arms sales, which Italy pursued for
commercial motives until the successes of its businessmen forced
new political roles upon the Italian government.
67Tfee Politics of Italian Foreign Policy, p. 93.
68The Politics of Italian Foreign Policy, p. 96.
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Italy's Importance for the NATO Alliance
Alliance Facilities in Italy
Until the 1970s, Italy lived under the paradox of being nearly
neutral in its strategic outlook at the same time that it became
highly militarised. Italy became the focus of NATO operations on
the Southern flank, and by the 1980s several major subdivisions of
the NATO alliance had headquarters in Italy, including the Allied
Forces Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH) at Naples (responsible for
the defence of Italy, Greece, Turkey and the sea lines of
communication in the Mediterranean and Black Seas), and Allied
Land Forces Southern Europe at Verona, and NAVSOUTH,
responsible for continuous surveillance to assure freedom of
navigation in the Mediterranean. The American Sixth Fleet also
uses Gaeta, near Naples, as its home base, and the commander in
chief of the U.S. Navy in Europe (CINCUSNAVEUR) transferred
from London to Naples in the mid-1980s, probably to counter
possible Russian aims in the Persian Gulf after the invasion of
Afghanistan.
From its bases in Italy, the United States is equipped to carry
out all its major tasks in the Mediterranean: naval warfare, nuclear
warfare, defence of the frontier with Yugoslavia, "rapid
reinforcement" of Turkey or the Middle East, intelligence gathering
and reconnaissance, and command, control and communications
(C3), as well as supervision of maritime traffic.69
A list compiled by SIPRI includes about 85 NATO
installations,70 but the Italian Parliament is not supplied with an
accurate estimate. The government also keeps the identities of
^^Simon Duke, unpublished paper prepared for SIPRI, p. 420.
70Duke, pp. 183-203.
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Italian officials assigned to NATO secret, as well as information
about which forces are assigned to national or NATO command.71
The naval and nuclear units are the most significant features
of American military activity in Italy. The Sixth Fleet alone is a
massive presence. The force comprises at minimum strength two
aircraft carrier battle groups with at least 150 aircraft, 14 warships, as
well as submarines, an amphibious unit, and other forces.72 Italy
also provides research facilities for submarine studies. The
Americans prize Sigonella, in Sicily, as a major base for intelligence-
gathering on Soviet naval operations and as a maintenance centre
for the U.S. Navy. Italy is the only country in the Mediterranean
which does not require regular re-negotiation of base rights.
The United States also has manned nuclear operations in Italy
for most of the postwar period. Of the major nuclear systems, the
Jupiters were dismantled in 1962 and the approximately 108 (plus
several spares) ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) installed
in the 1980s at Comiso, Sicily, were rendered obsolete by the December
1987 Intermediate Range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty. But the
presence of nuclear weaponry is still high in Italy. American
submarines have been equipped with nuclear missiles, p]-^ -jjg jg estimated
to maintain in the late 1980s 200 bombs for US fighter aircraft, 15
15mm nuclear artillery shells, 43 nuclear depth charges, and 50
warheads for anti-submarine missiles.73 American servicemen also
supervise aging nuclear munitions assigned to the Italian forces - 50
bombs for Italian aircraft, 100 LANCE warheads (assigned to the
Missile Battalion Volturno of the Italian 5th Army Corps), 70-96
NIKE-Hercules surface-to-air missile warheads (Air Force), 40
artillery shells (Army) and 20 depth bombs (Navy).74
71 Boldrini and D'Alessio, pp. 249-252.
72Duke, p. 422.
^estimate by IRDISP, Quello che gli russi gia sanno e gli italiani non devono
sapere (Rome: March 1984), cited in Duke, p. 424-425.
74Duke, p. 423-425.
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After the initial rearmament programs of the 1950s, Italy-
received no military assistance or special benefits from the NATO
basing agreements or from its close collaboration with the
Americans. Italy receives some income, however, in the form of
employment and business opportunities because of the presence of
the bases. In the 1980s the number of Italian nationals employed at
American bases amounts to about 2000.75 Average salaries of $17,857
annually bring American support to approximately $36 million.
The jobs of Italian citizens are guaranteed by their own government
if NATO terminates their employment.76 American military
personnel in Italy are estimated at 14,900 to 17,000, with perhaps
16,000 dependents. Americans consequently pay about $120 million
in off-base housing for the personnel.77 Contracts for services and
construction bring in perhaps $15 million per year to the Italian
economy.
The costs of hosting NATO are certainly high, however. The
American Navy is Responsible for reviving the Sicilian Mafia,
largely expunged by Mussolini, for assistance in Allied operations
and establishment of anti-Communist leadership at the local level.
The NATO bases themselves often have constituted an invasion to
local populations, despite the revenues accrued. Air traffic
regulations officially imposed by NATO interfere with the lucrative
tourist trade along the Adriatic near Rimini. At Livorno, two
kilometres of quays were given over to the United States, and the
port had to be enlarged to accommodate the increase in activity.
NATO regulations
prohibit among other things building walls,
constructing buildings, opening roads, planting trees,
7^Jennifer Sims, "Economic Costs and Benefits of American Military Bases
and Facilities in Italy," (Stockholm: SIPRI, March 1988) p. 7.
7^Sims, p. 6
77Sims,p. 6
77a see Romolo Menighetti, Storia dell'autonomia siciliana dal Fascismo alio Statuto
(Siracusa: Ediprint, 1987), pp. 43-46; Rodney Campbell, The Luciano Project: Secret WartimeCollaboration of the Mafia and the US Navy (NY: McGraw Hill, 1977), esp. pp. 169-189; DenisMack Smith, A History of Sicily (London: Chatto and Windus, 1968), pp. 526-527.
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installing and using electrical and telephone lines,
radio antennae, etc... Sardinia has been transformed
into a sort of aircraft carrier; thousands of hectars
have been confiscated from shepherds and other
farmers, local autonomy is continually repressed by
superior military reasoning, and while plans for
local revival founder, projects for rocket propulsion
and European nuclear and space research are going
ahead... The support ships of the Fulton class are
bona fide floating nuclear workshops...The holds of
these ships contain the Subroc and MK48 atomic
warheads, combustible materials of enriched
uranium, and nuclear and electronic parts of the
propulsion systems of the submarines being assisted.
These are extremely dangerous arms, not least for
the reprisals they can provoke.78
In addition, Italian sovereignty could be limited by the
American use of bases on its territory in time of emergency.
In times of tension, these bases are put in a state of
alert without warning the Italian government and
without any consultation with it. This has
happened in 1956, during the French and British
aggression in Egypt; in 1958, during the Lebanon
crisis, and on different occasions during the Arab-
Israeli war and the events in Czechoslovakia in
1968.79
The Italians have challenged this control, however, by denying
the Americans use of their bases during the Yom Kippur crisis and
contesting American intervention at Sigonella during the
apprehension of the terrorists in the Achille Lauro crisis in 1985.
As a result of the massive presence of NATO with its superior
technology and advanced strategic plans, Italy's own military
78Boldrini and D'Alessio, pp. 246-147.
^Boldrini and D'Alessio, p. 248.
44
concerns were eclipsed. In a 1969 study Air Force General Nino
Pasti underscored the total absence of a national defence policy.
No serious study has been undertaken, on a national
basis, to examine if our armed forces respond to real
Italian defence requirements...and we do not even
know what political premises should form the point
of departure for the formation of the armed forces.80
This shortcoming began to be felt acutely as for the first time
Italy began to face immediate threats to its security in the 1970s.
810Nino Pasti, "I problemi delle forze armate italiane," Belfagar, no. 5,
September 1969, cited in II potere militare in Italia, p. 271.
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CHAPTER TWO
The Emergence of the ItalianMilitary in the 1970s and 1980s
New Threats in the Mediterranean
In the early 1970s nearly every aspect of the Italian armed forces
was in crisis. Their organisation and decision-making structures
were outdated and ineffective, their equipment was obsolete, and
the top leadership was considered to be preoccupied with internal
political struggles. All of these conditions underwent dramatic
changes in the following decade. A major reform had been hinted
at since Giulio Andreotti during a term as Defence Minister
addressed some of the problems in the 1960s. By the 1970s, the
severity of Italy's defence limitations began to show itself: the
Mediterranean was becoming increasingly hazardous, at a time
when Italy had reached a stage of acute dependence on maintaining
good relations there for its economic survival. The spur for real
change in the armed forces came from the realisation that Italy
might need to call upon its defences and be able to depend upon
them.
The Italian military image was completely transformed as the
international focus of attention shifted gradually south. Italy was no
longer on the peripheral flank of an alliance; it was suddenly in the
middle of the most violent, economically vital and politically
changeable region in the world.
In the context of the decline of the bipolar system and
the growth of the phenomena of "the diffusion of
power," the Mediterranean "centrality" of Italy no
longer allows it to navigate on "automatic pilot"
with a low profile, as it has in preceding decades.
The risk of being subjected to growing threats and
violence from actors or quasi-actors aspiring to fill in
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the power vacuum left by Italy in the Mediterranean
basin is considerably elevated.1
The phenomenal growth of trade and interdependence
between the industrialised and developing worlds was unforeseen
in the early postwar period. The Western appetite for Middle
Eastern oil was matched by a heavy reliance of the developing
countries on European foodstuffs, services and manufactured goods.
In the early 1980s it was calculated that one billion tons of cargo pass
through Mediterranean ports, and at any given moment 1,500 ships
and 5,000 smaller craft sail the waters between the Suez and
Gibraltar. This is equivalent to about half of all ocean traffic
throughout all of the NATO's maritime zone.2
In the 1970s nearly every aspect of Italian society had become
dependent on materials that passed through the Mediterranean.
Italy uses the sea for 90% of its imports, and about 65% of its
exports.3 Italy also has the highest dependence of Western countries
on Middle Eastern energy sources; about 75% of its national
requirement is imported, almost two thirds of that through the
Mediterranean.
Just as the first phase of domestic terrorism was winding down,
the Italians faced an unanticipated rise in random aggression from
outside their territory, and often from groups they had considered to
be their allies. In September 1973 Libyan planes bombed an Italian
corvette as it supervised fishing activities in international waters.
The Italians were instrumental in the modernisation of the Libyan
Air Force in the same period. In the same year, Palestinian terrorists
unleashed two attacks on the airport at Fiumincino near Rome;
again, the Italians had been among the most sympathetic of the
^uigi Caligaris and Carlo Maria Santoro, Obiettivo difesa: strategia,
direzione politica, comando operativo (Bologna: Mulino, 1986), pp.40-41.
2William H. Rowden, "The Mediterranean: Environment of the Sixth Fleet,"
NATO and the Mediterranean, p. 20
3Maurizio Cremasco, "A guardia del made in Italy" Panorama, 4 October
1977, p. 78.
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Europeans to the Palestinian cause. In addition, there were
mounting fears about nuclear proliferation in the area; rumours of
an Israeli nuclear capability had sparked the race for a bomb in
the Arab world.
Italy's military options became even more confused when new
tensions in the area arose from hostilities between two members of
the NATO Alliance itself. In July 1974 Turkey invaded Cyprus,
opening a bitter conflict with Greece. The Alliance looked to Italy to
help maintain NATO operability in the Mediterranean, especially as
Greece called into question American base rights and the US had
suspended military aid to the Turks. The Italians tried to maintain
good relations with both of their neighbours in the Mediterranean,
and simultaneously answer the American request for the transfer of
naval facilities from Turkey to Italy.
Further, Italy's casual attitude toward the threat from the
Warsaw Pact was also undergoing changes. Until the late 1960s, the
focus of Italian defence was weighted overwhelmingly toward the
Gorizia Gap, a passage along Italy's Northeast border. This
concentration had been convenient in the 1950s when Italy
combatted a separatist movement within the German minority in
the South Tyrol. But although Hungary was only 300 km away, the
Northeast border was not considered a possible flashpoint in an
East-West conflict, since Italy was buffered by neutral Austria and
Yugoslavia.
Until the 1960s, Soviet involvement in Mediterranean affairs
was limited to military support of Egypt during the Suez crisis, and
demands that its neighbour Turkey dismantle the Jupiter missiles.
When Albania left the Soviet bloc in 1961 and closed the submarine
base at Valona there was, for a time, virtually no Soviet maritime
activity in Mediterranean waters.4
4Kaplan and Clawson, "NATO and the Mediterranean Powers in Historical
Perspective," NATO and the Mediterranean, p. 13.
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A decade later, however, the Soviet Union had more units in
the Mediterranean than all of the NATO forces there combined.
While the technological standard was lower than that of the
American Sixth Fleet, the Russians still posed a potential threat to
the trade routes that brought vital materials to the West. The
Soviets also cultivated allies in Iraq and East Africa and were granted
base rights.5 By the 1980s the Soviet 5th Eskadra used ports in the
Gulf of Hammamet (near Tunisia), the Gulf of Solium (near Libya),
and near Cape Passero off Sicily.6
The Soviets were often as impotent as any other country
attempting to win political influence in the area, but they could be
expected to come to the defence of their interests, which reached an
increasingly high level of concentration in the Mediterranean. In
the 1980s, 60% of the exports of the USSR and half of its imports
pass through the Bosphorus.
As Italy found itself unprepared, technically and strategically, to
carry out any military operations, Alliance support in the area also
had dipped to a new low. France withdrew from NATO operational
command in 1966; in 1972 the United Kingdom abandoned its role
as a Western "caretaker" in the Mediterranean and removed all of
its permanent Royal Navy units from the area. The Americans
called for increased military spending by other NATO allies while
reducing their own commitment to Europe following the major
setbacks of Vietnam and economic crisis in the United States. Sixth
Fleet operations shifted focus in part toward the Indian Ocean. In
the meantime Syria, Egypt, Israel, Libya, and other nations were
engaged in an intensive rearmament program. Increasingly, Italy
found its 8,000 miles of exposed coastline more worrisome.
5Istituto Affari Internazionali, L'ltalia nella Politico, lnternazionale 1974-
1975 (Ediziorii di Comunita), pp.371-2.
6Sims p. 21.
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Reform and Rearmament of the Armed Forces in the 1970s
These solicitations for a larger defence role of the
Europan allies, among them Italy, against external
threats, coincided with new tendencies emerging
within the Italian military. At the beginning of the
1970s, a new group of high officials reached the top
leadership. They shared a renunciation of the role of
internal "super-police" and the desire for a more
legitimate role in the country, of a more military
nature, typical of the forces of other industrialised
countries. The restructuring of the military
establishment along the lines of these new objectives
was accompanied by the progressive distancing of
neo-Fascist groups, and a more respectful rapport
with the Parliament, as well as a drive to overcome
its separation from civil society. And in the sphere of
industry, with which the military are in direct
contact for the development and production of
armaments...is emerging the "defence firm which
produces the national asset of security." To carry out
a credible military role the new "technocrat" officers
are proposing modifications of the military
establishment, of the operative doctrines, and the
acquisition of new arms systems.7
The reassessment of the Italian military establishment took the
form of two programs, one to streamline forces and decision¬
making, and a major re-equipment campaign for all three branches
of the armed forces.
Structural Changes
Immediately following the Second World War, reforms in Italy
had made greater progress toward unifying the command structure
than in many other countries, including the United States. Besides
bringing together the various war ministries into one Defence
7 "La politica della sicurezza italiana,", pp. 121-122.
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Ministry at the political level, the Italians also instituted a single
Chief of Staff, with real authority over the chiefs of each of the
forces, as General Luigi Caligaris points out, "a situation not brought
into effect in the American armed forces, and instituted by the
major European countries after a long delay."8
The reforms of 1964, in the midst of the alleged plots, had far-
reaching ambitions. The law of 9 October 1964 called for the
elimination of duplications and a new structure capable of effecting
the transition from peacetime to a state of war. The Capo di Stato
Maggiore (Chief of Staff) was given renewed authority over the
individual Chiefs, as the "high technical and military counsellor to
the [defence] minister." This status was later annulled in effect by
the creation of the Comitato dei Capi di Stato Maggiore in 1968.
Through this organ of collegial decision-making, the forces retained
control over their own areas of authority and resisted the unifying
role of the Capo, who was reduced to a "spokesman, arbiter and
notary among the contrasting parties...The subtle reform was the
product not so much of in-depth examination as of the personal
rivalries among the top leaders, exercised almost to the limits of
insubordination."9
All attempts to bring about changes in the military
establishment were marred by intense inter-service rivalry at every
level. Another campaign to reform the structure of the military in
1975 met with obstacles because of the
absence of a common strategic plan to refer to, which
was impossible because of the inability of the parties
to argue their point, and the inability to decrease the
military leadership, divided and at odds with one
another, in the face of the political authorities, which
were also divided among themselves. The political
authorities also had little desire to carry the
unpleasant political burden of bringing into effect the
8Obiettivo difesa, p. 286.
9Obiettivo difesa, p. 287.
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most unpopular but most essential part of the
reform, that is the elimination of non-functioning or
uneconomical structures, most of them civilian.'0
In the early 1970s, after the armed forces returned to the public
eye through the revelations of subversive activities, defence leaders
first attempted to bring the practices of the armed forces more in line
with social reforms which had swept Italy in the late 1960s. This was
reflected in the revision of the disciplinary code in 197511 and the
first recognition of conscientious objectors.
Attempts to take changes too far met with resistance from
Christian Democrat Minister of Defence Arnaldo Forlani.
In one of his speeches to the Senate Defence
Commission (15 October 1975), Forlani maintained
that, although the time had come to relate the
military experience to the social realities of the
country, it was likewise necessary to "neutralise
every attempt to politicise in an inappropriate
manner the armed forces." Further, he declared
himself opposed to the institution of military
unions, and had very harsh words for the
"widespread and demogogic anti-military
propaganda." As one can see, these were statements
that would appear almost incomprehensible in
Northern European countries.1 2
Manpower Levels and Other Aspects of Personnel
The initial reforms which had responded to the changing social
climate within Italy were followed by structural changes in response
to Italy's external threats. The Italians began a program to bring
about the "qualitative renewal of the military, to confer upon it a
T-°Obiettivo difesa, p. 288.
nIAl 1975-1976 , p. 443
12 A11975-1976, p. 444.
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higher level of efficiency in terms of personnel and equipment,"
according to the Green Paper published by the Army.13 A small but
efficient military force had been an aim since the time of Italian
integration into NATO,14 given Italy's resources, and even as the
country became wealthier, its leaders hoped to cut back personnel
costs to compensate for new allotments for equipment.
In fact, both expenditures rose in the 1970s. Military employees
increased by 10,829 and civil employees of the military services by
4,948, by one calculation.15 The failure of the reforms was obscured
in part by a return to practices of secrecy regarding official figures;
halfway through the first period of the programs, Defence Minister
Lelio Lagorio became reluctant to release information about
manpower levels in Italy.
Besides the problems of cutting jobs in the bureaucratic and
lower levels of the military, the establishment still suffered from a
"reverse pyramid structure," in which the levels of men in the
highest ranks of the Air Force, for example, included 20 generals, 103
colonels, 49 lieutenant colonels, and 2,505 first class marshalls
beyond the limits set by law.16 Most of these could be assumed to be
against sacrificing their posts for the sake of streamlining the
establishment. The Army Chief of Staff General Luigi Poli finally
announced in September 1985 the reduction of his forces by 25,000
over a seven-year period, to bring the Army to about 350,000
(mostly conscripts); minors cuts were also announced for the Navy
and Air Force, but none for the 90,000 carabinieri.17
Some other changes were introduced more smoothly. Military
service in the army was reduced to twelve months in 1976 as in the
Air Force, and the Navy's term of service was reduced from
13cited inA7 1975-1976 , p. 436.
14FRUS, Volume III, 1948 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1974), p 794.
15Roberto Cicciomessere, L'ltalia armata (Milan: Gammalibri, 1982), p. 65.
16L'ltalia armata, pp. 65-66.
17Jane's Defence Weekly, 28 September 1985, p. 678.
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eighteen to twelve months several years later. The Army also
underwent far-reaching adjustments. The level of division in its
traditional sense was eliminated and the Army was based on the
brigade, reduced from 36 to 24 in number, with greater autonomy
between them. The subdivision into nine mechanised, five
armoured, four alpini, one airborne and four motorised brigades
transformed the army from a primarily infantry-based force.18 The
reforms aimed at enhanced preparedness and flexibility by
abolishing distinctions between the Northern units of the Esercito di
campagna and the other territorial defence brigades.19
In the early 1980s 18 brigades were stationed in the North,
leaving only six brigades to cover the remaining two-thirds of
Italian territory. To address this imbalance, three batteries of an
artillery regiment were moved from Bologna in 1986 to reinforce
the Sicilian bases of Comiso and Sigonella against air attack.20
However, anti-tank and anti-aircraft capabilities in general were
considered out-of-date throughout most of the 1980s.21 In addition,
20,000 draftees were expected to be waived from military service in
1989 in an attempt to reduce the bloated Army.22
In this period noted military figures took seats in Parliament
as Communist, Socialist and Republican deputies, including Pasti
and Accame. Both of these men later moved to more radical parties
of the parliamentary left and became harsh critics of the armed
forces. But there was also an apparent decline in the anti-militarist
stance of the Communist and Socialist parties. PCI interest in the
armed forces was expressed at a conference on "Military Institutions
and the Constitutional Order" in February 1974. Participants made
recommendations for further structural improvements and
advances in the disciplinary code, and called for better access to the
18Jane's Defence Review, Vol. 2 No. 4, 1984, p. 336.
19L47 1975-1976, p. 436.
20Jane's Defence Weekly, 1 February 1986, p. 143.
21Jane's Defence Review, Vol. 2 No. 4, 1984, p. 337.
22-Corriere della sera, 17 October 1988.
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military establishment for members of Parliament and other
outsiders. The PSI also sponsored a conference in December 1975,
entitled "The Renewal of the Armed Forces with the Renewal of the
State and the Country." Deputy Guadalupi went as far as to
hypothesise on the importance that the military sector could have
for economic progress in Italy. Guadalupi called on the support of
the national trade unions in launching "a new policy, with the
prospect of strengthening, rather than weakening the logistic
apparatus and the support of the defence industry."23
The Promotional Laws and the Re-Equipment Programs
The power of the military sector both to demand and to
generate economic resources came into full force in Italy in the mid-
1970s. Defence officials attempted to redress equipment inadequacies
through a greatly increased share of the national budget, and the
defence industry emerged as a lucrative exporting sector and as an
active extension of the armed forces. In the 1970s the defence budget
accounted for about 5% of state spending, and 2% of GNP.24 This
placed Italy on average eleventh among the other countries in
NATO at that time, despite the fact that it had nearly doubled earlier
expenditures for defence.
In the early part of the decade the armed forces emerged on the
political scene with appeals for extra-budgetary outlays from
Parliament. Low defence spending was cited as a main reason for
Italy's strategic vulnerability. Explained an armed forces
publication, "a continual decay of the operative efficiency of the
military is occurring, which we cannot confront with the resources
provided through the normal budget."25
23cited in IAI1975-1976, p. 446.
24Bruce George and Ian Lindsay, "Italy: Bulwark of NATO's Southern Flank,"
Jane's Defence Weekly, 13 July 1985, p. 82.
25cited inL47 1975-1976, pp. 433-434.
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Naturally, the poor efficiency of the military
machine in Italy as an instrument of external
defence, a fact admitted even at official levels, is
certainly not attributable solely to rising costs and
limited budgets. This is due in part to "historical"
reasons still in force (one of the main functions of
the army has always been that of assuring full control
over the internal situation), in part to less
intentional reasons such as a mediocre and plethoric
organisation, antiquated concepts of security, etc. It is
true however that expenditures for defence, in
relation to the dimensions of the Italian armed forces
and the standards of other European states, appear
low. Great Britain, for example, has about 350,000
men at arms, like Italy, and spends more than
double.26
The Navy Law
The three separate acts of legislation, for the Navy in 1975 and
for the Army and Air Force in 1977, reflected the continuing
fragmentation of the forces. Demands for special funds for
rearmament first came from the Navy, which as the force directly
responsible for safeguarding Italy from Mediterranean threats, felt
the urgency of adapting Italy's defence to rising tensions from the
south. Further, the reduction in operations of the Sixth Fleet also
favoured the Navy request for special funding.
The Italian Navy also desired the means to allow it greater
freedom of action, as it became clear that there were situations in the
Mediterranean where Italy's interests might not coincide with those
of the Alliance. By denying the use of its bases by the Americans
during the Yom Kippur war, for instance, Italy had staved off an
OPEC embargo. But for any more active statements of its position,
Italy had little in the way of military force to fall back on.
The naval laws were approved by all of the parties except for
the PCI. The Communists based their dissent, however, not on the
26IAI1975-1976, p 434.
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attempt to modernise the armed forces, but on the absence of a
coherent report on the proposed use of the extraordinary funding,
and the "urgent need to insert the construction programs of the
armed forces into a national program based on interforce needs."27
The Communists did not follow up on their initial opposition to
the laws, and in general were thought to be increasingly receptive
toward the re-equipment of the armed forces.
This is no immaterial change of position. Mostly for
economic reasons the parliamentary left seems
practically to have abandoned its traditional position
of opposing any expansion of the military industry.
Ten-year laws could be a suitable way of effectively
sustaining the industrial side of the sector.28
Initially there were 13 naval projects, with budget requests
totalling 223 billion lire. This figure increased over the next two
years to about 1,000 billion, as the parliamentary committee assigned
to the proposal had been convinced to more than double the
number of contracts.29 The Navy program was designed to meet a
requirement which was set at 105,000 tonnes, with no other
stipulations of technical capability or strategic uses.30 In the 1960s,
tonnage had decreased by 45,000, as 52 ships were deleted and only
nine new ones ordered.31
The main programs included two guided missile destroyers of
the Super Audace class, eight Maestrale-class frigates, two Sauro-
class submarines, four hydrofoils of the Sparviero class, ten
minehunters and an 18,000-tonne amphibious ship.32 Already in
service were four Lupo-class frigates, two Sauro submarines, and
27cited in IAI1974-1975, p. 375.
28IAI1974-1975 pp 375-376.
29IA1 1976-1977, p. 411.
30Marco De Andreis, Le armi delta Repubblica (Milan: Gammalibri, 1983), p.
81.
31Jane's Defence Review, Vol. 2 No. 4, 1984, p. 337.
82Jane's Defence Review, Vol. 2 No. 4, 1984, p. 337-340.
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three Sparviero hydrofoils. A total of about 50 helicopters was also
ordered, of the AB-212 and SH-3D models. The major project
centred on the construction of the Garibaldi cruiser.
Designed as an air-craft carrier, the vessel was nonetheless
prevented from taking that name until the law no. 695 of 28 March
1923, in which Mussolini made fixed-wing aviation the sole
preserve of the air force, could be repealed in Parliament. A bill to
repeal the law was introduced in 1987 and received the approval of
the critical Senate Defence Commission before being eclipsed by
other political issues before the Parliament. The bill is expected to
pass when it returns to the floor. The Air Force sought to maintain
sole control over Italy's limited resources for aircraft procurement
for more than sixty years, but they will have no role in Garibaldi's
air operations, under the Navy's plan to purchase the planes with
their own funds and train their own pilots in Great Britain or the
United States.33 Until Mediterranean operations expanded, the
Navy itself had not pushed for a reform of the law, because of fears
that a fixed-wing capability would drain funds.34
The Garibaldi was designed to accommodate up to 16
helicopters or up to 12 STOVL aircraft. The construction of ships for
air support was long discouraged in Italy, even by Mussolini, who
considered Italy itself an aircraft carrier. The Doria and Veneto
cruisers had abilities as helicopter carriers, but closer to the time of
the launch of the Garibaldi in the mid-1980s, Italian admirals
looked for greater tactical support. Admiral Vittorio Marulli
remarked: "the
concrete contribution which even a limited seaborne
air component can give to the total capability of a
naval formation in terms of air defence, ship attack
and tactical air support is highly cost effective. The
Falklands experience teaches us this.35
33La Repubblica, 2 October 1987.
34Jane's Defence Weekly, 18 May 1985.
35"Stretching Italy's Capability," interview with Admiral Vittorio Marulli
Defence Attache , No. 2, 1984, p. 29
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The Navy intends to purchase Harrier or AV-8B aircraft for use
on the ship, which was launched on 4 June 1983 at Italcantieri's
Monfalcone yard. The emergence of the Garibaldi changed the
Italian Navy from an out-dated force largely subordinated to the
Sixth Fleet, to a force with considerable offensive capability.
Naval task groups will be able to go farther and stay
longer at sea. The commissioning of Garibaldi will
affect the navy's overall operational attitude as the 16
SH-3Ds she can carry will enable the conduct of large,
continuous and long-range anti-submarine
operations, thus greatly improving the Fleet's anti¬
submarine capability. Garibaldi will also be able to
participate in amphibious operations, both as a flag¬
ship because of her very advanced system, and as
an assault ship because of her helicopters and the
possibility of accommodating a contingent of marine
troops. Her through-deck and built-in ski jump also
make the Garibaldi an excellent platform for V/STOL
aircraft.36
The initial estimates, even after annual revisions, were still far
short of what was eventually spent in extraordinary funding for the
Navy. By one estimate, attained by adding disparate Defence
Ministry figures published from year to year, outlays reached 4,452
billion lire. In addition, another 2,400 billion in 1983 prices were
earmarked for completion of the program.37 The Navy also
increased its acquisitions through the normal annual procurement
budget. Between 1976 and 1983 1,300 billion worth of equipment
was acquired through these channels.38
36Jane's Defence Review, Vol. 2 No. 4, 1984, p. 340. For outline of the initial
program, see IA11976-1977, pp. 411-412.
37Le armi della Repubblica , p. 87.
38Le armi della Repubblica, p. 88.
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Army Programs
The Army re-equipment program attempted to redress the
Italian deficiency in anti-tank and anti-aircraft capabilities. Leopard
tanks and armoured recovery vehicles were ordered to complement
some already in use. Other orders included approximately 9,000
FIAT lorries of different types, 30 radars for battlefield surveillance,
40 anti-aircraft Sistel MEI-80 missile systems, 250 artti -aircraft self-
propelled 25mm guns, 500 anti-aircraft Stinger missiles and other
miscellaneous systems. The main remedy for the anti-tank
weakness was the Breda Folgore rocket launcher and the MILAN
medium-range missile. About 20,000 of the latter were expected to
be procured, the majority produced at a new OTO-Melara and Breda
factory. In addition, the Italian army sponsored three new national
armoured fighting vehicle programs, the C-l, the VCC-80 and the B-
1 Ariete.39 Improved TOW anti-tank missiles were to be delivered
by Hughes Aircraft between April 1988 and April 1989 at a cost of $84
million;40 Saab Scania received an order from Italy in 1987 for
aiming devices for helicopter-mounted anti-tank missiles worth
$23.2 million. The acquisition of the Italian A-129 Mangusta or
Mongoose, the first specialised anti-tank helicopter in service in
Western Europe, was also planned for the late 1980s.
The Army also launched a number of research and
development programs with the new funding, notably the $1 billion
CATRIN integrated field communications system, which drew on
collaboration from Aeritalia, Agusta Sistemi, Italtel, Marconi
Italiana, Selenia, and Telettra.41
The Air Force Law
The Air Force program was heavily weighted toward the
acquisition of a single system: the MRCA Tornado aircraft, produced
39International Defense Review, July 1987, p. 857.
40Jane's Defence Weekly, 15 August 1987, p. 263.
44International Defense Review, February 1987, p. 205.
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by the Panavia consortium which brought Italy into cooperation
with Great Britain and West Germany. The Tornado swallowed
about two thirds of the total budget of about 7,400 billion lire, and its
costs continued to rise. The price of a single unit was about 585
billion lire in 1983 prices. The Air Force subsequently judged the
MRCA aircraft inadequate as Italy's missions evolved, and with the
delay in production, even its intended functions were soon
surpassed by new technology. The other main programs were the
MB-339 trainer aircraft (100 were ordered to replace the MB326s) and
the Selenia Spada missile system, which included 20 batteries and
1,000 missiles. Before the initial programs were complete, the Air
Force also commissioned the AMX tactical support fighter to replace
the aging G-91 and some of the country's F-104s. Up to the time of
the completion of the legge aeronautica commissions, the Air Force
relied on many planes which had been in service for more than 20
years. Anti-aircraft defence consisted only of feeble, obsolete
systems. The Air Force also suffered a manpower shortage into the
1980s. Over the 1970s the number of pilots decreased from 2,600 to
1,500 and only 37 of a proposed 50 squadrons were operational.42
Effects of the Leggi Promozionali
Although the leggi and the restructuring of the forces on the
lines of other NATO defence establishments brought the armed
forces a new measure of respectability, the heavy expenditures soon
raised public alarm. The unbridled spending of the armed forces
was in part covered by the perennial resort to military secrecy in
Italy.
The parliamentary defence commissions have never
had the ability to carry out investigations of military
contracts, in spite of the recurrent scandals...To fully
understand the reasons for the choice of certain arms
42Jane's Defence Review, Vol. 2 No. 4, 1984, p. 341.
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systems, the Parliament should be able to have data
bases at its disposition and other information for
making judgments, which on the contrary are
systematically denied it.43
Overruns in budget outlays for all of the rearmament programs
met with protest, especially from parties such as the Radicals who
undertook major research programs trying to chart the effects of the
rearmament. All of the leggi suffered sky-high cost overruns, and
more than doubled the expected time of completion in most cases.
Defence officials attributed the phenomenal rise in outlays to
inflation, but the 103% rise for the air force, 88% for the Army, and
54% for the Navy went far beyond national inflation figures.44
By 1983, for instance, the financing of the Army legge
promozionale reached 5,067 billion lire.45 A further 3,635 at current
prices was estimated to be required to complete the programs up to
1990. The Army also has consistently spent more for procurement
within the ordinary budget than through the legge,46 probably by
disguising acquisitions in various sections of the overall budget.
In its approach to procurement, however, the Italian military
was simply conforming to practices endemic within NATO, and
indeed most countries concentrating resources in national security.
General Luigi Caligaris pointed out the chronic problem plaguing
NATO defences at the time of the 40th anniversary of the alliance:
Money is too often called into play to compensate for
the inadequacies of the strategic structure. Financial
inputs get more attention than military outputs.
Duplication of efforts and the related waste of
resources are frequent, while a specialisation of roles,
45Boldrini and D'Alessio, p. 234.
44L'ltalia armata. p. 227.
45Le armi della Repubblica, p. 91.
46Le armi della Repubblica, p. 93.
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missions and forces would improve the cost-benefit
ratio. 41
All of the forces experienced a mass infusion of new
equipment, but the leggi only fulfilled the intended objectives in a
limited sense. The equipment programs did not spark the intended
economic renewal in the Italian South, with the rewards still
concentrated along Italy's prosperous Northern industrial belt. In
addition, the armed forces continued to turn to foreign suppliers for
many types of equipment. The equipment campaigns suffered such
long delays that in some cases the weaponry was considered obsolete
when it was finally delivered.
More major procurement plans were announced in 1981 and
again in February 1988. The latter program involved a request of 30
thousand billion lire over ten years by the Ministry of Defence to the
Italian Parliament, ostensibly to keep up Italy's responsibilities in
the wake of the nuclear disarmament accords. Ministry officials
claimed that greater attention was to be focussed on an integrated
defence plan, but the procurement appeared to be outlined again on
the needs of the separate forces. The Italian Air Force requested
funds for the massive AMX program to replace the G91, as well as
for four tankers, Skyguard/Aspide missiles, and 1008 billion lire for
additional Tornados. The Army's main acquisitions were to be
armoured tracked vehicles and a new main battle tank, while the
Navy asked for 132 billion lire for the purchase of V/STOL aircraft
for the Garibaldi, 662 billion for two Animoso class destroyers, 382
billion for Minerva class corvettes, as well as funds for the EH101
anti-submarine helicopter.48 Research and development for the
European Fighter Aircraft (EFA), the European helicopter NH-90,
4^Luigi Caligaris, "Gauging NATO's Achievements" Jane's Defence Weekly,
8 April 1989, p. 601.
48"AZ/e armi trentamila miliardi," Corriere della sera, 24 February 1988 and
Jane's Defence Weekly, 22 April 1989, p. 680.
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new missile and radar systems was also to be included in the
"extraordinary funding."
A positive outcome of the increased visibility of the military as
a pressure group in Parliament was perceived to be a rise in the
legitimacy of the Italian defence establishment, and a broadened
consensus about the need to support it. This was reinforced by the
vividness of Italy's security issues, as violence in the Mediterranean
appeared unlikely to taper off. The laws also resulted in the creation
of a major showpiece for the Italians, the Garibaldi aircraft carrier,
which became a symbol of the revival of the Italian presence in the
Mediterreanean in a new form.
The Italian Military Abroad
Even before the first phase of Italian rearmament was
completed, the Italians sent troops into combat for the first time
since World War II. One of the first cases of Italian military
projection abroad was a humanitarian mission, the dispatch of the
cruisers Andrea Doria and Vittorio Veneto and the support ship
Stromboli to assist in the rescue of Vietnamese boat people in 1979.
The Italians also sent a helicopter unit to reinforce the United
Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) beginning in 1978 to
buffer Israeli and Lebanese troops.49
Missions of a more distinctly military flavour followed later in
the 1980s. The Italians sent a contingent as part of the Multinational
Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai, to oversee the fulfillment
of the Camp David accord between Egypt and Israel and to assure
safe passage through the Straits of Tiran. Italian forces participated
with troops from Australia, Colombia, Fiji, France, New Zealand,
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the US and Uruguay. While
the military role of the troops was modest, the mission represented
a political gesture, as only those nations in favour of an Arab-Israeli
49Italian Ministry of Defence, White Paper 1985, Appendix 12, p. 162.
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rapprochement participated, and not, as in other situations, the
entire United Nations. The main MFO bureau is at the American
Embassy in Rome, and three Italian Navy officers are among the
commander's staff. The first director-general, American diplomat
Leamon R. Hunt, was assassinated in Rome in 1985.50
The dispatch of Italian troops to Lebanon in 1982 represented a
much greater commitment, both in political and military terms.
The Italian government had supported indirectly an earlier
intervention in Lebanon, when Anglo-American forces used an air
base at Capodichino near Naples as a stopover point in July 1958.
Britain and the US intervened in defence of the Lebanese
government in power, in order to prevent a Communist takeover.
Although Italian troops were not involved, the mission was
denounced by the PCI and PSI, who opposed the
classic example of economic imperialism of English
and American oil companies...[and] intervention in
the internal affairs of a foreign country. The
Socialists had opposed Soviet intervention in
Hungary, and now opposed American intervention
in Lebanon.51
By the 1980s there was a much wider consensus about Italy's
ability to project its force, especially in terms of missions perceived
to have primarily humanitarian aims. In June 1982 Israel invaded
Lebanon, and although the subsequent withdrawal was peaceful,
international observers were called in to oversee the departure of
PLO troops. Since UN support was divided, the operation was taken
on as a special mission of United States envoy Philip Habib. Italian
operation
involvement in theAwas secured through a bilateral agreement
solicited by the Lebanese government. The initial mission, Italcon 1,
ended in September 1982, but after a few weeks the massacres at the
50White Paper 1985, Appendix 12, p. 170.
51A Political History of Postwar Italy, p. 129.
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Sabra and Chatila refugee camps prompted the return of the French,
British, American and Italian forces, this time united as the
Multinational Force (MNF).
The Italians sent 1,100 men initially, and supervised a 25
square-mile area including several of the refugee camps which had
undergone the recent attacks. Italy constructed a hospital for
Palestinian refugees, and increased its contingent, officially known
as Italcon 2, to 2200 soldiers by November.
The military record of the Italians in Lebanon was characterised
by a distinct "self-limitation in the use of force."52 By contrast,
American and French forces responded by opening fire after the
shelling against their units. Two suicide attacks in October 1983
resulted in hundreds of deaths of US and French forces, seriously
weakening the Western commitment to the mission. The Italians
were the last to leave after this first intervention in Lebanon, and
their forces returned to Italy in February 1984 with the loss of one
casualty.
It was not merely a case of protecting the Palestinian
camps, but also of reinforcing the authority of the
Lebanese government. By the agreement between
the Italians and the British, it was assumed that
Italcon 2 could be involved in combat not only for
self defence, but also in any way that was "required to
carry out its assignment in support of the armed
forces of the Lebanese government." The
composition of the contingent and the armaments
changed as well. To the draftee bersaglieri were
added largely professional paratroopers of the
Folgore brigade, and marines of the battalion San
Marco (incidentally the same units that were to form
the civil protection force). Italcon 2 was equipped
with medium level and heavy fire support (the latter
on ships anchored in the port of Beirut). Because of
the potential contradictory nature of its objectives
(protecting the Palestinian camps and at the same
52 "La politica di sicurezza italiana," p. 143.
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time supporting the Lebanese government is
difficult, if the Lebanese government is itself aiming
to chase the Palestinians out of the camps) and the
armaments assigned to it, the Italcon2 mission rests
on the line between peace-keeping and peace-
enforcing.53
The latter function involves a will to resort to force to come to
the aid of an ally, and not merely acting as a passive buffer. Italy had
the capacity to arm itself on level of sophistication equivalent to
most other European countries, but preferred to exercise restraint,
and 2,200 men and 500 vehicles in Lebanon served largely as a
deterrent presence. The experience had a number of repercussions
at home.
The first was the legitimation of the armed forces as
an efficient and important element in Italian society.
The Lebanese mission uplifted the pride of the
armed forces, gave them new motivation and
provided them with an opportunity to demonstrate
their professionalism in the face of the scepticism
and indifference of a considerable part of the public.
It gave them a chance to show the politicians the
importance of having ready and efficient armed
forces as an instrument of foreign policy and as a
means of projecting Italy's image abroad.
Furthermore, by confirming that there were
numerous occasions for the use of military force for
"peaceful" purposes in the Mediterranean, the
mission gave the military reason to demand greater
attention from political parties for its needs. If the
government wanted to implement a more high-
profile Mediterranean policy, it had to understand
the military implications and, consequently, the need
for allocation of enough funds to allow the armed
53"La politica di sicurezza italiana," p. 138.
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forces to increase their capability and operational
readiness.54
On the operational level, evaluation of the experience in
Lebanon brought to light deficiencies in air cover during evacuation
of Italian forces, before the introduction of the Garibaldi, as well as a
number of logistical weaknesses. In the analysis of General
Caligaris,
The operations were not the product of planning and
preparation by unified and competent leaders with
foresight, and of a globally capable military, but
rather of the efforts of a few people, who with ability
and dedication be it in the military units or in Rome,
carried the day.55
In 1982 the Italians carried out a unilateral mission, largely
overshadowed by the experience in Lebanon, in which the Audace,
the frigate Orsa and the support vessel Vesuvio were dispatched to
Somalia. While the experience in Lebanon was seen as act of
international cooperation, the brief Italian mission during the
conflict in the Horn of Africa appeared to be a gesture inspired by
politica velleitaria or "political whim," coinciding with a period of
greater independence from the Americans. Explained Defence
Minister Lagorio,
In recent times Italy has considered that it would be
in its interest and its responsibility to intervene in
the Horn of Africa for a better balance of the parties
in conflict. The Alliance does not completely cover
and cannot completely cover Italian interests. Our
country, as every other free ar^sovereign country,
pursues in fact its own policies^ »f they coincide in
large measure with those of the Atlantic Alliance,
54Maurizio Cremasco, "Italy: A New Role in the Mediterranean?" in John
Chipman ed., NATO's Southern Allies: Internal and External Challenges (London
and New York: Routledge, 1988), p. 222.
550biettivo difesa, p. 292.
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they do not necess
action and above c A"
^match it in every real
autonomous and
independent with respect to all of the territories not
covered in the North Atlantic Treaty.56
Lagorio's assertion was more striking for the innovation in
Italian rhetoric, but Italy did not subsequently carry out unilateral
policies to the extent that he suggested. Another departure in
Italian policy, however, was the rapprochement with Malta. In 1980
Italy signed an accord to guarantee Malta's neutrality, in the sense
that Italy committed itself to use "any measure, not excluding
military assistance,"57 which would be judged necessary to confront
threats to the island. After strained relations with Western
countries and other allies, Malta had expelled all foreign bases as of
March 1979. After Malta unilaterally suspended the accord with
Italy in 1984, Bettino Craxi revived the friendship through a £92
million aid package in November 1986. Italy went to great lengths
to maintain good relations with this country which had welcomed
Soviet ships and North Korean military officers on their way to
Libyan training courses.
To emphasise the Italian willingness to cooperate on a military
plane, Defence Minister Spadolini and 58 officials and technicians
met with the Maltese in late August 1984 to discuss civil and
military defence programs.58 The neutrality agreement was
reinstated in November 1986; by that time economic ties were
thickening considerably. Malta launched measures to become an
off-shore financial centre. Wrote a financial columnist in Rome in
March 1988:
The project was launched with the creation of a
shares market open initially solely to Maltese firms
and later to receive an influx of capital from every
part of the world...Malta would present itself as a
56cited in "La politica di sicurezza italiana," p. 139.
57Accordo di Neutralita Malta-Italia, Ministero Affari Esteri, 15 September
1980, p. 30.
58IAI '84-'85, p. 487.
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crossroads between European companies and the
capital of the Arab world which currently are
weighted in other financial centres...Ultimately the
Maltese intend to request the entrance of their island
into the EEC: economic and financial stability would
finally be unified with political stability.59
Italy as "Bulwark of NATO's Southern Flank"?
Testing New Roles in the 1980s
Much of the new maturity in military thinking was reflected in
the publication of a comprehensive White Paper in 1985 under
Defence Minister Spadolini. The document was only the second of
its kind in the postwar period and was much more comprehensive
than the 1977 White Paper. The Defence Ministry was now able to
define its objectives in terms of five missions:
a. the defence of the northeastern border
b. the defence of the south and protection of the sea
lines of communication
c. the defence of the air space
d. the operational defence of the territory
e. peace-keeping, security and civil protection
activities.60
This updated the Italian defence model considerably. A new
clarity of vision was also reflected in the declaration of four general
strategic themes, "the renunciation of force as a means to resolve
international controversies; second, NATO membership; third, the
European dimension of the policy; fourth, Italy's Mediterranean
'specificity.'"61
59"Malta, Paradiso fiscale a due passi dall'Italia," La Repubblica, 4 March
1988.
60White Paper 1985, p. 39.
61Maurizio Cremasco, "Italy: A New Role in the Mediterranean?" in John
Chipman, ed., NATO's Southern Allies (London: Routledge, 1988), pp. 219-220.
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The White Paper outlined five missions; but the
responsibilities of Italy could be reduced to two threats, the
traditional enemy of the Warsaw Pact, coupled with the increasing
violence of the North African and Middle Eastern region. Syria,
Libya and Algeria were the unnamed threats in the Libro Bianco's
discussion of the Mediterranean.62 Nonetheless, intervention in
situations such as Lebanon where Italian interests were not directly
at stake was also well established as one of the forces' most
important roles. Italy is probably the only Western country to
specifically include humanitarian duties among its primary
missions.
The fourth and fifth missions gave rise to the creation of the
Forza di Intervento Rapido (FIR) in an attempt to have combat units
ready for deployment for situations such as that carried out in
Lebanon. The Italians drew upon the example of the American
Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, formed in March 1980 in the
wake of Iranian crisis, which became a permanent feature of the US
armed forces when it was transformed into a theater command force
(USCENTCOM) in January 1983. The French also introduced a Force
d'Action Rapide in 1983.63
The FIR was designed to function in conjunction with other
NATO mobile forces in the event of an international emergency,
and would also be available for rapid mobilisation in the case of a
national emergency. No permanent units were diverted to the FIR,
which would draw upon several "ear-marked" sections of the
ordinary forces, comprising an airborne brigade, a mechanised
infantry brigade, and a naval infantry battalion.64
Even in this limited configuration, the FIR comprised the first
Italian interforce command. This was brought about on the limited
scale of the force for reasons of military effectiveness, since wider
62 "La politica di sicurezza italiana," p. 153-154.
63Obiettivo difesa, p. 99.
64Dexter Jerome Smith, "Italy's Changing Defence Posture," Defence, January
1988, p. 53.
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problems of force unification still resisted change. At the time of the
creation of the FIR, defence officials tried to play down its role in
projecting force and emphasised its capability as a civil defence
corps. But its role in enhancing Italy's increased awareness of
international scenarios was obvious. Besides serving as a deterrent
to possible attack, the force's utility would be one of force projection.
The use of the FIR, even if it is primarily linked to
the defence of Italian national territory, cannot be
confined to this limited sphere where, however, it is
improbable that it could be brought into use, except
in the case of general war. Its structure, the units
assigned to it, its specific capabilities (mobility, rapid
transport, armaments), make it objectively a political
and strategic instrument of a new type that, with the
passage of time, should be able to acquire a multi-role
character which with make it prepared for tasks
which the growing turbulence of the Mediterranean
basin force and will force upon our country.65
The FIR first exercised in December 1985.66
The White Paper also launched a new review of both the
operational and technical structures of the armed forces. Again,
adjustments focussed on restoring a distinct hierarchy of authority.
The major change will be the assertion of the
superiority of the Chief of Defence Staff over the
individual Service Chiefs of Staff and his exclusive
command in the operational area. Previously, the
Secretary General of Defence oversaw both the
administration and the operational areas, but he will
in future be competent only in the former area. This
proposal is expected to further the functional
division of defence, although it may hinder overall
coordination.67
65Obiettivo difesa, p. 98.
66 "La politica di sicurezza italiana," pp. 156-158.
67"Italy: Bulwark of NATO's Southern Flank," p. 82.
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The FIR was designed to function within this new system, as it
was assigned to the Office of the Chief of the Defence Staff, thereby
avoiding the individual chains of command of the separate Service
Chiefs.
Settling Into a Military Role
In many respects, the White Paper marked the arrival of Italy
in the circle of Western countries with a high level of military
sophistication and political backing of the national defence posture.
Italy had proved its ability to engage its armed forces abroad and
exhibited a growing understanding of the political responsibilites
involved in making a show of force. The experiences abroad
brought a rush of confidence, especially in some circles of the Navy.
We are living in times of violent peace. And we
finally are realising that the Navy is the most flexible
instrument at the disposition of our foreign
policy...Try to send a battalion of soldiers abroad or a
combat aircraft: everyone becomes alarmed. On the
other hand, if a fine ship comes into port, there are
only looks of admiration and good will...We are the
right hand of diplomacy.68
The Italian military was galvanized by perhaps the most
dramatic "out-of-area" episode of a NATO country, the British
experience in the Falklands-Malvinas. Italian politicians had not
supported BritishAsanctions against Argentina,. and the
general feeling among the public and in Parliament was that "the
Falklands battle represents today an absurd laceration which divides
the North Atlantic from the South, the East from the West,
68Naval officers quoted in Panorama, 4 October 1987, p. 75.
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auguring a fracture which could become incurable!69 But the
military was fired by the example of the British Navy which had
shown that "military vessels are not to be cast aside, but have
another century of life in them."70. Ironically, if anything the
experience of the Falklands had illustrated the vulnerability of large
military vessels in modern warfare. The success of the British led
Italians to aspire to a similar role,71
a military role that was not in the least merely
symbolic given that, unlike what happened in the
past, today the "virtual" use of force does not
intimidate even the smaller nations of the Third
World, according to the White Paper. An analysis
which seems to draw upon the English intervention
in the Falklands-Malvinas, to which the White Paper
is careful to make reference. This curious analysis
based on a single trial is supposed to guarantee that
middle powers, among them Italy, would be in a
position to do at a more or less regional level what
powers such as the United States and Soviet Union
did not succeed in doing on a global level.72
Italy's new commitment was seen by some to verge on the
perilous. Discounting the presence of other allies' naval forces in
the region, including Greek, Spanish, French and Turkish forces, the
Italian Defence Ministry seemed to propose that Italy was ready to
take on unilaterally any threat which arose in the Mediterranean.
The expansion of the Italian military image began to slow in
the mid-1980s. Politicians who had sparked the reform and
expansion of the military establishment wished to place limits on its
growth and use. In August 1984 the Italians participated in the de-
mining of the Red Sea, at the request of the Egyptian government.
69M. Gilmozzi, "Lo scandalo della guerra," II Popolo, 5 May 1982, cited in IAI
1981-1982, p. 539.
70Panorama, 4 October 1987, p. 75.
71 Le armi della Repubblica, p. 104.
72 "La politica di sicurezza italiana," p. 152.
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Of the over 200 objects recovered, none were mines. When an
Italian commercial vessel was attacked, the Italians again sent
minesweeping and escort forces alongside the multi-national navies
supervising safe maritime passage in the Gulf. By now, enthusiasm
was waning for prolonged out-of-area operations which appeared to
give few results. Public demonstrations against Italian involvement
in the Gulf began to appear, and the Goria government finally
withdrew the ships without fanfare. Italy became more
discriminating about the roles it would subject its forces to in the
out-of-area context. It remained armed for the most advanced type
of missions, however.
This greater military force presupposes a firm
political will to apply it, when and if necessary, and
not only for the defence of [Italy's] own forces at sea,
but also for carrying out reactive operations with the
intent of neutralising the offensive capacities of the
potential adversary. It seems permissible to wonder
whether this firm political will exists today in
Italy...In an international framework in which the
hypothesis of an East-West conflict in Europe has lost
much of its credibility, while factors arising from the
belligerence between countries of the Third World
and from indirect and undeclared war are emerging
ever more forcefully...such tendencies appear to have
a logical motivation. But it is necessary that they be
logically inserted in the context of a military policy
which has clear objectives and the knowledge of the
limits of economic resources which the country can
dedicate to defence expenditures.73
The limits of Italy's military potential now had to be
determined. Italy was reluctant to develop into a full-blown
offensive power; indeed, its leaders had decided not to respond with
military force on several occasions, notably in Lebanon and
following the Libyan attack on Lampedusa.
"A guardia del made in Italy," p. 79.
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But the growth of the Italian military did find an outlet, in the
form of a significant arms exports phenomenon. These exports fell
into the category not of military policy, as with most countries, but
flourished more closely along the model of Italy's other trade during
the same period. The military — and its defence-industrial aspect in
particular ~ was seen even among some traditionally pacifist circles
as one of the most promising areas of the Italian economy.
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CHAPTER THREE
Dimensions of the Italian Defence Industries
And Arms Exports
Introduction
The main trends in the Italian defence industry and exports
did not closely parallel the transformation of the Italian national
military policy in the postwar period. Nor is there is much of a
correlation between the prosperity of Italy in the postwar period and
the rise of its defence industry.
Italian leaders were reluctant to infuse funds into the military
industry, despite encouragement from the United States. But even
without a national program the industry expanded steadily, with
the different sectors naturally developing at an uneven pace
according to demand from the national armed forces and from the
nascent exports market.
The shipbuilding, aerospace, electronics, and heavy and light
mechanical fields all reached a sophisticated level in the 1970s.
Because of the absence of open political support, and the tendency of
the military toward isolationism, the growth of Italian military
technology remained relatively unknown outside a small circle of
the upper ranks of the military, politics,Amdustry in Italy. An
increasing number of clients emerged for the Italian industry in the
1970s and the sector gradually absorbed enough technology to create
specialised products designed for the openings in the defence
market. This pattern of growth in the industry, which except in rare
instances was neither hindered nor encouraged by an ill-informed
public at large, accelerated throughout the decade until the Italians
had one of the most profitable military industries in Western
Europe. By the 1980s the Americans would even become clients of
the Italian defence industry.
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The defence industry capitalised on economic conditions
which offered protection at home, and relative freedom to trade
abroad. Italian businessmen dealt with the production of weaponry
as almost any other industry with commercial value. As Italian
industrialists developed their own independent strategies, defence
production gradually found a place among the other successful
ventures nurtured by Italy's entrepreneurs. The defence industry
followed the commercial motives which drove Italian industrialists
as in nearly any other sector. It was launched during a period of
relatively low domestic demand, but by expanding on technology
acquired from abroad Italian producers were able to find outlets in
lucrative foreign markets. The successful exports side of the
industry, for many years completely out of proportion to Italy's
international military commitments, reached its peak as leaders like
Craxi, Lagorio and Spadolini sought to put more military weight
behind the Italian national image. In the mid-1980s, the defence
industry was adopted a national asset to allow more open assistance
from the state as the industry found it could no longer sustain the
successes of earlier years.
Origins of the Defence Industry
The military focus of early industry in Italy has been called the
"original sin of Italian big industry."1 Italy industrialised later and
at a slower pace than other West European nations. After the
unification of the Italy in 1861, military production was used as a
spur to industrialisation. Many fundamental areas of industry owe
their prosperity to early opportunities for selling equipment to the
Italian armed forces under protectionist strategies of the late 19th-
and early 20th-century governments. Ansaldo, initially a private
firm, was able to produce naval vessels by 1889 including much of
1Fabrizio Battistelli. Armi: nuovo modello di sviluppo? (Turin: Einaudi,
1980), p.ll.
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the heavy machinery and engines. The Terni Steel Works was also
closely tied to shipbuilding. Writes one historian:
In 1912 about 21 percent of Italian steel production
went for military or transportation uses directly, that
is, into state-managed or state-subsidized sectors;
without the state it probably would not have been
worthwhile setting up a steel industry at all.2
The shipyards of Terni-Orlando-Odero (later to be known as
OTO, with a wide range of defence output) were closely linked to
Vickers in Britain. Breda concentrated on artillery and guns in an
attempt to eliminate domination of Krupp and Schneider as
primary suppliers to the Italian forces.3 Another defence company
which would later attain considerable success was BPD, formed by
industrialists Bombrini and Parodi-Delfino.
Italy's largest private company, FIAT (Fabbrica Italiana
Automobili Torino) reached its status as a major industry because of
the opportunities of wartime production in the early 20th century.
FIAT introduced its first airplane in 1907, branching out from
concentration on the production of automobiles for the wealthy.4
Profits soared when the company entered military production
during World War I, and at the end of the war the company
jumped from 30th to third place among Italian industries. Between
1915 and 1918 its capital multiplied seven times and employment
levels soared from 4,000 to approximately 40,000. FIAT supplied
92% of Italian-made tanks and 80% of the country's aircraft motors.
During this time, FIAT was able to export to Italy's allies as well as
covering internal demand.5 The feverish activity required to meet
2R.A. Webster, Industrial Imperialism in Italy 1908-1915 (Berkeley and
London: University of California Press, 1975), p. 71.
3Webster, p. 74.
4Clark, p. 125.
5Armi: nuovo modello di sviluppo? pp. 19-20.
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military quotas was an important catalyst for the development of
FIAT's industrial strategy of maximizing labour output and
minimising costs.
Manufacturing machine guns and munitions led to
the introduction of series production; in addition the
economies that were possible in this field in the costs
of management offered growing profit margins.6
Even when Italy's war-making ability was made the focal point
of the Fascist regime and the country engaged in colonial wars, the
government did not succeed in harnessing the capability of the
arms industry, either as a national military asset or for potential
commercial rewards. The Italian defence industry did not reach
levels of production necessary to support Mussolini's military
campaigns. The modest growth of the defence industry during this
period could be attributed to a few business concerns which entered
and withdrew from the field of defence production in response to
the opportunities of the market.
A campaign to increase defence production did not occur until
1935, and even this was characterised by an acute lack of
coordination among the forces' procurement plans, seen by some as
the result of Mussolini's desire to keep the armed forces fragmented
and therefore weak.7 Mussolini also concentrated on increasing the
manpower levels of the Army and other branches rather than
improving their technical capabilities. Italian forces entered World
War II with only about 83,000 motorised vehicles, less than 8,000
units of artillery and about 3,400 armoured cars, produced with the
6Valerio Castronovo, Giovanni Agnelli, (Turin: UTET, 1971), p. 110.
7Fortunato Minniti, "II problema degli armamenti nella preparazione
militare italiana dal 1935 al 1943" Storia contemporanea, anno IX, no.l, February
1978, p. 61.
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combined forces of both private (FIAT, Caproni, Breda, Lancia) and
public concerns (Ansaldo, OTO, Alfa Romeo).8
The aeronautics industry was more efficient in preparing for
ItaUan defence; between 1935 and 1943 almost 20,000 aircraft were
delivered to the Italian Air Force, with output greatly accelerated in
the early 1940s. Still, the Italians never matched the levels of other
countries at war, including the 92,000 produced in Germany and the
105,000 produced in Britain between 1940 and 1943.9 By September
1943 the Air Force only had 749 nationally-produced bombers and
fighters in its possession.10 Italian maritime output between 1935
and 1943 was 89 vessels, including submarines, with a total tonnage
of 508,828.11 However, military production, and especially the
strategic programming that led up to it, fell short of Mussolini's
ambitions to become a strong military partner to Hitler.
The extremely difficult and ruthless test of wartime
exposed the defects of our military industry. The
speculative and entrepreneurial component was a
marked characteristic of the involvement of the
private companies; the lack of adequate scientific,
technical and research support did not allow us to
maintain a level with other countries; the incapacity
and the improvisational nature of military and
political direction, carried out by the Fascist groups in
power, by the corrupt monarchy and the
bureaucratised military caste, did the rest, leading us
into a series of defeats. In the end the country was
abandoned to its own devices.12
Although Italy's postwar relationship with the United States
and Europe began as a military alliance based on economic
8Minniti, p. 28.
9Armi: nuovo modello di sviluppo? p. 127.
10 Minniti, p. 41.
^Minniti, p. 48.
12Boldrini and D'Alessio, p. 224.
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interdependence, the combination of these two factors, the military-
industry, was relaunched as a minor responsibility for Italy. The
industry developed initially as almost an outpost for American
military production. For most Italian companies the commercial
appeal of maintaining an arms industry had nearly disappeared,
and former defence manufacturers had branched out into other
fields such as production of motor vehicles for civilian use.
Postwar production got its first major impetus when the United
States urged the Italian government to take on its own program of
domestic rearmament. Approximately $302 million was set aside
for new equipment over the years 1951-1954;13 defence spending in
Italy, however, remained a modest priority.
Because of the high level of public ownership in the Italian
defence industry, much of its development was influenced by the
special Italian system of the state-holding companies. After the
Second World War, the state concentrated heavily on new
investments to make the national economy function; the policies of
low wages and emphasis on exports were not the only strategies
carried out by the government. But the public sector existed with
the primary aim of promoting the private sector. One primary goal
of the government "safety net" was to facilitate the return of weak
businesses to private self-sufficiency. In general private market
strategies were quietly left to dominate, and collective goals were
not the centrepiece of government economic planning. As a result,
underdevelopment of the South was never fully tackled, and its
problems were exacerbated to the benefit of the North. Southern
migration, building of roads and so on all benefitted the car-makers
and construction companies which formed the core the wealth of
the industrial belt.14 The arms industry clearly drew advantages
from this general government policy of providing the financial
™FRUS, Volume III,' 1950, p. 1503.
14Donald Sassoon, Contemporary Italy (Harlow, Essex: Longman, 1986), p.
36.
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assistance for businesses while imposing few criteria for the type of
industrial output.
In Italy, the support of the state was crucial for setting the
defence industries in motion, and for "bailing out" companies
which were unable to sell their products after costly development.
But the real prosperity of the Italian industry arose out of the
absence of public support that fuel industries in other countries.
About 60% of Italian defence production in the 1980s was exported.
The export-led industry succeeded mostly because the state did not
take a part in constructing the rapport with foreign armed forces
that would be necessary for most countries seeking to become major
arms suppliers. Most of these sales, if they had been made public,
could not have been supported by Italy's political leaders: the main
clients were embargoed nations, political pariahs, and developing
nations with low social standards and disproportionate military
budgets. Lack of open political support for the defence industry in
Italy, therefore, was a prerequisite for its success.
Economic Dimensions
By the 1970s, the Italian defence industry had become a unique
economic phenomenon in Italy. It showed a higher rate of growth
than any other area in the 1970s, and did not follow the same cycles
as other industrial areas.15
The defence industry was estimated to be between 40 and 60%
state owned.16 The frequent deals which brought private companies
in and out of the sector made the public stake difficult to pinpoint
in any given year. The state-owned firms are controlled by two
holding companies. IRI (Istituto per la ricostruzione industriale)
was created in 1933 to support banks and industries during the
15 Armi: nuovo modello di sviluppo? pp.229-230.
16Michele Nones, "11 sistema difesa-industria-ricerca in Italia,"
unpublished paper, 15 November 1987, p 33.
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depression. It is now the largest company in Europe, and even the
largest outside the United States (not including oil companies).
Through its approximately 600 holdings it controls a vast stake in
Italy's iron and steel production, shipbuilding and shipping, the
aircraft industry and Alitalia, electronics and telecommunications,
and engineering firms.17 Defence production is carried out by
Fincantieri, STET (including the electronics companies Selenia and
ELSAG), and Finmeccanica (Aeritalia and other companies for the
production of aircraft and vehicles). These are among the largest
military firms in Italy are controlled by IRI, but defence, (at about
3.3%) does not constitute a major part of IRI's mammoth holdings.
On the other hand, the output of the smallest state holding
company, EFIM, is considerably more dependent on the military
field. About a quarter of its workforce was involved in military
contracts in the early 1980s.18 EFIM controls the various Breda
companies, Agusta, SIAI-Marchetti, OTO-Melara, Galileo, and
Italmissile, among others. EFIM is traditionally run by appointees
of the socialist parties (PSI) and (PSDI), although relations became
strained when EFIM reported consistent losses in the 1970s and
1980s; ERI is generally the preserve of the DC.
In the mid 1980s FIAT, the only major private concern among
Italian defence producers, was thought to have the highest output
in the field, although the company denied this status.19
FIAT's involvement in military production was sporadic since
the company's inception. The firm has been called the only
company in Italy to have a real strategy in the defence field, since it
showed considerable agility in entering and withdrawing from
markets according to profit opportunities.20 The company had
17Spotts and Wieser, p. 137.
18/4rmz: nuovo modello di sviluppo? p. 192
19Financial Times, Italian Defence Industry Survey, 28 July 1986; interview
with James Buxton, Edinburgh February 1987.
20Interview Archivio Dzsarmo,March 1988.
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more than a billion dollars of annual revenues in defence contracts
in the 1980s.21 FIAT's ability to find lucrative markets in this field
even without the safety net of the publically-financed holding
groups is evidence of the enormous opportunities that were open to
Italian weapons producers with the ability to implement
commercial strategies.
FIAT took on joint ownership in some projects dominated by
the state-run companies. In defence it controlled in part or entirely
FIAT Aviazione, Turbo Motori Internazionale, Valsella, Borletti,
Whitehead, Telettra, and Iveco.22 Fiat's output included transport
and armoured vehicles, propulsion systems, electronics and
telecommunications systems, munitions, mines, and torpedoes.23
A main subsidiary, SNIA-BPD, became one of Italy's most advanced
electronics firms with annual sales in the range of 545 thousand
million lire.24
One of FIAT's top officials, managing director Cesare Romiti,
had spent the first 22 years of his career at BPD, and later at SNIA
after the two companies merged. BPD was originally the
armaments sides of the company; "for Cesare Romiti, in fact, the
arms trade had accounted for more than half of his professional
life."25 By the time he reached the senior levels of FIAT
management, Romiti probably had greater expertise in the world arms trade than most
government officials, and was well qualified to assess prospects for future military
business:
The prospects [of the shipbuilding sector] do not
point to expansion, and the total volume of the
market in the middle term forecasts reductions both
in terms of quantity and of the dimensions of the
21Friedman, p. 212.
22DeAndreis and Alessandro Liberati, "L'lniustria bellica italiana e le
esportazioni di armamenti," L'ltalia e la corsa al riarmo, pp. 305-307.
23"Difesa-industria-ricercap 4.
24Sergio Rossi, "The Italian Defence Industry in the International Context,"
Defence Today, February-March 1988, p. 46.
^Friedman, p. 207.
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new work under construction. The second-hand
market, ships transferred at very low cost or as direct
gifts, will be controlled by the two or three richest and
best equipped nations. And this situation is not
limited to the maritime sector: it certainly holds true
for aircraft and combat vehicles as well. In addition,
the attention that the International Monetary Fund
has shown for the indebtedness of a few countries
because of their arms procurement policies suggests
future pressures for a "chill" in this type of import.
These countries will have no choice but to content
themselves with military aid remunerated in the
essentially political currency of ties to one of the two
blocs. This is a type of transfer that, at present, Italy is
certainly not in a position to plan by itself, but that
must be resolved in the context of specific roles to be
agreed upon with our principal ally.26
There is also a high incidence of foreign ownership in the
Italian defence industry. By the mid 1980s this had reached a level
of about 30%.27
Employment Levels and Economic Concentration of the Italian Defence Industry
One area of general agreement among researchers was the size
of the workforce of the defence industry. Estimates usually hovered
at 80,000 workers during the peak of the late 1970s and early 1980s,
although some sources, mostly those close to the Ministry of
Defence (such as Defence Ministers Spadolini and Lagorio, and
direct of CASD General Carlo Jean) included the workforce of
subcontractors and other related fields to bring the estimates to
92,000 and even as high as 100,000. 28 Figures for employment
fluctuated very little during the 1980s; however the numbers
26cited in DeAndreis and Liberati, pp. 297-298.
27 "Difesa-industria-ricerca," p. 4. It is not certain whether licences are
included in this calculation.
28Sergio Rossi, "Italy," Nicole Ball and Milton Leitenberg, eds., The
Structure of the Defense Industry (London: Croom Helm, 1983), p.221.
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represented a major jump in employment in the sector over an
earlier period. Fabrizio Battistelli's estimates show employment in
38 major companies more than doubling from 1968 to 1978, from
36,000 to 74,000.29
The approximately 50 major defence companies constitute a
highly concentrated area of the Italian economy. There are perhaps
500 companies involved in military production in Italy,30 but in
1980 one source estimated that the ten largest firms accounted for
42.5% of total defence sales measured that year, and 62% of the
personnel employed.31 In a larger pool, 25 companies had 75% of
total defence sales and 81% of the workforce.
Most of the firms were distributed over only five of Italy's 20
regions.32 In general, production was concentrated in the
industrialised North of Italy, but the region of Campania, which
includes Naples, employs about 20% of the defence industry
workforce, the highest regional concentration. Aircraft production
offers the greatest number of jobs in this area, followed by
electronics and shipbuilding. Lombardy also has a high percentage
of the nation's defence industry employees (about 18%), but as in
the other highly-industrialised regions of the North, the
contribution of military-related work to local employment is
fractional. Liguria, with electronics firms as well as important
shipbuilding centres at Genoa and La Spezia, Piedmont with aircraft
and mechanical production, and Latium with a high concentration
of electronics, do not rely heavily on the defence industry for
sustaining local industry.33 Military industry supporters have cited
the important employment opportunities the field could bring to
depressed areas of the south, and firms are encouraged by state
29Armi: nuovo modello di sviluppo? pp. 208-209.
30Rossi in Ball and Leitenberg, p. 238.
31Rossi in Ball and Leitenberg, p. 221.
32Rossi in Ball and Leitenberg, pp. 238-243.
33Rossi in Ball and Leitenberg, pp. 240-241.
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subsidies to build plants in areas of high unemployment. Little to
date has emerged from these plans.34
Productivity and Sales
Figures on productivity in the defence sector also show
tremendous growth. This is perhaps the most difficult economic
aspect to quantify. It is impossible to derive exactly the figures in
defence from the annual turnover figures released by firms whose
output is only partly directed to military use. The amount of work
actually produced by the company after licenced production and
purchase of foreign components is also extremely difficult to trace.35
In some areas, especially shipbuilding, the incidence of foreign-
bought components is very high, but the value-added is rarely
specified when firms release costs for the sale of the equipment.
Because of the problems in obtaining data, researchers estimate a
margin of error of at least 10%.36 Nonetheless the patterns of
marked expansion are a significant indication of the industry's
dynamism and overall economic performance.
The increase by nearly ten times over the first period examined
is a striking pattern, unmatched by any sector of civilian industry.37
Estimates of value-added figures showed a similar steep rise, with
an average 24.7% annually in the 1970s, against a non-military
average of 17% per year over the same period.38 The growth index
of gross investments also grew much faster in defence, reaching the
figure of 4.4 against 2.87 for total Italian industry. Another
indication of productivity, sales per employee, shows that defence
34DeAndreis and Liberati, p. 280.
35Afh' Parlamentari, Senato della Repubblica, Legislatura VIII, "La
consistenza dell'industria bellica italiana," p. 115; De Andreis and Liberati, p. 269
ff.
35De Andreis and Liberati, p. 273.
37Rossi in Ball and Leitenberg, p. 230.
38Rossi in Ball and Leitenberg, p. 232.
88
was two to five times more successful than the civilian sectors.39
The criteria for the calculations, however, are not made known, and
may not take into account duplications. The growth rates within
the defence industry also do not reflect its modest size in
comparison to the rest of Italian manufacturing: in 1984, defence
accounted for only about 2.1% of the national value added level of
all of Italian industry.40
The Industrial Area of the Armed Forces
Another small percentage of defence production is covered by
the production and repair facilities run directly by the armed forces.
Before the First World War, nearly all of the nation's military
equipment was supplied and repaired at these centres. The more
efficient commercial circles within Italy quickly surpassed the
productivity of the national arsenals, which were hindered by the
bureaucracy and limited resources of the armed forces. Today it is
estimated that the facilities produce only from two to five percent of
the equipment procured by the armed forces every year.41
Modernisation of facilities and salaries for scientists and specialised
technicians did not keep pace with other careers.42
The defence industrial area is today a sclerotic
apparatus, characterised by outdated plants and by an
under-used workforce, whose average age is very
high and utility practically nil. The prolonged
absence over the past 30 years of rational and efficient
management of the human and material resources of
the military establishments has brought on a marked
deterioration, which in turn greatly favours
39DeAndreis and Liberati, p. 277.
40DeAndreis and Liberati, p. 278.
41White Paper 1985, p. 74 cites 5%; Carlo Jean, "La strategia industriale del
sistema difesa" Conferenza Difesa-lndustria, Rome, 3-4 July 1984, p. 46, cites 2%.
42"Difesa-industria-ricerca, " p. 23.
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companies, both public and private, which are active
in military production.43
A large number of the facilities run by the armed forces claim
the capability to produce artillery, mortars, munitions, missiles,
guns and related equipment. The Army Arsenal at Naples was
responsible for the initial development of the 105/14 howitzer but
production was quickly taken over by OTO-Melara when its
commercial potential became clear.44 But much of the sector is
devoted to addressing daily needs of the armed forces, such as
preparation of food and beverage of an abysmal standard, printing
services, clothing production, and so on. A commentator writing in
1974 made these observations about the industrial services:
The Italian Army is only in part a modern army:
within it survive outdated, uneconomical and
useless structures that no one wants to eliminate for
fear of disturbing the order of things... It is almost
incredible, but factories exist for the production of
mortadella (such as the Second Experimental Unit of
Maddaloni, near Caserta), as well as chemical and
pharmaceutical laboratories which produce
medicine, distilled liquors such as anethole, etc. The
Military Chemical and Pharmaceutical Institute in
Florence takes charge of all of that, and also of the
definition of the characteristics that food and drink
destined for the troops should have in order to be
edible. It is clear that no one has taken a survey of
the military "experts" who do not seem to notice,
however, that often the pasta is inedible, the tins of
meat very often date to the Second World War, and
that the notorious hard-tack is often more than 30
years old.45
The industrial area of the armed forces perhaps still plays a
role in acquiring foreign know-how and building systems which,
43Armi: nuovo modello di sviluppo? p. 196.
nuovo modello di sviluppo? p. 197.
45Massobrio, pp. 316-317.
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because of their highly sensitive nature, are difficult fields for the
more independent firms, even those owned by the state. This could
include the area of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons.
It is possible that chemical weapons are produced in Italy.
Italy was the first country to contravene the Geneva
Convention's prohibition of the use of toxic gas, in Ethiopia in 1935
and 1936.47 "NBC" weapons have since been used on numerous
occasions (Japan in China in 1936; Egypt in North Yemen, the US in
Vietnam; Vietnam in Laos and Kampuchea; the USSR in
Afghanistan, Iraq in Halabja)48 but the superpowers are thought to
hold the only major stockpiles.
The Italians retain a number of facilities relating to chemical
weapons, including three storage sites at Scanziano Belfiore, Lago di
Vico, and Santa Lucia-Civitavecchia. The latter facility was reported
to be undergoing expansion at the same time that President Reagan
asked the Italians to house part of his $5 billion program for new
chemical weapons.49 The amount of weapons in Italy is probably
not high, especially compared to stockpiles in other NATO
countries like West Germany. However, Zaire was alleged to have
Italian-made napalm bombs, and part of the Iraqi arsenal may have
been acquired in Italy.50
A military analyst suggested that other situations when the
industrial facilities of the armed forces might be called into
production would be when a small quantity of equipment of low
technological content is ordered and would not offer the economies
46A top Italian defence official could not deny that chemical weapons are
produced in Italy during an interview in April 1988.
47Russell Warren Howe, Weapons (London: Abacus, 1981), p.15.
4877ie Economist, 4 June 1988, p. 26.
49L'ltalia armata, pp. 312-313.
50IAI 1976-1977, p. 428, note 8; Armi: nuovo modello di sviluppo? p. 268; De
Andreis, "Le esportazioni di armi italiane a Iraq e Iran," Le esportazioni italiane
di armi: due casi, Centro studi di politica internazionale (Cespi): Note e ricerche,
n.18, March 1988,p. 6.
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of scale necessary to attract other sectors of the defence industry, or
when the equipment or spare parts are needed urgently and
ordering from the industry would be too time-consuming.51
The low technological capacity of the armed forces' industrial
facilities, however, combined with the inevitable slowness
associated with state institutions in Italy probably make it unlikely
that these facilities can step in and adapt to a wide variety of
equipment requirements of the armed forces. Usually the
commercially-oriented area of the defence industry is contracted in
all but the rarest examples, and simply paid by the Ministry of
Defence whatever is necessary to complete the work.
Because of the sophistication of modern equipment, repair
work is not even possible in many cases in the armed forces
facilities, and is often included as part of the producer's
responsibilties in the procurement agreement. And with the
exception of ships, Italian military equipment is more often
replaced and modernised before it is sent for extensive repairs. A
"reserve capacity" in the industrial sector of the armed forces is no
capacity at all unless it can have the ability to enter at short notice
into production of equipment that when produced privately usually
requires years of research and investment in sophisticated
machinery. The main reason for maintaining these establishments
is really the employment opportunities they offer to a bloated,
under-used workforce.
The Italian Ministry of Defence has attempted to optimize the
efficiency of the maintenance and repair sector and studies
undertaken in 1976 and 1981 expressed the aims of
—subdividing maintenance activities between
military and civilian facilities in order to protect the
interests of both sides and guarantee speed, efficiency
51 "La strategia industriale del sistema difesa" p. 46.
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and maximum flexibility within the military
structure, especially in an emergency
—eliminating smaller and useless factories
—containing drastically the financial burden of
restructuring to be distributed over several fiscal
years
—setting up some maintenance centres, also for the
Air Force.52
Even after rationalisation efforts were underway in the 1980s, a
participant at a Senate hearing remarked on the paradoxical fact that
the establishments employed nearly as many people as the defence
industry itself, without attaining even a fraction of that sector's
productivity.53 A curious part of the rationalisation program was
an increase in the number of facilities, and the employment of
15,000 new workers54. Ministry of Defence officials are faced with
the dilemma of wanting to enlarge or hold steady public sector
employment at the same time that they need to contract the
industrial facilities for them to reach even minimum efficiency.
Research and Development
Another function usually fulfilled in large measure by
nationally-owned establishments in other countries are research
and development projects. On a world scale, military research and
development devour an increasing share of resources. SIPRI
estimates that 10% of worldwide defence expenditures are directed
to R & D, and such projects employ more than half of the world
physicists and engineers. In addition, between every generation of
52White Paper 1985, p. 74.
53 "La consistenza dell'industria bellica italiana," Atti parlamentari,
Legislatura VIII, p. 114.
54Le armi della repubblica, p. 99.
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new technology, the Independent European Planning Group (IEPG)
estimates that costs rise 5-10% annually.55
The ceaseless pattern of inflation has affected the earnings
even of major companies such as Boeing.56 The United States
spends the most on development programs, diverting about 10% of
its defence budget to research. European countries spend about a
third of the American figures;57 France and the FRG each spend
about 4-5% of their own defence outlays.58
While in other countries, military research represents a
significant diversion of national funds and the foundation of many
nations' technological wealth, in Italy there is no such
phenomenon.
In the military [research] establishment little of great
validity is accomplished, money is thrown away,
more often than not the practice is to buy outright
and engage in illegal dealings. The involvement of
Italian scientists is rare, those who do collaborate are
professionally discredited.59
Other countries at one time had similar divisions in their
national research communities. In postwar France the arms
industry initially had few friends in the theoretically-oriented
university scientific community. R&D was carried out in the old-
fashioned state arsenal system. But research was transformed under
de Gaulle when expenditures tripled to cover the development of
55General Luigi Stefani, "Cooperazione internazionale e sfida tecnologica,"
presented at CASD, 2 June 1988, p. 4.
56Jane's Defence Weekly, 28 October 1987.
57 Stefani p. 11.
58 Rossi, "II sistema economico della difesa," Conferenza Difesa-Industria, p.
34.
59Armi: nuovo modello di sviluppo? p. 305.
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nuclear forces, and defence research brought "scientists, technicians
and military elites together."60
R & D in Italy
Such a revolution never occurred in Italy, which in the 1980s
still produces a very small amount of the technology used in its
defence materiel. As weapons systems advanced in the 1960s,
however, some indigenous research became essential, even if the
aim was only to adapt or modernise existing technology. In Italy
most of this work is conducted at the expense of the firms. Costs for
research are reflected in the contracts for the purchase of the
completed systems. Naturally the prices may not correspond exactly
to the costs incurred by the company for individual systems, but are
adjusted according to the customer and the conditions of the sale.
In a sense the national armed forces fund R&D indirectly, by
paying higher prices for nationally-produced weaponry to offset the
"technological inflation" suffered by the firms in the R&D stages.
The investments for research and development cost as much as
15% of the turnover.61
Since private research dominated, the largest private firm
FIAT had an important role in developing scientific facilities.
Research centres for gas turbines at Sangone, for avionics at Caselle,
a wind tunnel and experiments in electronics were all funded by
FIAT. President of FIAT Aviazione, Giuseppe Gabrielli, a celebrated
engineer and test pilot, was a professor at the Turin Polytechnic
until 1973. This position allowed him to
realise a fruitful collaboration between university
and industry which while enriching the university
60Edward A. Kolodziej, Making and Marketing Arms: The French Experience
and Its Implications for the International System (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1987) p. 193.
61 "II sistema economico della difesa," p. 43.
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with fascinating experiences also permitted me to
hire a great number of the best students in the
technical offices and laboratories of FIAT. I brought
about further collaboration between university and
industry as national delegate of AGARD (Advisory
Group for Aerospace Research and Development)
thereby using the opportunities, the means and the
valuable knowledge that the institution promoted
and continues to promote in the interests of NATO
countries.62
Gabrielli's activity was one of a few rare instances of close
university-industry cooperation until the 1980s. Even in the case of
FIAT, suspicion was mutual between the two fields: the company's
president Vittorio Valletta was remembered to have considered
"with incredulity and a certain scepticism the opportunities that the
universities could offer."63
Italian universities were very late to develop the rapport with
the military establishment that became commonplace in other
countries. The Italian universities were generally as separatist and
ill-managed as the armed forces. Cooperation between academic
institutions and the electronics industry increased in the 1980s. To
preserve confidentiality, sometimes the name of the firm and the
purpose of the research are released only to the scientists directly
involved in the project. Italian participation in the Strategic
Defense Initiative (SDI) research, with the promise of generous
American contracts, was the first time that university and military
scientists made a serious attempt at collaboration. Private industry
sometimes cooperates with the Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche





State-sponsored R & D for defence is one of the lowest among
industrialised countries, whether measured as a percentage of GNP
or as the proportion of all the country's funds for scientific research.
About 11% of public financing for R & D in Italy went for military
purposes; this is a modest figure as Italy spends only about 0.7% of
its GNP on research. This notwithstanding, by the 1980s, Italy
considerably increased its R & D efforts in various areas. The
promotional laws of the 1970s were a significant spur to the
development of new military equipment and to close cooperation
between the armed forces and industry.
The leggi promozionali allowed the Italian military a
procedure for rapidly acquiring advanced and expensive equipment,
because for the most part Italian political circles were now
convinced of the need to bring Italy in line with the standards of its
NATO allies, to pose an adequate response to the instability in the
Mediterranean. By pinpointing advanced equipment, Italy
favoured its nascent electronics industry in particular. A third of
the outlays were directed to systems in this field, which
subsequently developed some of the most advanced systems in the
world. Naval systems were especially emphasised, as Admiral
Vittorio Marulli, head of the Navy, explained in 1984:
Over the last 20 years in the field of command
control communications and active and passive
sensors, the Italian Navy has evolved an incentive
policy for industry in order to establish national
sources of supply. The strategic and economic
motives are obvious. Our electronic industry had at
that time acquired sufficient experience in the
building of instruments under licence to be able to
proceed indepedently. Such abilities have been since
widely demonstrated with the success achieved in
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foreign markets against strong international
competition.6'1
The advanced new inventory also gave Italian companies
incentives and funding to embark on joint ventures with European
and American partners, as will be discussed later, thereby
replenishing the national industry's technological base.
In 1984 another bill was passed in the Italian parliament
allocating 996 billion lire over six years for the development of
three new systems: the Italian-Brazilian AMX fighter, the CATRIN
field intelligence system, and the Italian-British EH-101 helicopter
project. By this time, the Ministry of Defence was able to publish in
its White Paper a lengthy list of the projects under development.65
Public funding from a variety of sources amounted to
approximately 700 to 800 billion lire in the late 1980s.66 The state
sponsors R&D through a number of channels. In real terms, public
funding quadrupled over a fifteen year period. As a part of total
public outlays for research, military R&D also doubled in four years
and as a percentage of the military budget, the value trebled.67
Sources of public funding include the Ministry of Defence,
various Funds for Research, as well as the state-holding
companies.68 The Ministry of Defence makes outlays for research
projects under two headings of the defence budget. A small amount
is allocated specifically to "Expenditures for Scientific Research"; the
5 billion lire under this heading in 1981 increased to 22 billion in
1986. Most of the research directly funded by the Ministry of
Defence is absorbed into programs for "Modernisation and Renewal
of Defence."
64"Stretching Italy's Capability" Defence Attache, No. 2, 1984, p. 32.
65White Paper 1985, pp. 188-192.
66 "Difesa-industria-ricerca," p. 34.
67 "Difesa-industria-ricerca," p. 27
68"Difesa-industria-ricerca,"pp. 24ff.
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The two Fondi per la ricerca in Italy are controlled by two
different ministries in the Italian government. The Fund for
Applied Research, created in 1968 and managed by the Istituto
Mobiliare Italiano (IMI) for the Ministry for Scientific and
Technological Research, releases about 50 billion lire annually to
national projects, including a high incidence of civilian research.
The Ministry of Industry created the Rotating Fund for
Technological Innovation in 1982. Outlays for military research
reach perhaps 50 billion lire annually in addition to civilian work;
chemicals, aeronautics, electronics, the automobile industry, and
components are among the areas emphasised by the fund. There is
little coordination between these two funds and their resources are
wasted to some extent by the creation of redundant projects. An
example of the duplications in publically-financed projects is the
case of the Aermacchi MB339 and the SIAI-Marchetti S-211 fighter
planes, which were supported by different funds and entered into
direct competition.
The state-holding companies also finance research costs for the
military industry. In 1987 these firms invested 578 billion lire in
military R&D, more than what the Ministry of Defence itself
funded.69 The state-holding firms release funds through their enti
di dotazione or endowment funds, but the main strategy for most
firms developing new systems, within the private or public sphere,
is to put forward the research costs in the development stages and
recoup the expenses when the weapons are priced for sale.
Overall, the R&D structure in Italy is highly fragmented and
the research base to support the industry's ambitious commercial
aims does not exist. One military analyst observed:
The unified approach of the process from research
and development to production in industry requires
a similarly unified approach in the decision-making
69 "Difesa-industria-ricerca," p. 33.
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and operative functions of the [Ministry of] Defence.
The organs devoted to research should be redirected
under the responsibility of a renewed and
strengthened National Direction for Armaments in
such a way as to include all of the research, and not
just inter-service and international projects, in a
single plan, related to the more general activity of
procurement.70
The Industry-Defence Committee created by the Ministry of
Defence in 1984 has been almost completely impotent in this
coordination process. The most striking feature to note however is
that the Italians made considerable advances without the presence
of an alliance between the nation's scientific and defence industry
communities. They became major manufacturers and exporters of
weaponry before the effort to introduce a research base in the 1980s,
in a field that pivots on technological strength.
Italian Defence Exports 1949-1972
Immediately following the Second World War, when Italy's
political life and military stance were relatively unformed, arms
exports had already begun. In the late 1940s, military production
employed about 3,000 people; the first product was probably the G-46
trainer. Seventy of this model were sold to Argentina, and ten to
Syria. The G-55 was sold to the same clients, as well as to Egypt.
After 1949, the Italians exported 50 Vampire aircraft, produced
under DeHavilland's licence, to Syria which transferred them to
Egypt. In 1950, Macchi sold 50 single motor fighter planes directly to
Egypt. Production of this model dated from the war years.71
Between 1950 and 1960, exports increased as Italian military
manufacturers acquired a number of licences, mostly for aircraft.
The shipbuilding industry was also active; foreign outlets for
70 "Difesa-industria-ricerca," p. 41.
71 "II nostro mercato di morte," p. 26.
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Italian-made military frigates and corvettes included Venezuela and
Indonesia. In 1957 Israel and Iran also bought light ships for
military purposes.72
During the 1950s, the aircraft industry acquired a technological
base which permitted a subsequent boom in exports in the
following decade. In generating a pool of clients, the weapons
industry dealt from its early years in politically delicate areas.
Italian firms sold arms to Peron right up to his downfall, and Fidel
Castro claimed that Italian and English armaments manufacturers
were the last to sell weapons to Batista before his overthrow in
Cuba.73 In the early 1960s, Italy was already condemned at the
United Nations because of its increasing cooperation in arming the
South African regime of apartheid. Italian government policy in
areas of tension, as will be seen later, remained effectively unaltered
until the 1980s.
Italy's politicians were forced to acknowledge this area of
Italian industry by the mid-1960s, both because of the prestige of
entering the circle of the top world suppliers, and because of the
political embarrassment provoked by Italy's range of weapons
clients. As a middle-level supplier, Italy had the crucial advantage
over other developing industries such as Argentina's or India's of
having access to the high technology of the United States and
NATO. While the Italian defence industry remained dependent on
outside sources for technology at the production level, it discovered
gaps in international exports markets that the larger countries left
untapped, either because of political reasons or because profits were
too modest.
72 "II nostro mercato di morte," p. 26.
73/ze Politics of Italian Foreign Policy, p. 94.
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Arms Exports 1972 to the Present
Changes in Patterns of World Military Transfers
New conditions emerged which paved the way for the
expansion in Italian weapons exports. Changing policies of the
major supplier countries created new opportunities for smaller
sellers to fill markets. The major alteration in arms transfers was
the change in status of the superpowers from donors to sellers of
weapons. The United States and Soviet Union began to supply
strategically important allies in the 1960s with weapons in exchange
for payment, instead of arming their allies with gifts of surplus or
obsolete stock. The continued failure of more direct types of
military intervention, especially by the Americans in Vietnam, and
the Soviet need for hard currency confirmed the new trend in arms
sales.
Weapons came to be seen increasingly in economic terms, and
smaller suppliers with more modest political ambitions began to
market armaments for their commercial value. The Americans
also placed a new emphasis on burden-sharing within the Atlantic
Alliance. European industries which were hard-pressed to meet
Alliance commitments increasingly sought to effect longer military
production runs, and exported a greater proportion of their
armaments to offset costs.
Simultaneously, new demands of recipient countries radically
changed world patterns in arms sales. The developing countries
became the major importers of arms and many of these nations also
began to exercise tremendous leverage because of their riches in raw
materials, especially oil. In the 1950s, the developing world had
received a negligible amount of arms transfers, and accounted for
about 50% of the trade by the 1960s.74 During the 1970s over three
quarters of world arms sales were directed to Third World
7^Armi: nuovo modello di sviluppo? p. 235.
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countries.75 Former French, British and Portuguese colonies
underwent liberation movements; arms were ordered in vast
.quantities both for use in conflicts arising from the new political
instability, and as symbols of prestige for the newly-formed
governments. Military spending increased more than three times
as fast as in the industrialised countries in the 1970s. More than a
third of the major importers of arms in the developing countries
also ranked among the poorest nations in the world, with annual
per capita income averaging less than $500.76
The oil-producing nations became the greatest new consumers
of armaments. In the early 1970s exports of the Organisation of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) were worth about $100
billion per year.77 Armaments became one means for the
industrialised countries to counter the rising costs of energy and
raw materials which were purchased from the developing
countries. France, for example, is thought to have covered about
24% of its oil purchases with arms sales in the 1970s.78
Italy has also sealed its own fine arms-for-oil deals. If
in this field the most clamorous contract was that
made by Agusta on 24 February 1977 with the Shah
(50 CH-47 Chinook helicopters worth $425 million in
exchange for 5 million tonnes of oil to AGIP), other
agreements occurred in the various exchanges
between Italy and other oil producers such as Libya,
Venezuela, Iraq, and on a more limited scale, Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, and Indonesia.79
75Andrew J. Pierre, The Global Politics of Arms Sales, (Council on Foreign
Relations; Princeton: PUP, 1982)p. 36.
76Pierre, p. 36.
77SIPR1 Yearbook 1975, p. 199.
78Edward A. Kolodziej and Bokanga Lokulutu, "Security Interests and French
Arms-Transfer Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa," in Bruce Arlinghaus, ed., Arms for
Africa (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1983), p. 144.
79Armi: nuovo modello di sviluppo? p. 279.
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The demand for arms also increased because of the fact that
these new stores of arms in the Third World were often used in
combat, unlike the arsenals of the Western countries. The Middle
East War of 1973, for example, both unleashed a new cycle of
rearmament to replace the depleted stocks of the countries at war
and provoked a local arms race. The war consumed $2.5 billion in
US equipment- and it took four years for the Americans to renew
pre-war levels. In the surrounding region many nations increased
their purchases of arms steeply in preparation for later conflicts. All
of these conditions provided opportunities for West European
suppliers, including Italy, to increase arms exports to the Middle
East.
Expansion of Italian Military Exports
The Italian arms industry had reached a degree of preparedness
by the late 1960s which enabled it to expand in response to the
opening of new markets and its need to adjust its balance of
payments. In 1972, exports accounted for only one fifth of the
turnover of the Italian arms industry, or about 100 billion lire. In
the following year exports began to increase at an average rate of
21% until 1985; in the second half of the 1970s the yearly rate of
increase reached as much as 36%.
Italy had already established commercial connections in many
countries which were now seeking to buv arms, and did not suffer
other
some of the political obstacles of theAex-imperialist countries. The
industry had reached a technological level through its cooperation
with other Western countries which would satisfy foreign
customers, and was about to embark on an even greater expansion
because of the refurbishment of the Italian armed forces under the
program laws. By the 1970s, Italy's politicians were also expressing
cautious interest in the economic potential of this area of Italian
industry.
104
Between 80 and 91% of Italian exports went to the Third
World, and more than half of all the country's arms exports went to
the oil-producing nations. This was a greater concentration than
that of any other major supplier; the US exported about 50% to the
Third World, the USSR about 75%, France 80% and the UK 73%.80
Italy's dependence on foreign sources for energy and raw materials
is acute. Along with Japan it is the most dependent country on
outside energy sources in the world, and only in the late 1980s began
in earnest to develop alternative sources. It was in large part
because of the rise in oil prices in the 1970s that Italy's respectable
trade record of the previous decade fell into deep crisis. By August
1976 the foreign debt to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the
EEC, West Germany and other international capital sources had
reached a high of 17 billion.81
By region, Africa (including OPEC members) received the
greatest amount of Italian arms exports, accounting for
approximately a third of the transfers. Libya was the highest
recipient, with about $700 million of Italian war materiel in its
arsenal by the early 1980s. The Middle East and Latin America were
the next highest consumers of Italian arms. In the period 1979 to
1983, when Africa received 31% of Italian weapons exports, the
Middle East bought 27% and Latin America 23.5%. After Libya,
Venezuela was Italy's most important customer, with about $550
million in purchases. Somalia and Iraq both imported arms worth
$410 million from Italy.82 Italy had a wide range of smaller
customers which provided a steady clientele for the Italian industry.
In the period 1979-1981, Italy reached the ranking of fourth
largest exporter of major weapons systems in the world, after the
80S1PRI Yearbook 1985, p. 346.
81Donald Sassoon, "The Making of Italian Foreign Policy," in William
Wallace, ed., Foreign Policy Making in Western Europe (Westmead, Farnborough,
Hants.: Saxon House, 1979), p. 92.
8^Archivio Disarmo, Scheda COD IB no. 13, Rome, 5 May 1986.
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Soviet Union, the US, and France. The Italian weapons exporters
had maintained such a low profile that a major study published in
the same year made almost no reference to the Italian trade in
arms.83 Italy held a 4.3% share of the world market, followed by the
UK with 3.6% and the FRG with 3%.84 By the middle of the decade,
however, conditions began to change to the disadvantage of many
Italian suppliers. Many Third World armed forces had satiated
their desire for arms; tensions in the Persian Gulf eased, and many
of Italy's former customers themselves became aggressive
armaments exporters. In the late 1980s Italy had fallen to eighth
place among world exporters, behind the USSR, the USA, France,
the UK, China, the FRG and Czechoslovakia. In 1988 alone it fell
below all of those countries as well as Sweden and the Netherlands;
it was also nearly surpassed by its client Brazil. Exports of major
systems were thought to bring in about $397 million to Italy.85 The
surge of the previous decade had come in response to forces outside
of Italy, and when the Italian share of the arms market dropped
steeply, manufacturers were forced to devise new strategies. Their
new aim was to enlist government support for the industry, and to
seek broader outlets in "legitimate" markets, such as joint ventures
within NATO.
83Andrew Pierre's Council on Foreign Relations study of world arms industries
does not mention the dimensions of the Italian trade and does not list it as one of the
world's major suppliers.
8aSIPRI Yearbook 1982, p. 176.
85SIPRI Yearbook 1989, p. 199.
CHAPTER FOUR
The Individual Sectors of the ItalianDefence Industry
The Italian Aerospace Industry
Origins
The tradition of Italian aviation dates back to Leonardo da
Vinci, but the first experiments in aircraft production began in the
early 1900s.1 The company Aermacchi claims to be the oldest in
Italy, and the second oldest in the world.2 Giovanni Agusta,
Giovanni Agnelli of FIAT and the first of the Piaggio industrialists
were also aircraft enthusiasts who introduced aviation production to
their family businesses. Agusta produced the AG-1 glider in 1901;
FIAT began airplane construction in 1907 and motor production a
year later. Piaggio had made a fortune in shipbuilding and railroad
construction before entering the aeronautics field in 1915.
The Italians undertook many experimental projects in the field
of aviation, including production of the largest aircraft built during
World War II, a quadrimotore constructed by Piaggio,3 and a plane
designed for testing pressurization for other aeronautics
developments.4 Aviation pioneers such as Italo Balbo spurred the
development of aircraft technology in Italy in the early 20th century.
But the aerospace industry did not succeed in producing aircraft in
the quantities necessary to support Mussolini's military contribution
to Axis forces.
Accustomed to dependence on stronger foreign military
industries, the Italians followed American initiatives when aircraft
production resumed after the creation of NATO. The Italian Air
dexter Jerome Smith, "Italy's Changing Defence Posture, Defence, January
1988.
2Affz parlamentari, IX Legislatura, 14 March 1986, n. 4, p. 1.
^Atti parlamentari, IX Legislatura, 14 March 1986, n. 4, p. 8.
4Atti parlamentari, IX Legislatura, 14 March 1986, n. 4, p. 8.
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Force was among the earliest beneficiaries of the Mutual Defense
Aid Program.5 In the aerospace field, however, American
collaboration in the early years was considered by some in retrospect
as a hindrance to industrial growth, rather than a spur to expansion
and innovation. The supply of free American equipment
in effect was a grave impediment for the Italian
aeronautics industry to following up efforts to update
technology, since the supply of support material for
the aircraft — equipment, motors and spare parts ~
was automatically passed to American firms.6
Italy and the World Aircraft Industry
As Italy remained a client of the American aeronautics
establishment, it was naturally affected by the larger trends of the
world industry. Military demand sparked an explosion in world
aircraft production. In the first three decades after the war, 76
different types (and 144 variants) of aircraft were put into service by
the US, USSR, France and the United Kingdom.7 The fast expansion
of the industry was fueled by extremely high investments for
research and production. Unit costs of military aircraft rose as much
as five-fold from one generation to the next, both in Europe and the
US.8 The spiralling costs were responsible for the decline in the
1970s of construction of fighter aircraft in the United States, which is
now carried out by only four companies. Companies engaged in
5FRUS, Volume III, 1950 p.
6Ministero del Bilancio e della programmazione economica, Relazione Caron,
Rome 1970, p. 42, cited in Armi: nuovo modello di sviluppo? p. 129
7Howe, p. xxv.
8Ulrich Albrecht, "The Federal Republic of Germany and Italy: New
Strategies of Mid-Sized Weapons Exporters?" Journal of International Affairs, Vol.
40 No. 1, summer 1986, p. 134.
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commercial aircraft production outside of the Eastern bloc declined
as well from eight to five firms between 1959 and 1986.9
Aeronautics is perhaps the sector where many major features
of the defence establishment are most pronounced. It is most
affected by frequent mergers and takeovers, recourse to consortia for
sharing research and development costs and effecting economies of
scale in production, and the frequent use of high "mediation fees" to
ensure the success of contracts. In Italy price containment is not
encouraged by the high level of state ownership, which permits
firms to carry losses and protects them almost unconditionally from
bankrupcy.
In its advanced stage of development in the 1980s the Italian
industry was not immune to the greater problems of world
aeronautics industries, in which an emphasis on high performance
military applications and an inability to contain costs was holding
back progress of the sector:
The [Second World] war and the subsequent
dependence on the military market can be said to
have stunted the development of the aircraft
industry, to have shifted the industry from the design
emphasis characteristic of the early phases of an
industry, which involved increasing returns as each
new investment yielded important innovations, to
the design emphasis characteristic of the later stages
of an industry, more aircraft per aircraft, without ever
going through the stage of production
engineering...The military market froze the structure
of the aircraft industry.10
^Atti parlamentari, IX Legislatura, 13 March 1986, p. 2.




At the start of the postwar period, FIAT, Agusta, Macchi and
Piaggio had converted mostly to civilian production,11 but by the
1950s all of these companies had been attracted again to the military
aircraft field. In 1949, FIAT and Macchi acquired the licence to build
150 Vampire fighters from the British firm DeHavilland. Then at its
peak, DeHavilland was especially noted for the fact that it was one of
the few companies in the world to produce motors, like FIAT. As a
result of the agreement, "a vast network of collaboration was set in
motion between the British and Italian industries...In addition,
military pilots and technicians were sent abroad to finish their
training."12
Cooperation with American companies began to overshadow
the early Anglo-Italian partnership when FIAT received the licence
to produce the F-86K Sabre fighter-interceptor in 1956. This project,
part of the American Mutual Weapon Development Program,
"mobilised the entire Italian aeronautics industry."13 Technology
was received from the US to manufacture the planes and the Italian
industry invested heavily in new machinery both for assembling the
planes and carrying out the finer electronics processes involved in
the avionics systems. The new equipment acquisitions were
considered "bona fide jewels of technology" for the nascent industry
in Italy.14
Italian aeronautics scored its first postwar success with the
construction of FIAT's G-91 for NATO. Macchi's MB-326 tactical
support aircraft and several Piaggio models also represented
technological achievements for the Italians. In the case of the MB-





326, about 850 models were exported over 20 years, and licences to
produce the plane were sold to Australia, Brazil and South Africa.15
Aermacchi tied its fortune to the trainer jet MB-326
which was widely exported besides being in service in
the Italian armed forces. In this case the foreign
orders were particularly significant, since they
illustrated the competitive potential of models
designed in Italy without the support of NATO or the
USA. Aermacchi entered into collaboration with
Lockheed, which bought some of its shares and
enabled Macchi to produce the light multi-role AL-60
aircraft.16
In 1961 Italy participated as a junior partner in the NATO
consortium for the production of the Lockheed F-104G along with
West Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and the US; the
American firm retained export rights for the aircraft.
State Involvement and the Creation of Aeritalia in the 1960s
The industry was given special assistance under Andreotti's
tenure at the Ministry of Defence in the mid-1960s. He announced
to a parliamentary commission that "we have sought to lend
government assistance, within the limits of our budget, to the
various Italian aeronautics industries," and when opportunities for
international collaborations arose, "a certain level of assistance was
furnished to private firms on the part of the government."17 The
aeronautics industry was evidently an increasingly important
symbol for this politician who had witnessed Italian developments
since the time of De Gasperi. During a public speech at the opening
15Armz: nuovo modello di sviluppo? p. 130.
16Boldrini and D'Alessio, p. 227.
17Giulio Andreotti, cited in Carlo Federici, "Verso un complesso militare
industriale?" II Potere Militare in Italia, p. 187.
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of an international air show, Andreotti heaped praise upon FIAT's
Gabrielli:
We now have the joy of considering the field of
aeronautics not only as a glory of the past, but as an
active living reality. We can see through the 50
billion lire worth of aeronautics production, and
through the modest exports (31 billion last year), an
affirmation of the great importance of our types of
aircraft, and here I would like to state that the plane
that shone most brilliantly [was] the G-91 which by
winning an international competition, a NATO
competition, has not only brought benefits to an
industry, and to a complex of industries, but also has
done a great good for our country...Professor Gabrielli,
you may not have the fame of a diva or a great sports
champion, but I believe that you can carry on your
conscience the certainty that you have rendered a
great service to the dignity of our country.18
Between 1966 and 1969 the Caron Commission undertook an
investigation in the Italian Parliament into the possible
rationalisation of the Italian aeronautics industry. The sector had
profited greatly from cooperation led successfully by FIAT-
Aviazione, which united Aerfer, Macchi, and Piaggio SLAI in the
construction of the G-222 transport plane for the Ministry of
Defence. Recalled Gabrielli:
The division of labour [in building the G-222], which
began from the development phase of the project,
occurred for the first time in Italy. An intense
collaboration was established among hundreds of
technicians, engineers, and specialised
designers...besides, naturally, the complicated
relations of the administrators and accountants. The
men of the different firms did excellent work and the
18quoted in Gabrielli, p. 176.
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collaboration was experienced in a truly praiseworthy
spirit.19
In 1969, FIAT-Aviazione, Air-Fer and Salmoiraghi were
combined under a new company, Aeritalia, with partial state control
(under IRI's subsidiary Finmeccanica) and some private
shareholdings (through FIAT). The mixed ownership of the
company ended when FIAT pulled out in 1976.
This still left Aermacchi, Piaggio and other firms in open
competition. Further rationalisation followed in 1981, when
Aeritalia took shareholdings in other aerospace companies in Italy.20
The merger followed the trend of other European industries, such as
the British sector which nearly 20 years earlier had reduced over 30
firms into groups concentrated around helicopters (Westland), fixed-
wing airplanes (British Aerospace) and motors (Rolls Royce).21
Once the problem of fragmentation had been partially
addressed, Italy was prepared to enter the international market and
greatly increase its production. By the late 1960s aeronautics had
already reached a level of relative maturity among defence-related
industries in Italy, and was prepared to respond more efficiently to
the large demand that appeared in the following decade. Rapid
growth followed in the 1970s and 1980s, even by the standards of the
booming defence field.
Between 1968 and 1978, production leapt by 15 times, compared
to the average 1,000% growth of the rest of the defence industry.
Profits and employment also increased at a slightly greater pace in
aerospace than in other types of defence production.22 From 1975 to
1980, the turnover was estimated to have tripled, from 460 million
(current lire) to 1,500 million. Employment levels rose from an
19Gabrielli, p. 207.
20International Defense Review, April 1982, p. 437
21Ath' parlamentari, IX Legislatura, 14 March 1986, p. 19.
22 "II sistema economico della difesa," p. 235.
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estimated 31,500 to 40,70023 thus finally regaining the levels under
Mussolini.24 In the 1980s, aerospace confronted obstacles but
nevertheless recorded steady growth, such as a 15% increase in
turnover recorded between 1983 and 1984.25 During this time about
60% of the aerospace industry in Italy was geared toward defence,26
but production continued to be spread among a number of firms
which often had competing interests even under the umbrella of the
state-holding system.
Aeritalia and the MRCA Tornado
From its inception Aeritalia embarked on the Tornado project
with West Germany's Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm and British
Aerospace, to build the successor to the F-104. Of all of these
companies that came together in the Panavia consortium based in
West Germany, Aeritalia was the smallest. It was responsible for
building all the wings at its production centre near Turin.27 Italy's
initial share of 15% was reduced to 12.3%, and the Italian Air Force
agreed to acquire 100 models.28 By 1988, 809 aircraft had been
produced, and with renewed orders from West Germany, Oman and
Saudi Arabia, Panavia projected that sales would reached 1,000
aircraft.
23Angiola Contini and Sergio Parazzini, "L'industria militare italiana negli
anni '70" in Spese militari, tecnologia, e rapporti Nord-Sud (Milan: Vita e pensiero,
1982), p. 206.
24Boldrini and D'Alessio, p.226.
28Financial Times, Italian Defence Industry Survey, 28 July 1986.
26 "II sistema economico della difesa," p. 42.
27Dexter Jerome Smith, "Italy's Defence Industry," Defence, January 1988, p.
58.
28Contini and Parazzini, p. 213.
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The defects of the aircraft were evident from its inception, and
although the Tornado continued to be sold in Europe and the Third
World well into the 1980s, most countries, including Italy,
simultaneously drafted plans for its successor.
This "splendid machine" is, in fact, an expensive
compromise between the differing requirements of
national armed forces and the differing capabilities of
national arms manufacturers. The RAF wanted
Tornado for long-range strike and strategic air
defence...the Germans wanted a plane for battlefield
support, and the Italians wanted a plane for air
superiority. None of these roles is easy to
reconcile...In the end, Tornado cannot satisfactorily
fulfill any of its roles, except perhaps the long-range
nuclear mission, which does not require a heavy
payload...Even in its nuclear strike role, Tornado will
have many "wasted characteristics," like its STOL
capability.29
The costs of the Tornado were certainly higher than Italy would
have paid if it continued as a client of the American industry. Italy's
role both as a customer and supplier in major aircraft projects could
have been substituted with contracts for American aircraft, as
outright purchases or under licenced production.30 Nonetheless,
Italy adhered to the successor program launched in the 1980s, the
European Fighter Aircraft (EFA).
Aeritalia experienced continuous expansion throughout the
1980s. From a turnover of only 50 billion lire in 1971, the company
surpassed the 1,600 billion mark in 1986, with 55% attributed to
foreign sales.31 Between 1986 and 1987 the company's turnover
again increased by 13% to 1,586 billion lire with a 40% rise in
29T/ze Baroque Arsenal, pp. 189-190.
30Financial Times, Italian Defence Industry Survey, 28 July 1986.
3117 sole-24 ore, 6 March 1987, p. 11.
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earnings.32 The group was involved in 30 joint ventures in the late
1980s (although not all in the military field). Foreign collaborators
include aeronautics companies in the United States (Boeing,
McDonnell-Douglas, General Electric, Pratt & Whitney), the United
Kingdom (British Aerospace), France (Aerospatiale, Matra), the
Federal Republic of Germany (MBB, Dornier), Brazil (Embraer),
Spain (Casa), and the People's Republic of China.33
Piaggio
Aeritalia also began to take partial ownership of the Piaggio
group. When Aeritalia purchased 34% of the company's
shareholdings in February 1988, Piaggio employed 1,700 workers at
two facilities in Liguria, and its annual turnover stood at about 186
billion lire.34 Piaggio aimed to keep its status as essentially a private
concern, remaining under the leadership of Rinaldo Piaggio. While
its real specialisation was business aircraft, it also became involved
in many of the major projects undertaken by state-owned concerns.
Piaggio was involved in production of the G-222 transport plane and
of the Tornado with Aeritalia, and built engines and components for
the Agusta A-129 Mangusta helicopter and the Aeritalia-Aermacchi-
Embraer AMX fighter.35
Aermacchi
Another of the well-established firms, Aermacchi, joined FIAT
in co-production of the DeHavilland Vampire fighter in the early
postwar years. Macchi had an independent success in the form of
the MB-326 and the more recent MB-339 trainers, which sold several
33-Corriere della sera, 20 March 1988.
33Il Sole-24 Ore, 11 Jan 1987.
34L« Repubblica ,19 February 1988.
35 Jane's Defence Weekly, 14 Sept 1985.
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hundred models. Like the other firms, most of Macchi's work
pivoted on collaborative efforts, with FIAT and with Aeritalia. The
latter bought a 25% share in Macchi as a result of favourable results
of their cooperation.36 Collaborative work on the Tornado and the
G-222 transport plane was followed by the development of the AMX.
The aircraft was billed as a successor to the G-91 and the F-104G, but
was also believed to be designed to cover functions in which the
multi-role Tornado was found inadequate. From its programming
stage, the development of the AMX represented a departure in
Italian aeronautics - and indeed in the world aircraft industry. The
Brazilian Air Force and aircraft company Embraer were Macchi's
collaborators on the AMX, and this time had a significant input
during the planning stages, in contrast to the era beginning 10 years
earlier when the Brazilians produced approximately 190 MB-326
trainers under Macchi's licence. With the AMX, a major Western
company took into consideration the requirements of a less
developed nation in planning a new aircraft. The Brazilians had a
30% stake in the project and were expected to deliver their locally-
produced models in the spring of 1989. The aircraft was consigned to
the Italian Air Force in November 1988.
FIAT
In the field of aviation, FIAT was one of the most successful
and innovative Italian concerns. Following the Second World War,
FIAT-Aviazione cooperated on the licence-production of the
Vampire and the F-86K, and later developed its own model, the G-
91. FIAT merged its aviation production with Finmeccanica in 1969,
and began to withdraw from building complete military aircraft, in
favour of production of motors. FIAT sold its shares in Aeritalia in
1976 as a final break from full-scale production. Instead the
company sought to increase its two thirds share of the motor-
3&Atti parlamentari, IX Legislatura, 14 March 1986, p. 6.
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producing field, which it had entered relatively late in comparison
with its rivals Piaggio and Alfa Romeo Avionics.37 FIAT sought to
rationalise the industry by simply driving less competitive firms out
of the market. Most other countries, even those with large military
industries, have only one or two companies producing motors.38
FIAT's new strategy focussed on increasing its civilian production to
50% of the firm's activity, through joint ventures with Pratt and
Whitney, Rolls Royce, MTU of West Germany, and several Japanese
firms.39 FIAT concentrated its efforts in the production of motors
and mechanical components at the expense of repeated offers to
enter the helicopter and aircraft ventures. The Director General of
FIAT-Aviazione depicted this voluntary act of rationalisation as a
favour to the aeronautics world in Italy:
Beginning in 1970 we began to realise that military
production alone, destined for Italian defence
purposes, could not allow us to expand the firm the
way we would have liked. Therefore we began to cast
around to construct a network of collaboration, above
all with the United States. The result of this is that
today we have a military production that responds to
the requests of our government for the nation's
defence.40
Agusta and Italian Helicopter Production
Italy's place in the helicopter market is dominated by Agusta.
The company also produces fixed-wing aircraft such as the S-lll
trainer, a competitor of Aeritalia's MB-336. The company's
emphasis on helicopter production dates from 1952 when it began a
long tradition of work under licence from the American firms Bell,
37Atti parlamentari, IX Legislatura, 25 March 1986, p. 7.
38Atti parlamentari, IX Legislatura, 13 March 1986, p. 10.
39Atti parlamentari, IX Legislatura, 14 March 1986, no. 4, pp. 19-20.
40Atti parlamentari, IX Legislatura, 14 March 1986, no. 4, p. 19.
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Sikorsky and later Boeing Vertol and Hughes. During this time
helicopters were first used on a large scale during the Korean War
and world production expanded rapidly. Agusta received exclusive
rights for the export of two Bell versions, the 204B and 205, for
Europe, North Africa and the Middle East. Independently designed
models were first introduced in the 1960s, usually using American
or British motors.
Agusta's absorption into the Socialist-controlled EFIM state-
holding firm began in 1973 and reached 98% by 1984. The public
sector served as a safety net in the early 1980s when the company
encountered loss-making years. In these same years Agusta had
consolidated a reputation as one of the leading helicopter
manufacturers in the world. Agusta accounted for approximately a
quarter of all the Italian aeronautics turnover, with a heavy reliance
on exports. Former president of Agusta Raffaello Teti estimated that
sales to approximately 85 foreign clients accounted for four-fifths of
the company's production.41 Agusta claimed to hold a 15% quota of
world helicopter production beginning in the 1970s, which the
company planned to increase.
Agusta became a "common denominator" in joint European
helicopter production42 and in the mid-1980s began infusing the
equivalent of 25% of its turnover into research and development.43
After the success of the A-109 model, Agusta embarked on an
ambitious project to develop an anti-tank helicopter, without the
collaboration of other countries, at a time when France and West
Germany were beginning a similar project. The A-129 Mangusta
anti-tank helicopter was developed for the Italian army at a cost of
41Raffaello Teti, "L'incLustria aeronautica," Rivista militare, July-August
1987, p. 12.
42"European Helicopter Projects," Financial Times, 10 April 1987.
43Teti, p. 12.
119
700 billion lire for the Italian army and failed to receive foreign
orders in its early years.
One of the strange features of NATO procurement is
that France and West Germany were in 1984
ponderously setting forth on the development of a
dedicated anti-tank helicopter for service after 1991,
while in Italy an exactly similar machine is already
flying. The A-129 is Western Europe's only
helicopter in this class, and it has been planned to
meet the needs of all customers until at least the year
2000...Equipment includes...for the first time on a
helicopter an integrated multiplex system to
centralise management of all systems.44
The design had the unprecedented status for an Italian
helicopter, however, of being adopted by a European consortium for
the production of the new Tonal project.
The collaboration with Westland on the EH-101 naval and
utility helicopter resulted in production of 150 units for the Italian
Navy and for the British Navy and Army. There were few other
orders to offset the £650m costs of the system, which made it the
most expensive helicopter ever produced in Western Europe. Chief
of the Italian Navy, Admiral Vittorio Marulli, described the new
helicopter's roles:
It is the only ASW [anti-submarine warfare]
helicopter of the 1990s generation...[and] will be
equipped with radar, an integrated acoustic
system...an ESM system, and possibly night vision
equipment. The combat system will be completely
automated and will be connected via data link to
other air/sea forces. In short, the EH-101 is designed
to be the first truly multi-role naval helicopter,
44B. Gunston, Illustrated Guide to Future Fighter and Combat Aircraft
(London: Salamander, 1984), pp. 138-139.
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capable of carrying out both ASW and anti-ship
operations completely autonomously45.
Agusta was shaken by its involvement in the unsuccessful
European consortium attemntincr f-n amyre Westland in 1986; Teti
difficulties arising from the Westland affair
attributed the ^ to Vhe uemenaous pressure placed on the
four European manufacturers of helicopters to counter the equal
number of highly successful American producers.
Agusta's marked dependence on exports forced the company to
resort to new strategies, including more aggressive marketing and
the pursuit of the most sophisticated technology to satisfy potential
customers. Huge losses in the early 1980s were reversed by strong
profits in 1987, and Agusta anticipated continuing demand from the
military, for instance, for the NATO helicopter (NH-90). But
Agusta's corner of the military market shrank steadily in the 1980s
and the company began to test its strengths in the civilian sector. In
the field of helicopters for use by business executives, Agusta even
began to penetrate the American market, with a production centre
in the Eastern United States.
Ties in the United States were important to the company,
because despite Agusta's strong leanings toward European and
particularly British cooperation, scientific collaboration with the
United States also remained essential for its livelihood.46 As will be
discussed later, the international cooperation which had brought
high standards to Italian industry became an even greater necessity,
both for gaining the necessary input to the industry in terms of
know-how and capital, and for finding an outlet for the products.
Agusta, like most Italian defence firms, was dependent on its
international network at every stage of its production. Teti wrote of
Agusta in 1987:
45Defence Attache, No. 2 1984, pp. 30-31.
46"L'industria aeronautica," p. 14.
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Agusta's strategy showed a marked dependence on
international markets and collaboration. A decisive
incentive to this process came from new programs,
already in process or just launched, that we sought to
open for collaboration with all of those countries, and
there are many of them, which could possibly be
interested in developing them with us.47
A former lawyer with specialisation in navigation law and an
experienced pilot, Teti resigned in November 1988 in protest of the
political interference in the company's activity.
The Shipbuilding Sector
High Level of State Ownership
The shipbuilding sector was brought under state supervision
earlier than any of the other sectors. A law introduced under
Mussolini in 1937 grouped all companies in naval production with
over 100 billion lire in capital under the auspices of IRI, established
four years earlier. This effectively brought 80% of the shipbuilding
industry into the hands of the state which had fostered its
emergence a half-century earlier as an extension of the national steel
industry. Shipbuilding in Italy developed as a primarily loss-
making sector48 and with only a small ratio of defence to civil
production, about one to ten, the opposite of the aeronautics
industry.49
The government took further measures to concentrate the
industry with the establishment in 1959 of an autonomous wing of
IRI, Fincantieri, which united Finmeccanica's shipbuilding
subsidiaries, Navalmeccanica, Ansaldo, and Cantieri Riuniti
47L'industria aeronautica," p. 13.
48Armi: nuovo modello di sviluppo? p. 224.
49Armi: nuovo modello di sviluppo? p. 132.
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deH'Adriatico.50 At that time Italy held about 4-5% of world
production. The Caron Commission which revitalised the
aeronautics industry also made recommendations for the
shipbuilding industry which sparked a seven-year restructuring
program. The major elements of the sector were organised around
Fincantieri and EFIM's holding, Cantiere Navale Breda as well as
Piaggio, the only private element. A new company for turbine
motor production was created within Finmeccanica; diesel motors
were consigned solely to Grandi Motori Trieste, in which FIAT and
Fincantieri each had a 50% stake. EFIM's policy
gave rise to an enormous expansion of the facilities, a
doubling of the workforce (from 1,350 to 2,880 over
the decade 1968-1977), to a duplication of the
productive capabilities of the Fincantieri shipyards
and a struggle with no holds barred for the
acquisition of foreign contracts. The results of this
strategy...were a further aggravation of the precarious
productive and financial balance of the sector, which
was force-fed with investments but wanting for
contracts. In the summer of 1979 Cantiere Navale
Breda was finally given over to Fincantieri, its former
competitor.51
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Fincantieri and its subsidiary
Italcantieri emerged as the main focus of the sector in Italy, with
increased shareholdings in important shipyards which had been
successful in civil production and were reconverted to military uses,
including refitting of old warships.52
Shipbuilding has experienced greater state protection than
other sectors related to defence, but it has also encountered the
greatest economic difficulties. With the rise in air travel as a means
50Armi: nuovo modello di sviluppo? p. 133.
51 Armz: nuovo modello di sviluppo? p. 140.
52International Defense Review, April 1982.
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of transport for both goods and people the world shipping industry-
went into severe decline in the postwar period.53 Italian
shipbuilding in the 1950s was hit by the rise in world competition
primarily from Japan, combined with the drop in demand.
Employment fell from 27,500 in 1957 to 18,700 in 1969.54 After
unions accepted rationalisation measures, shipyard workers in
Genoa and Trieste went on strike in November 1967.55 A
subsequent upsurge in production was soon brought to an end by
the crisis in the petroleum industry in 1973. The government
nonetheless attempted to maintain employment levels, especially at
shipyards in the South.
Expansion of Italian Shipbuilding
The necessity for the government to make a choice between
maximizing the industry's efficiency to the greatest extent possible
and subsidizing its continued losses in support of the industry's jobs
was partially avoided by the emergence of another factor: an increase
in demand from the nation's armed forces. The Naval Law sparked
a tremendous rise in production in the domestic sphere, which was
followed by a string of contracts for foreign navies. In the early 1980s
Italy became Europe's leading warship builder.56 Its dependence on
military orders for 40% of its production is "exceptionally high" by
Western standards.57
53Armi: nuovo modello di sviluppo? p. 132.
54Daniel Todd, The World Shipbuilding Industry (London: Croom Helm,
1985), p. 298.
55Modern Italy, p. 375.
56Antony Preston, "Italy's Naval Industry," Defence, January 1988, p. 60.
57Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson, Arms Transfers to the Third World
1971-1985 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 79.
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Under Fincantieri the naval industry increased its production
of defence vessels in the 1980s by 40%.58 Frigates and destroyers were
produced at Riva Trigoso and fitted at Muggiano, while submarine
production was concentrated at Monfalcone. Intermarine built
specialised minehunters at Sarzana. Industry leaders claimed that
despite the period of success in foreign sales, the industry's structure
was geared primarily toward domestic needs. The boom in
international orders was covered by taking advantage of the
facilities' excess capacity and re-opening disused yards for short-term
use. Thus the sector did not make international sales a critical part
of its industrial strategy. It remained the closest to a real wing of the
state, designed to fill the flow of orders from the Italian Navy, and
providing jobs which are in turn protected by a state-subsidized lay¬
off program. The output of the shipbuilding industry, unlike other
sectors, was for the most part a catalogue of the Italian fleet. Smaller
firms trying to break into the market on primarily international
orders, such as Pichiotti, Crestitalia, Cantieri Liguri and Azimut
faced considerable risks.59
Production in the 1980s included Minerva-class corvettes as
well as a series of minehunters, a field in which the Italians excel.
This type of vessel was brought into use during Western efforts to
free the Suez and the Persian Gulf of mines during Middle East
conflicts in the 1980s. The Italians have a large share of the
minehunting market with their Lenci-class model.60 The Italian
Navy has supported an innovative, autonomous industry in
submarine building throughout the postwar period. Aside from
several generations of the Sauro class, the Italian Navy also operates
58 "II sistema economico della difesa,"p. 42.
59 Navy International, June 1986, p. 332.
60 Navy International, p. 329.
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four small Enrico Toff-class submarines dating to the 1960s and two
USN Tang vessels.61
The focus of recent Italian shipbuilding was the construction
and launching of the Giuseppe Garibaldi. The new flagship of the
Italian fleet, delivered in July 1985, was the biggest ship produced by
Fincantieri since World War II.
By the late 1980s the Italian military shipbuilding industry faced
steep decline. Domestic orders were expected to keep shipyards
open; activity centred on the construction of the destroyers Animoso
and Ardimentoso, at about $1.1 billion, to replace the aging
Impavido series. Substantial foreign orders, especially along the
lines of the Iraqi order (see Chapter 7), were not anticipated. Like
West Germany and the Netherlands, Italy sought to increase its
share of the refitting market for old ships; but this business was
usually reserved for the original suppliers.62 In March 1988 IRI's
Fincantieri announced a new rationalisation plan intended to cut
20% of its workforce, or about 4,500 jobs. Unlike similar measures 20
years earlier, the redundancies did not appear to provoke
widespread protest since they were couched in terms of early
retirement and incentive plans.63 Although Fincantieri termed the
move a "recovery plan," it was evident that the Italian shipbuilding
sector was facing severe reductions.
Electronics
The electronics industry has penetrated every corner of the
defence field. Advanced technology in its many forms, radar,
information systems, communications, avionics, missiles and
61Jane's Defence Weekly, 23 August 1986.
62Jane's Defence Weekly, 19 December 1987, p. 1426.
63"Fincantieri prepares for competition," Italian Business Trends, March 1988,
p. 40.
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miscellaneous components, have made electronics systems an
inextricable feature of modern weaponry. The explosion of
advanced technology is the most significant development in its field
since the Second World War.
Aside from nuclear weapons which, with their
terrifying destructive capability, have monopolised
public interest and as a result have overshadowed
every other innovation, in the realm of conventional
weapons the major innovation is represented by the
entrance on the industrial scene of a new actor:
electronics. In the space of 15 years, this sector has
conquered the principal role...If we put the events of
the past 40 years in historical perspective, we can see
that the place occupied by the metal and mechanical
industry since the rise of the industrial warfare (that
is, from the time of the American Civil War), and
culminating in the Second World War, has now been
overtaken by electronics.64
Italy began to place more emphasis on electronics when
demand for conventional weaponry rebounded in the 1960s.
Nuclear weapons represented a technical solution to the problem of
meeting the threat from the Warsaw Pact, since no Western country
wanted to pay the price to match the Eastern bloc tank for tank. As
NATO doctrine went through a series of revisions, nuclear
retaliation was no longer considered the most effective response to
every hypothetical act of aggression. The Alliance reorientated its
defences on the doctrine of "flexible response," a gracWed scale of
military actions, which would rangejfrom the use of a variety of
conventional weapons before the nuclear threshold.
NATO -members were forced to support the tremendous
development costs for the partial withdrawal from the "nuclear
64Michele Nones and Secondo Rolfo. "L'elettronica per la difesa in Italia e in
Europa," Strategia Globale, April 1984, p. 63.
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umbrella." Mines, missiles and intelligence systems emerged as the
new "technological solution" to perceived threats from the Eastern
bloc and from new unpredictable forces in the Third World.
Electronics even produced its own technological offspring, in the
form of a new field of systems to coordinate and integrate the
electronics systems themselves.65 Research in countries with strong
scientific endowments advanced at such a pace that the relationship
between technology and doctrine often came into question: did
defence needs determine technological innovation, or did the
scientific capabilities available determine the military doctrine?
At the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, the
expansion of the industry on a world scale came into full force, as
electronic systems had crucial applications in every aspect of warfare.
Innovations emerged at an astounding pace. Swift obsolescence kept
the lifetime of many systems very short, while rising costs made
new procurement a major strain on the budgets of Western armed
forces.
Electronics in Italy
Investment by international electronics companies in Italy was
the point of departure for the domestic sector. The Swiss companies
Oerlikon-Buehrle and Contraves set up Italian subsidiaries between
1949 and 1952 and began making artillery and electronic apparatuses.
General Electric ran a factory in Italy, supervised from 1950 on by its
subsidiary CGE-FIAR. This company produced the Italian Army's
first radar system.66 The Italian state also set the industry in motion
with the creation of various companies within IRI's Finmeccanica
division beginning in the 1950s. These firms were supported by
mixed private and public ownership and included the establishment
65Nones and Rolfo, p. 65.
66Armz: nuovo modello di sviluppo? p. 131.
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of the company that would become Selenia,67 which grew to be
Italy's largest electronics interest by the 1980s.
The first two decades of the industry were devoted mainly to
licenced production, but collaboration in international projects was
another means of bringing the Italians the level of know-how and
prestige that would prepare them for an enormous expansion in the
1970s. Notable collaborations in the early years included work with
the European consortium for the Hawk missile, adopted by NATO
forces in 1959, and the production of radar for the F-104G aircraft.68
By the 1980s, the Italian industry was among the most
productive and profitable in the world in this competitive and costly
field, for both civilian and military purposes. The electronics field is
perhaps the supreme example of the Italians making something out
of nothing. How did they penetrate a market that requires producers
to find substantial investments and push the frontiers of the field
with every new project?
Italian Strategies
Most of the success can be attributed to the attention to creating
products that were highly "personalized,"69 or highly adaptable. This
meant producing components of weapons which were not fulfilled
by other nations' suppliers, or producing weapons that were
interchangeable with products in use which could be adapted to
survive generational changes. Italy has succeeded in re-working
technology of mid-level sophistication that was made available
through various forms of international collaboration. Although the
Italians found customers for some of their highly advanced output,
most of their sales fell into the middle range of the market. "There
is never a requirement for tomorrow's technology," one
67Armi: nuovo modello di sviluppo? p. 131.
68Armz: nuovo modello di sviluppo? pp. 131-132.
69Armi: nuovo modello di sviluppo? p. 223.
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industrialist explained of the defence industry's relation to the
Italian Navy.70 Systems with a low technological content could be
delivered within a relatively short period of time, perhaps five
years.71
Designing systems that can be altered to fulfill different
requirements has been a source of success for the Italian industry.
The Albatros missile system, for instance, was introduced by Selenia
in the 1970s for naval purposes when sales in warships were
reaching a peak. In the 1980s, however, the system's basic structure
with a "semi-active guidance system" was transformed into the
Spada land-based battery, using Italian Aspide anti-aircraft missiles.
The Aspide itself was a well-worn model which received gradual
modifications over its ten-year lifespan and was a tremendously
successful export. The Aspide missile was later modified to replace
the NATO Seasparrow, and as a further example of the Italians'
concentration on versatility within a single system, Seasparrow
launchers had the possibility of being refitted to take Aspide rounds
and if necessary converted back to the Seasparrozv system.72 Still
another instance of Italian marketing in the 1980s is the case of
SNIA's rocket launcher designed in part for export to three
unspecified Middle Eastern clients: the calibre is the same as the
Soviet BM-21 model which is widely used in the Third World.73
Another key to the progress of the electronics sector is the
recourse to consortia and joint ventures both within Italy and with
foreign concerns. In the case of Elettronica, collaboration with
Plessey resulted in the acquisition of a 35% stake in^ Italian company
by the British firm. Uncertainties about Plessey's future were
perhaps partially responsible for continuous loss-making years in
70"Italy's Naval Industry."
71 "Italy's Naval Industry."
72"Italy's Naval Industry."
73L4/ 1983-1984, p. 187.
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the 1980s during which Elettronica laid off one seventh of its
workforce. Elettronica is one of the most dependent of all Italy's
electronics firms on defence sales. As its military contracts
continued to shrink, the firm was considering branching out into
bio-medical engineering.
The electronics field is highly fragmented in Italy. There are
about 54 companies which manufacture for defence.74 Small firms
are scattered about the country, each usually specialising in limited
projects which sometimes face stiff competition even among
domestic firms. The most successful companies have come together
in consortia when their survival depends on involvement in
"complete packages" such as the complete technology for the sale of
a warship. The Melara Club groups ten such suppliers from
different fields for coordination of naval warfare systems.75 Selenia-
ELSAG, Elettronica, Elmer, Breda, and OTO-Melara (guns and
missiles), and FIAT's Whitehead (torpedoes).
Whitehead and ELSAG also came together in a consortium
known as WELSE to counter Italy's gap in production for
underwater warfare. Although the Italian Navy's increasing
submarine activity would suggest the presence of an industry to
support it, national forces still rely on an American-designed
surveillance system that is ill-adapted to Mediterranean waters.76
The foreign concern Oerlikon-Buerhle maintained a high military
turnover, falling perhaps seventh after FIAT and the IRI and EFIM
companies.77
Officine Galileo, located in Tuscany, has about a 70%
dependence on military contracts with a highly skilled workforce of
74Nones and Rolfo, p. 81.
75 "Difesa-Industria-Ricerca, "p. 9.
76"Equipped for Many Tasks," Italian Defence Industry Survey, Financial
Times, 28 July 1986.
77 "Difesa-industria-ricerca," p. 4.
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about 1,400.78 Galileo also had the special status among military
contractors of enjoying close collaboration with the wider scientific
community.
Much of Galileo's research is undertaken in
collaboration with universities and research centres
in a tight network of consultation and cooperation.
To relaunch its commitment in the field of optic
electronics, Galileo put forward a proposal in 1986 to
found the Consortium for Optronic Excellence (CEO),
with the University of Florence's departments of
Physics, Electronics and Engineering, and the Institute
of Electromagnetic Wave Research.79
The new collaboration with the universities evidently required
the defence firms to compromise some of their basic objectives.
At the presentation of the consortium's project the
academics discovered a surprise clause which stated
that the research was to be carried out under the
strictest secrecy, prohibiting the publication of the
results of the studies in any form whatsoever.
Arguments burst out and the researchers' objections
prevailed: not only was the cloak of secrecy lifted, but
Article 2 of CEO's statute explicitly stated that the
research carried out would not have military
applications.80
This reflected the willingness, or indeed the necessity, of the
military-orientated industries to make long-term plans along
strategies that eventually would take them out of the defence sector.
78"Camere termiche al posto delle armi," L'Unita, 5 March 1988.
79Mario Pianta, "Esplosivo: La conversione del militare," Politica ed
economia, no. 11, November 1987, p. 56.
80Pianta, pp. 56-57.
CHAPTER FIVE
Italian Foreign Affairs and Defence Cooperation
The New Limits of Italian-American Relations:
The Cruise Missile Deployment and the Achille Lauro Incident
By the time Italy became established as a major arms seller in
the 1980s, its foreign relations had begun to take on a new shape.
The policies of the Socialists, themselves a new phenomenon at the
head of the Italian government, represented a new approach of
Italian leaders to the country's foreign interests. There was a
growing realisation within Italy that the country was now firmly
established as one of the top industrialised countries. From this
came a desire both to consolidate economic successes and to gain
greater recognition, both among Western allies and as trading
partner and humanitarian donor in the Third World.
Two major foreign policy issues defined the new boundaries of
Italian-American relations during this period. The first is the
Euromissiles case. The acceptance by the Italians was crucial for
letting European deployment go forward; without the acceptance by
another continental NATO country, West Germany appeared ready
to refuse the missiles. Besides this external effect, the deployment
marked an important change in Italian politics as well. The support
for the deployment by the PSI was generally seen as a prelude to the
premiership of Craxi, the first time the post of prime minister was
held by a Socialist and the longest-lasting term to date.
Evoking the backing of Atlantic allies became less effective as
an instrument of internal politics. Italy's foreign policy stance was
defused as an issue of domestic struggle by 1977, when all of the
major parties, including the PCI, declared a consensus about the
"twin pillars" of Italian foreign policy: NATO and the European
Economic Community. The resolution, approved 19 October in the
Senate and 1 December in the Chamber,
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expresses positive approval for the direction and the
work of the Italian government at the international
level and in the context of the Atlantic Alliance and
of EEC commitments, which represent the
fundamental points of reference of Italian foreign
policy.1
The PCI did not make its formal break with Moscow until after
the imposition of martial law in Poland in 1981, but fractures had
been evident from the time of the invasions of Czechoslovakia in
1968 and Afghanistan in 1979. With the 1977 Resolution, the PCI
became the only European Communist party to accept NATO.
Nonetheless the ideological make-up of the Communist Party made
it impossible for its leaders to endorse openly the most difficult
elements of Alliance membership such as arms modernisation.
The Socialists and Italian Foreign Affairs
The Euromissile issue legitimised the PSI because their backing
of the deployment brought them into the group of confirmed
Atlanticists in Italian politics. Craxi is generally believed to have
been ill-informed about the strategic significance of the missiles P
Since the strategic implications of the deployment were lost on
all but a few experts, the missiles are generally considered to have
had above all political reverberations. Abroad the Socialists
strengthened ties with the German Social Democrats, and at home,
Craxi finally drew an unmistakable distinction between his
"acceptable" party and the other party of the left, the PCI. While the
lrThis text of the Parliamentary resolution provided by Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.
2Maurizio Cremasco, "The Political Debate on the Deployment of
Euromissiles," International Spectator, vol. XIX, no.2, April-June 1984, p. 117.
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rival PCI leaders could endorse Italy's adherence to NATO and the
EEC in the abstract, they were still reluctant to show support for
many American initiatives and were not the recipient of US
favours. The American ambassador Richard Gardner had been
urging the PSI to make a formal break with the Communist Party
for about two years.3
It is difficult to say to what extent the Euromissiles
question was exploited by the Socialist Party to
achieve various conceivable ends: as a symbol of its
"differentness" with respect to other parties of the
Italian left; as a means for establishing a new balance
of power with respect to the Christian Democrats, the
Socialists, too, could show their "loyalty" to the
Atlantic Alliance by backing, though not
unconditionally, its rearmament decisions; as an act
of responsibility aimed at gaining the consensus of
those who shared the Socialists' reformist ideas but
were wary of their willingness to take Italy's security
and defence needs into due account; or as an external
sign (directed at Washington in particular) of the
Party's maturity in the field of particularly
controversial and difficult foreign policy choices.4
Craxi enjoyed four years as the head of Italy's government and
as the creator of a distinctly new Italian image abroad. But while he
had made clear his opening to the Americans with the Euromissiles
debate, he also was careful to set the limits on Italy's service to the
American cause. The Socialist prime minister was accepted by the
Americans as being more pragmatic and business-minded than his
DC predecessors; the drop in Italian inflation and rise in
productivity which occurred during his term in office proved to be
greater national successes than the economic reforms attempted
simultaneously under American President Ronald Reagan. By
some accounts, Italy replaced Britain as the fifth industrial power in
the world. In February 1987 Craxi insisted that Italy should no
3"Quando Craxi usd i Cruise contro il PCI," La Repubblica, 5 February 1983.
4"The1^olitical Debate on the Deployment of Euromissiles," p. 119.
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longer be excluded from international economic decision-making by
a reduction in consultation from the Group of Seven to a Group of
Five.
Challenging the Americans
Craxi was conscious of Italy's new strengths, both in its
economy and in its foreign image, and in his third year in office he
was able to challenge the Americans over major issues of foreign
policy. The first event which marked a change in Italian attitudes
was the Achille Lauro incident, an act of terrorism on a scale which
had not been seen previously, with hundreds of passengers at risk.
Italian diplomatic connections in the Arab world assisted in
bringing the hijacking to an end at a port in Egypt. The Americans
had suffered the loss of invalid Leon Klinghoffer, and were
determined to bring the terrorists to justice. But the Italians
resented the subsequent interference of the American military,
which landed at the base at Sigonella on Sicily where the terrorists
were awaiting transfer to Rome. The American officers attempted
to take custody of the terrorists, and then shadowed an Italian
military aircraft which transported the terrorists to the mainland.
In what would have been a normal procedure in earlier
decades of Italian-American relations, the Italian government now
saw an unacceptable level of arrogance in the American
intervention. Craxi's government released the Palestinian
Mohammed Abbas believed to have been the main actor in the
hijacking; Abbas departed for Yugoslavia and was thought to have
moved on to Southern Yemen, which has no diplomatic relations
with the US.5 Hard-line Atlanticist Giovanni Spadolini withdrew
his support from Craxi's coalition in response to the Prime
Minister's outspoken protests in the Italian Parliament against the
Americans. This was the first time an Italian postwar cabinet had
collapsed over an incident of foreign policy.
5"US Hopes to Keep Close Italian Ties," New York Times, 18 October 1985.
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Craxi and subsequent leaders did not question Italy's
fundamental commitment to the Atlantic Alliance; but they now
hoped to effect a better distribution of power with the Alliance and
win American respect for the Italians' perceived sphere of influence.
Andreotti made these remarks on the Alliance:
The greater complexity of international relations,
with more protagonists than ever with legitimate
aspirations, implies that our Alliance should not
seek uniformity, but rather allow for complementary
contributions by the individual NATO allies. It is by
this means that we retain our political flexibility,
within the firm limits of our principles and our
defence needs, and which accounts for the
adaptability of the Alliance as a whole, as well as of
its individual members, to the changing
international scene.6
Defence Cooperation with the USA
In Italian-US joint production of defence systems, which came
to the forefront of their relations in the 1980s, the direct rewards for
Italy were mainly political. Italy profited from tapping into the
American technological base in the postwar period, but bilateral
exchanges with the US served mostly to underscore political ties,
rather than bring economic opportunities to Italy. In every joint
venture, the heart of the system was provided by the Americans,
while the Italians often fulfilled the responsibility of subcontractor.
For many years Italy received American licences for production
and made almost nothing of its own design. The attempts to branch
out into a better division of labour met with difficulties as the
Americans tried to retain their authority over the projects. In this
phase, for example, was the case of Italian tank modernisation as
the M-47 became obsolete. Despite the existence of several models
6Giulio Andreotti, "The Alliance's Political Dimension: Time for a renewed
commitment," NATO Review, vol. 34 , no. 2, April 1986, p. 2.
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within NATO (AMX in France, the British Chieftain, the German
Leopard), the United States achieved an accord to produce the M-
60AI with OTO-Melara, FIAT and Lancia.
This was not a technical choice, but a political
compromise which the Italian government came to
under the pressure of the United States, with
consequences which very quickly turned out to be
disastrous, since the tank was revealed to be
untransportable on the [Italian] railway system; nor
was it appropriate for the needs of our army. The
acquisition was suspended, and we turned to the
German Leopard tank, which was to be supplied by
the end of 1976, even though many agree that this
equipment is already obsolete.7
But for Italy the connection with the Americans was still an
essential part of its political identity. In response to requests by the
French to help loose Europe of its dependence on the Americans in
the early 1960s, the DC stated "anti-DeGaullism" as the basis of its
policy.8 This made sense for the modest defence industry as well,
which was just beginning to enjoy the fruits of collaboration with
the US.
In the privileged relationship with the US, explicitly
underscored in every setting, whether in the context
of the Community, the Atlantic Alliance, or in
bilateral relations, the Italian industry sought a way
to save itself from the threatening proposals of
restructuring and rationalisation which could have
led to the creation of two or three aeronautics groups
in Europe, inevitably under French-Anglo-German
domination.9
7Boldrini and D'Alessio, p. 239.
8Marcello Omodarme, "L'europeismo dimezzato," Politica internazionale,
vol. X no. 2, February 1982, p. 32.
9Armi: nuovo modello di sviluppo? p. 124.
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Italy was a participant in many of NATO's early joint ventures
directed by the Americans. In the early years of the Alliance, the
predominance of the American industry assured a certain level of
uniformity within NATO forces.10 The first formal co-production
agreements, both for combat aircraft, were signed in April 1953; of
these Italy was included only in the American F-86, of American
design, which was assembled in Italy. The first project which
involved joint development and production within the Alliance
was the FIAT G-91. Many of this model were still in service in the
early 1980s. Subsequent co-productions were generally shared
among the NATO industries, but the Italians continued to buy a
great proportion of its equipment directly from the Americans.
The Ruffini-Brown Accord signed in September 1978 between
the American and Italian defence ministers was an attempt to
implement a "two-way street" system that would adjust the balance
in transatlantic arms procurement more in favour of Italian
producers. American dominance was always marked; the
proportion of military sales between the US and Italy was about 9:1
in 1978; between the US and West Germany it was 13.4:1 in the late
1970s, and 3.1:1 between the US and Great Britain.11
American producers were generally reluctant to see a
correction in the proportions of defence sales; many saw American
sales to European armies as a form of compensation for the heavy
US contributions to NATO defence on the Continent. The Italian
industry, on the other hand, was poorly equipped to implement the
agreement, because of the lack of permanent Italian staff assigned to
the task in Washington, because of lack of forward planning by the
companies, and by the perpetual lag in technology.
Nevertheless Italy attempted to take advantage of continuing
gestures by the US in the field of arms cooperation: the NATO Long
Term Defense Program (NLTDP) introduced in 1978, Defense
10NATO Facts and Figures, (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 10th
edition), p. 161.
11 "II sistema economico della difesa," p. 57.
139
Secretary Caspar Weinberger's proposals for cooperation in the field
of new technologies (1982); the Currie Commission on transatlantic
industrial cooperation; and the Nunn amendment, which set aside
$1 billion in special funding in the American defence budget for
enhancing US-European cooperation in armaments. Of 21 US-
European co-productions within NATO in the mid-1980s, Italy was
involved in eight projects, including the Sea Sparrow system, the
NATO frigate, and various electronics projects.
Despite the remaining imbalances, it was a major turning point
for Italy when it began to sell military materiel to the Americans.
Beretta won a major contest in the early 1980s to replace the
American Army standard issue handgun. In the test phase the firm
was selected over the American Smith and Wesson. The US was
expected to purchase 315,900 units, of which just under half would
be produced at a new Beretta factory in the United States. The Italian
company Isotta Franchini won a deal to supply 32 engines to US
Navy Avenger-class vessels, and Agusta was contracted to update
Sea King helicopters by June 1990. The US Navy also ordered OTO-
Melara cannons in the 1980s. These agreements marked the first
time in 20 years that work for the US Navy had been contracted to
foreign companies. In the spring of 1988, Fincantieri signed an
agreement with the National Steel and Shipbuilding Company of
San Diego to provide designs for submarines, frigates and corvettes
for joint marketing.12 The US Marines also agreed to buy Selenia air
traffic control systems.13
In overall trade, the US was Italy's third most important
customer, with 18,357 billion lire in sales in 1985 and 15,604 billion
lire in 1986.
12/ane's Defence Weekly, 14 May 1988.
13Interview with Pasquale Romeo (US Air Force), and John Bender (US
Navy), Office of Defence Cooperation, US Embassy, Rome 22 April 1988.
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Italy and Europe
Ties with the Major Allies
Although the Italians remained firmly in the American camp
at the political level, they experimented with an increasing number
of ventures which excluded the Americans in favour of completely
European ventures. This new tendency had been foreshadowed by
the activity of Italy's main producer, FIAT, which had followed an
independent strategy in arms cooperation:
There is a fact which creates a permanent paradox
within the Italian military industry: the "European-
ism" of FIAT which — whatever the reasons may be
(the multinational perspective that allows the
Agnelli group not to fear its European partners,
competitiveness with regard to American industry,
etc.) — constitutes objectively a contradictory element
in the pro-American strategy and the state arsenal
mentality dominating the Italian military industry.14
Greater interaction with Italy's European partners was seen as a
way of mitigating the heavy dependence on the United States and of
exposing Italian industries to new profitable opportunities. There
was a growing divergence of interests between the Americans and
the Italians. Italy increasingly found common ground with their
West European neighbours, while the Americans continued to push
policies which were hard to pass over on the Italian public, such as
the provocation of Libya, and abrupt changes in policy between
administrations.15
There was naturally a strong base of economic ties between
Italy and other European countries. In overall trade, West Germany
and France already received the greatest amount of Italian exports.
Aldo Moro supported enhanced European unity "because it would
allow us to have good and dignified relations with our major
1 ^Armi: nuovo modello di sviluppo? pp. 149-150.
15Interview with General Carlo Jean, Rome 25 March 1988.
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ally."16 For the sake of promoting common market solidarity Italy
has imposed high-priced community products on its consumers,
and it has not been aggressive in securing community subsidies for
which it would be eligible. Italian businessmen and politicians have
attempted to pay closer attention to EEC directives and have been
among the most active in anticipating the abolition of trade barriers
in December 1992.
Despite its reputation as one of Europe's most troubled
economies, Italy surprised its neighbours by effecting a "second
economic miracle" in the early 1980s, with a faster growth rate than
any other European nation. Italy was continually frustrated,
however, by its inability to penetrate the highest echelon of Western
decision-making and continued to regret its exclusion from
important international summits, such as the Guadeloupe meeting
(4-6 January 1979), the summit at the Council of Europe (27-28 April
1980), the French initiative toward to USSR (18-19 May 1980), the
North-South summit at Cancun and other events. Italy had
forfeited a chance at a prominent European role because of its
servility to the Americans; by the time it emerged as an economic
power the United States had long taken for granted the cooperation
of its ally and rarely bothered to consult. But increasingly Italy
sought to strengthen its European ties, both by exhibiting the
willingness to criticize the Americans, and by engaging in a number
of more tangible fields of cooperation within Europe.
One of the most successful areas for forging Italy's new bonds
within Europe was defence. Here, technological and
entrepreneurial skills proved stronger than the ability to assert a
political presence. But Italy was not the only country which was
unable to put into practice a coherent vision for European arms
production. Alliance industries remained divided and competitive
because of persisting national priorities, including different
operational requirements and procurement practices, industrial
16Donald Sassoon, "The Making of Italian Foreign Policy," William Wallace
and W.E. Paterson, eds. Foreign Policy Making in Western Europe, p. 99.
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capabilities, employment considerations and the desire to promote
national currencies. As former British Minister of Defence Michael
Heseltine pointed out, Europe has four main battle tanks (MBTs)
that cannot fire the same ammunition, 11 firms working on anti¬
tank weapons in seven countries, 18 firms in seven countries
making ground-to-air weapons, eight in six nations making air-to-
air missiles, and so forth.17
European arms cooperation afforded a number of
opportunities for Italy to penetrate the circles of its more senior
allies. Cooperation was more important for Italy than perhaps any
of the other countries, because of its inherent weaknesses in
research and its limited defence spending.
International cooperation is essential particularly for
the production of more complex and advanced
weapon systems entailing considerable research,
development and production expenditures
incompatible with the funds available and the
limited national requirements. The most advanced
and efficient form of international cooperation is
represented by specialised productions within the
Atlantic Alliance and Europe. Therefore, each
country should concentrate on the production of one
or more types of weapon systems which it would
supply to the whole Alliance with a considerable
reduction in unit costs. Obviously this is unfeasible,
not only [because of] the lack of the necessary
strategic and political consensus, but also [because of]
the problems descending from the industrial
reconversion and the mobility of the labour force
which would be necessary to achieve a complete
specialisation. A partial specialisation, however, is
feasible. This applies both to single components (e.g.
aircraft engines) and to various types of weapon
systems.18
17Robin Beard, "NATO Armamants Cooperation: Picking up the Gauntlet,"
NATO Review, no. 1, February 1987.
18White Paper 1985, pp. 80-81.
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Although Italy had strong bilateral links with other European
countries and their industries, the activity never seemed to add up
to a coherent defence role for Italy. It was constantly being
overshadowed by the publicity over other cases of bilateral
cooperation, namely Franco-German and Anglo-German relations.
Italy felt its exclusion keenly enough to complain to the French
during a state visit in Rome about the strengthened military links
between France and the FRG.19
European Defence Projects
The MRCA was the "first truly European program in every
sense, from the feasibility study, to the development of the
prototype, to the production in series."20 The Tornado project
represented a significant commitment of the Italians to continuing
in the aerospace sector, and from the point of view of the technology
acquired and the place earned for Italy among Europe's defence
producers, the experience was considered a success. It was only
through commitment such as the Tornado, and later the EFA, that a
small European industry could develop its own major production
lines and technological base, and cultivate markets independently of
the Americans. The price of independence for the European aircraft
companies was very high, and the rewards for avoiding the
American aircraft monopoly came more in prestige than in making
economies in European procurement budgets. In related fields,
such as motor production, companies like FIAT chose to continue
their close collaboration with the Americans and had favourable
results in renewing the Italian technological base.
Although the project was not considered a complete success,
the EFA was launched by the same partners with the added
participation of Spain. Aeritalia's share in the joint project
increased to 21%. With the addition of Spain, Italy was no longer
19Jane's Defence Weekly, 5 December 1987.
20Boldrini and D'Alessio, p. 237.
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the junior partner in the consortium. The project had greater
chances of success than the Tornado since the EFA was launched in
a time "likely never to be repeated, [when] the five nations all have
approximately the same fighter requirement and the same
timescale."21
Italy's Finmeccanica joined the European consortium for the
production of the NATO Hawk missile in 1959. Almost thirty years
later, the Italian and French defence ministers, Valerio Zanone and
Andre Giraud, agreed to build a short-range surface-to-air missile
intended to be the successor to the Hawk, for deployment in 1996.22
The Italian electronics sector had had successful collaboration with
the French in the Otomat missile, which was produced from the
mid-1970s with Matra. The Italian contribution remained on the
technological plane, while questions of strategy were left to others.
In the 1980s, France expressed interest in creating an AWACS force
with Spain and Italy for the Southern flank. This was part of a
wider French concern about defence of the Mediterranean, for
which the Italians had been unable to arouse interest.
Another Alliance-wide consortium was the Future
International Military/Civil Airlifter (FIMA), which included
Lockheed, British Aerospace, Aerospatiale and MBB, as well as
Italian and Spanish companies. This was designed to replace the C-
130 Hercules at the beginning of the 21st century.23
Cooperation with NATO's Mediterranean Partners
Italy transferred few political pressures with its arms
technology, and armed forces in the Mediterranean region saw
cooperation with the Italians as a way of developing their industries
without increasing dependence on the United States. In this sense
Italy acted as a second headquarters for NATO in the Mediterranean,
and Alliance members in the area were eager to increase
21Gunston, p. 64.
22Financial Times, 29 October 1988.
23Jane's Defence Weekly, 19 December 1987.
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cooperation with Italy's defence industry beginning in the 1970s. In
wider economic relations, Italy was also considered an important
link to Northern Europe for Greece and Spain during preparations
for inclusion in the EEC. Craxi discussed the possibility of setting up
a triangular cooperation program with Italy, Portugal and its African
ex-colonies (Angola, Mozambique, Capo Verde, etc.).24
Within the NATO Alliance, Turkey was Italy's biggest
customer for military equipment, followed by Greece and Spain.
Turkey purchased Agusta-Bell helicopters in the 1960s, and the F-
104S Lockheed Starfighter in the following decade. It continued to
purchase large orders of helicopters: 56 Agusta-Bell 205A-ls were
delivered to the Turkish Army, 12 AB-212s were delivered in 1980-
1981, and a further order of 40 AB-205 helicopters was agreed upon
in 1983. In 1977 Aermacchi was accused of giving $2.5 million to
Turkish politicians to favour a deal to set up local production of the
MB-339; the contract never went through.25
Aeritalia began negotiations in 1984 to launch licence
production of 50 G-222 transport planes in Turkey, after an initial
sale of two model units. The total value was expected to reach $553
million, of which Italy was to receive immediate payment of $43
million. The United States promised to guarantee a low-rate credit
agreement, to help compensate for the heavy imbalance in arms
sales between the US and Turkey.26
In the mid-1970s Selenia began deliveries of 200 Sparrow air-to-
air missiles. In the 1980s Italy received a number of significant
contracts in the electronics field, mostly to arm four German-made
Meko 200 frigates. Other sales included the Contraves Sea Guard
and Sea Zenith defence systems, OTO-Melara cannons, and Aspide
missiles for use with Sea Sparrow launchers.
Greece began purchasing Agusta-Bell helicopters in 1969;
deliveries continued in 1975 and 1978. In addition, 300 armoured
24M7 1933-1984, p. 484.
25Battistelli, p. 274, n.27.
26Jane's Defence Weekly, 26 May 1984.
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personnel carriers were thought to have been transferred from Italy
in 1974. About 120 Selenia Aspide/Sea Sparrow systems, co-
produced with the United States, were delivered in 1978-1979.
Twenty helicopters of the model 300C by Breda-Nardi were
delivered in 1985 for army and civilian missions. In 1985 an order
for six new frigates for the Greek Navy was received.
Spain was also a customer for Italian helicopters in the 1970s
and 1980s; models included the AB-205, the AB-212 (ASW), the SH-
3D Sea King, and the AB-312 Griffon. About 75 were purchased in
total. In a contract for 200 Aspide missiles signed in 1985, 40% of the
production was assigned to the Spanish industry. Electronics
purchases from Spain in the 1980s included equipment for
Descubierta-class corvettes, and 13 Skyguard anti-air batteries armed
with about 100 Aspide missiles. The sale of the OTO T20-model
turret was followed by licence production of 235 units.
Although its biggest Alliance market was among the
Mediterranean countries, Italy also sold military equipment to other
NATO countries, including Denmark, the Netherlands, and even
France and West Germany, mostly in the field of electronics.
Belgium purchased 22 SIAI-Marchetti SF-260 trainers for delivery
beginning in 1976. A Selenia radar system was in the running for
the updated version of the NATO Nadge on the Southern flank in
the mid-1980s; 12 to 17 systems would be produced if the model won
the competition. Canada expressed interest in the Spada/Aspide
anti-air battery systems for its facilities in West Germany and was a
potentially large customer for the EH-101 produced with Westland.
Other European destinations for Italian weapons included
Austria, which purchased 24 Agusta-Bell helicopters in 1978-1980
and the Republic of Ireland, which bought 11 SIAI-Marchetti 260W
Warrior trainers between 1976 and 1979 and OTO-Melara howitzers.
Finland purchased a small number of AB-212 Griffon helicopters in
1985.
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Italy and "Star Wars"
Italy took an interest in European space programs from their
early years. Italy joined the ELDO (European Launcher
Development Organisation) and ESRO (European Space Research
Organisation) in 1965, with FIAT as the national representative. As
prime contractor for Italy, FIAT supervised the construction of
structures for satellites. The national research body, the CNR,
created a program to study some of the astronomical, physical,
biological and medical problems related to man in space. The Air
Force backed a space-related program at the engineering department
at the University of Rome under Professor Luigi Broglio. After its
inception in the late 1960s, Aeritalia became a collaborator with
NASA.27
In the 1980s Italian companies became involved with the
European Hermes program and took a 14% share in the French
Helios military satellite.28 But the SDI proposals appeared to offer it
greater responsibility and opportunities for growth than any of the
previous projects.
However, contracts for SDI with Italy and other American
allies, including West Germany, Britain, France, Japan, and Israel,
never materialised on the levels promised by the United States.
Non-American firms received about 1 percent of all SDI contracts;
the country with the largest amount of funding, West Germany,
received $50.5 million, roughly the share of all SDI contracts granted
in the state of Utah.29 Although Italy was one of only three nations
to sign a government-to-government agreement, it received about
$10.4 million in contracts, about the same amount awarded to
French firms, whose government did not "sign on."
The project advanced in two phases, the first devoted to
research and the second to more advanced development. Of the
27Gabrielli, pp. 150-151.
28/ane's Defence Weekly, 19 December 1987.
29Bernd W. Kubbig, "SDI Partners: Much Ado about the Wrong Issue,"
International Herald Tribune, 30 March 1988.
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approximately 60 deals initially offered to Italy, only a handful were
later approved. In Phase One, Italy headed one of the seven
multinational consortia engaged in preliminary development and
research projects; included in this subdivision were the Italian
concerns SNIA-BPD (FIAT), FIAR, Microtecnica, and the Istituto
Affari Internazionali, and the American companies ORI, EER,
Fairchild Space, W.J. Shafer Associates, and the ITT Research
Institute.30
When the Americans made awards of $4.5 million to each of
five international consortia in the development stage, Italy headed
one of the divisions and participated in two of the others. The main
firms were SNIA-BPD, Selenia and Selenia Spazio, Aeritalia,
Contraves and FIAR.31 The Americans evidently pressed the Italian
government to maintain maximum secrecy on the issue; the US
also retained the rights to realise and market any technology or
software produced by the European research.
FIAT was hopeful about opportunities for SDI work; in the
early 1980s its relations with the US were strained by the conflict
with Ford over the highly contested sale of Alfa Romeo, and
accusations of FIAT transfers of ballistic missile technology to the
Third World (see Chapter 6). FIAT was eager to find outlets for its
advanced laboratories at SNIA which had been thwarted on other
fronts. But of 17 proposals developed by FIAT's subsidiaries alone,
only two by SNIA-BPD received American approval. Selenia
advanced a project for electronic sensors which could detect the
firing of enemy missiles. Although Selenia considered its chance of
success slim compared to American competitors, it considered
investment in the project necessary in the long term "to promote
more easily its technology in the corridors of the Pentagon."32 But
the possibility of the various foreign subcontractors of the US
30Rivista Italiana Difesa, March 1987, p. 10.
31Rivista Italiana Difesa, January 1988; Aviation Week and Space
Technology, 3 August 1987.
32La Repubblica, 12 September 1986, p. 5.
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having an effect on the larger country's policy were as yet
unimaginable. One of the directors of Aeritalia remarked,
Participation in SDI is inevitable for any industry;
the world is evolving towards a widening of the
dynamics which inexorably are carrying the
technologies of the Pacific (USA and Japan) towards
the stars, rather than European-based technologies.
Certainly there is the risk that through the SDI
operation the USA will skim off the best of the
European proposals to insert into their data banks,
but it is a risk to which we are forced to subject
ourselves. This is why an accord which safeguards
European industries is necessary, and perhaps is
already too late.33
The SDI contracts had repercussions on several levels. First of
all, Craxi's government (including Foreign Minister Andreotti)
received considerable heat for pushing through the deal with the
Americans during the summer recess of the Senate and Chamber of
Deputies, and reneging on a promise to make any agreement public
and subject to parliamentary vote. All of the Italian parties, for
different reasons, seemed to oppose Andreotti's clandestine
handling of the SDI agreement: the Republican party regretted that
the opportunity of a show of united support in Parliament for the
initiative had been missed, and the PCI condemned the whole
project for encouraging an arms race in space, diverting resources
from other programs, and constituting an "essential stumbling
block" in East-West relations.34 Veteran DC leader Fanfani, then
president of the Senate, issued a harsh formal letter to Craxi, saying
that as far as the "space shield" was concerned, "I have the same
point of view as the PCI."35 Andreotti himself admitted that the
spinoffs of the research would amount to practically nothing for
Italian society, and that Italian firms might be reduced to "simple
33La Repubblica, 12 September 1986, p. 5.
34La Stampa, 9 September 1986, and La Repubblica 14 October 1986.
35La Stampa, 9 September 1986.
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operatives of the contracts and would be put in the impossible
situation of trying to make some use of the research."36
International fears about adverse effects on East-West trade and
a drain of Western scientists into the military sector did not come
true, but as the Reagan administration passed on the program to
President George Bush, there were still doubts about the project's
viability and its compatibility with the ABM treaty.37 Fears about
the eventual deployment of the system had stirred European
politicians soon after the launching of the research: a meeting
between Craxi and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in
February 1987 resulted in a common request to the Americans that
they consult their European allies closely before putting the system
into action. By all accounts, however, the expensive venture looked
to yield few results, especially after the US House of Representatives
voted to cut $1.8 million from the 1990 SDI budget (although a third
of this was restored in a subsequent vote).38 The Italian cooperation
with the US on this issue stood as an example of the continued
willingness to be present in largely symbolic acts of collaboration.
Italy and the SocialistWorld
Italy's peculiar place in NATO is perhaps better understood by a
look at its relations outside of the West, as in particular with
NATO's adversaries. Italy was one of the first non-socialist
countries to implement policies of cooperation, mainly on an
economic plane, behind the Iron Curtain. Collaboration was
facilitated by Italy's stable and unquestioned membership in NATO,
its low level of political responsibility among Western countries,
and the presence of an aggressive class of industrialists.
36Andreotti, Chamber of Deputies, 4 June 1986, cited in La Repubblica, 12
September 1986, p. 5.
37"SDI Partners: Much Ado about the Wrong Issue."
38Jane's Defence Weekly, 5 August 1989; International Herald Tribune, 29
September 1989.
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The Roots of the Italian Ostpolitik
Italy is tied to Eastern Europe unlike any other Western
country because of the presence of Italy's "two churches," the
Communist Party and the Catholic Church, whose rivalry within
Italy is played out on a larger scale behind the Iron Curtain.
Although the PCI resisted Moscow's influence in many important
matters, it kept channels to Moscow open until the late 1970s.
Rome's role as a spiritual centre for East European Catholics,
especially in Poland, was heightened by the election of the first non-
Italian pope in 455 years, the Polish Karol Jozef Wojtyla.
While Italian Catholics and Communists shared important
ideological ties behind the Iron Curtain, an equally significant role
was played by Italy's capitalists. The Italians have a record of
productive trade links within the Eastern bloc that have been
unmatched in depth and duration until West Germany launched its
Ostpolitik in the 1970s.
Italian-Soviet cooperation took place almost completely
outside the context of East-West relations. Although trade
developed with the consent of both the Soviet and Italian
governments, the Soviets placed much less political weight on
involvement with Italy and relations progressed even when the
superpower conflict reached its lowest points. The Italians, without
shedding their identity as a Western country or sacrificing relations
with their NATO partners, built a parallel set of relations within the
Eastern bloc. Italian exchanges in this area had a long history — the
Kremlin itself had been built by Italian architects in the 14th century
— and the Italians forged a new form of cooperation which was
eventually adopted by other countries as a possible means of
attenuating East-West hostilities through increased economic
interdependence. Italian business leaders saw their activity as
distinctly beneficial to the West.
Clearly business has a key role to play. The methods
of Marco Polo are preferable to those of the
Crusaders. The flag has often followed, not preceded
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trade. Business headquarters are often better than
embassies for purposes of mutual understanding.
But Western governments must recognize that the
geography of business does not coincide with
political, ideological or military geographies.39
During the First World War, Russia was a customer of FIAT's
arms production sector. The Vice-President of the Duma Protopov
brought a delegation to a FIAT factory and Giovanni Agnelli made
an agreement for the supply of 6,000 tanks and related spare parts,
for about 240 million lire.40
Following the Second World War, the Soviet Union vetoed
the Italian entry into the United Nations five times during the
1950s. This was mostly because of residual resentment over
Mussolini's massive invasion of the Soviet Union, and to show
disapproval of the NATO-inspired Italian government which
suppressed the strongest Communist movement in the West. But
interestingly, economic relations already showed a promising future
in the first decade after the Second World War. When the Soviets
sought export markets for their newly-exploited oil fields, Enrico
Mattei, leader of the Italian state-run hydrocarbons interest, Ente
nazionale idrocarburi (ENI), responded immediately. In the late
1950s the Soviet share of oil imports to Italy rose from 4% to 16%.41
In exchange ENI found outlets for its fertilisers and synthetic rubber
products, and opened the way for an expansion of Soviet-Italian ties.
Other Italian enterprises -- mainly belonging to the
state-controlled IRI group, were brought into the deal
on terms which were never fully disclosed. It can be
assumed, however, that by doing all this Mattei not
only provided some material advantages for ENI
(who made such exports possible by oil imports) but
also broadened the ranks of people who supported
39"The Strategic Role of the Western Business Community," p. 259.
40Agnelli, pp. 108-109.
41P.H. Frankel, Mattei: Oil and Power Politics (London: Faber and Faber,
1966), p. 138.
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the whole transaction, a support which was
particularly useful in the face of opposition to it in
Italy and in the USA where, obviously, anti-Soviet
sentiments were being given a still sharper edge by
the propagandists of the oil companies.42
In 1962 Italian troops were put on alert during the Cuban
missile crisis. But Italy's official stand clashed with economic ties
which were already firmly in place. Soviet premier Khrushchev
recalled that America had been angered when Italy agreed to sell
tankers to help the USSR supply Cuba with petroleum. The
Americans accused Italy of contravening the spirit of economic
unity in the West. Remarked Khrushchev,
The lesson of the whole incident was that if a
capitalist country sees the chance to make some extra
money from trade with a Communist country, it
couldn't care less about economic solidarity.43
Italy's main private concern, FIAT, soon re-emerged as
probably the most important actor in Soviet-Italian relations. FIAT's
long history of ties in Russia formed a basis of mutual trust which
later allowed FIAT to launch a project in the Soviet Union which
became the centrepiece of the eighth Soviet Five-Year Plan. In 1966
FIAT sent about 2,500 technicians to set up an automobile plant in
the Volga Valley, in a town renamed Togliattigrad in honour of the
Italian Communist leader. Some of the most skilled Soviet workers
were diverted to this project, and over 2,000 were brought to Italy for
special training.44 The result was mass production of the Zhiguli,
modelled after the FIAT 124.
This contract, successfully implemented at a time when official
relations between East and West were still at a deadlock, became the
42Frankel, p. 140.
43Strobe Talbott, transl. Khrushchev Remembers. (London: Penguin, 1977), p.
522.
44Avi Shlaim and G.N. Yannopoulos, The EEC and Eastern Europe
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 142.
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model for economic deals when Brezhnev subsequently sought to
widen Soviet exposure to Western trade and technology. In the late
1960s imports of Western technology increased sharply in the
USSR.45 Agreements for science and technology exchange with
Italy and France in 1966 were followed by accords with Great Britain
in 1968, with Sweden in 1970, with Canada in 1971, the United States
in 1972, and Japan and West Germany in 1973.
Eastern Europe became an important outlet for West European
industries, which were increasingly unwilling to project business
strategies in accordance with political trends in the superpower
relationship. The United States, by contrast, maintained a policy of
"linkage" between economic accords and political conditions. Trade
agreements became a major part of the 1972 detente accords, but the
USSR did not implement this aspect of the agreements because of
US pressure about emigration and humanitarian practices in the
Soviet Union.
Cooperation of companies like FIAT did not undergo the same
political tests. One reason was the considerable independence
afforded Italian industrialists abroad by their government. In many
cases the commitment of the Italian businessman to Western ideals
was as strong as that of any other "Atlanticist." But these ideals and
concepts of freedom and progress often differed from — or in some
cases simply pre-dated — the concept of the East-West order that the
Americans followed. Wrote Gianni Agnelli,
I frankly do not believe that military aggression
against NATO countries by the Soviet bloc is at all
likely...As a strong believer in the superiority of our
system, I feel that trade developments with Eastern
Europe serve the cause of peace because, by
contributing to increased prosperity, they avert the
risk of tensions reaching a breaking point and
leading to armed confrontations. Here, too, plain
45John P. Hardt and Kate Tomlinson, "Soviet Economic Policies and Western
Europe," in Herbert J. Ellison, ed., Soviet Policy toward Western Europe, (Seattle
and London: University of Washington Press, 1978), p. 165.
155
trade is not enough, and new instruments, including
joint ventures and licensing, must be found to
encourage transformation of those societies.46
By the end of the 1980s, Agnelli's ideas had become pedestrian
among Western industrialists taking advantage of East European
overtures in the field of trade, but they were not stated as
confidently when military relations were still at a standstill. The
suggestion of Italian industrialist Carlo De Benedetti made on
French television in 1985 of instituting a type of "Marshall Plan" for
Eastern Europe was slowly adopted by Western countries, including
the United States which committed considerable sums in aid for the
recovery of Poland in 1989.
Today, Hungary and Poland have become Italy's closest
partners in the region, and Eastern Europe as a whole is the second
largest market for Italy after Western Europe.47 Most of the major
Italian banks have offices in almost all of the major East European
capitals.48 In 1975 Italy was responsible for about a fifth of all
Western credits to Comecon countries to support its economic
exchange there.49 Italy is the Soviet Union's third most important
partner in the West. Large firms dominate; FIAT and Pirelli are
expanding ties at anastronomical rate. IRI is involved in the largest
"turn-key" contract granted by the USSR to a foreign country. The
siderurgical factory at Volski represented the largest contract in the
history of Italimpianti, IRI's subsidiary. The 100-hectare "Italian
city" employed more than a thousand Italian technicians and
workmen and was estimated to bring profits to the company of
approximately 2,000 billion lire. In 1986 Italy suffered a £499 million
trade deficit with the USSR, in part because of energy imports.50 In
46"The Strategic Role of the Western Business Community," pp. 259-261.
47Interview with General Carlo Jean, Rome, 25 March 1988.
48The EEC and Eastern Europe, p. 183.
49Italico Santoro, "Le scelte economiche nella politica estera italiana,"
Natalino Ronzitti, ed., Ea politica estera italiana (Edizioni di Comunita, 1977), p.
191.
50Financial Times, 13 April 1987.
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the early 1980s Italy imported over 4.5 million barrels of crude oil
from the Soviets; this increased to nearly 8 million in 1984. Natural
gas imports also increased; together the gas and oil imports
constituted 17% of Italy's requirement.51
Perhaps as a result of the Italians' willingness to commit
themselves to practical cooperation of mutual benefit, Italian leaders
have enjoyed a considerably better reception among leaders of
Eastern Europe than many other Western heads-of-state. Andrei
Gromyko made a state visit to Rome and the Vatican in the mid-
1960s, one of a very small number of state visits in an era of cautious
conciliation that was symbolised mostly by visits of foreigners to
Moscow. Twenty years later Italian prime ministers were the first
Western leaders to visit Gorbachev after his rise to party secretary
meeting
and again in the aftermath of a crucial Politt>uroAcalled to decide the
course of perestroika in September 1988. During a speech in New
York, he cited Italy's prudence in not pursuing the arms build-up
that spurred other Western nations in the postwar period. General
Jaruzelski also travelled to Rome, to visit the seat of Catholicism in
the mid-1980s, when much of the opposition in Poland ident ifed
closely with the Church.
Italian-East European relations have not been cordial
throughout the entire postwar period, however. Relations reached
a low when the assassination attempt against Pope John Paul II in
1981 was linked to the Bulgarian secret services. After the
imposition of martial law in Poland, the PCI broke formally with
Moscow, and the government suspended its contracts temporarily
for the Soviet pipeline. All of the Italian parties were critical of the
Russian occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s.
In the mid-1980s the new Italian interest in military matters
came under attack by the Soviets, especially because of the
installation of the cruise missiles and the presence of Italian
warships in the Persian Gulf. The Soviet newspaper Novosti went
51Jane's Defence Weekly, 1 June 1985.
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as far as to call Italy "a nuclear hostage of the USA" and "gendarme
of the world" because of the cruise missiles and the Lebanese
mission.52
Businessmen remained the most dynamic representatives of
Italy in the Eastern bloc, sought to gain the maximum returns from
their trade links while at the same time discouraging a marked
dependence in any area. Under Mattei, for instance, Italian reliance
on Soviet energy was consciously counterbalanced by overtures to
the American company Esso.53 The content of trade relations during
the 1980s still remained consciously apolitical, an attitude which has
sparked protest from the Americans, who considered Italy to be a
"sieve to the East."54 Selenia, Olivetti, and OTO-Melara are among
the Italian firms accused of transferring politically-sensitive
technology to the East, although ironically an Italian has always held
the top post of the agency designed to regulate technology leaks to
the East, COCOM (Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export
Controls).55
Italy is even alleged to have sold arms within Eastern Europe.
The sale of an air traffic control system to the Soviet Union was
blocked because of its possible military uses.56 The Tuscan electronic
company Galileo was accused of selling equipment to Rumania and
other Eastern bloc countries. Galileo used the British Independent
Trading Company as an intermediary. When questioned about the
transfers, the lawyer of one of Galileo's directors replied, "The
material is not covered by military secrecy and there is
documentation that the contracts undertaken for the Rumanians





56Interview with Pasquale Romeo (US Air Force), and John Bender (US
Navy), Office of Defence Cooperation, US Embassy, Rome 22 April 1988.
57 "II nostro mercato di morte," p. 27.
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In addition, Beretta was accused of selling weapons to Bulgaria in
the 1970s.58
Another East European country, Italy's neighbour Yugoslavia,
pressed the Italians for increased military exchanges in the 1980s.
After the disputed Trieste was turned over to Italy in 1954, relations
had been stable, and the Treaty of Osimo in 1975 provided for future
military cooperation. In the early 1980s Yugoslavia acquired the
licence to produce FIAT Campagnola jeeps, and purchased tracked
snow vehicles for its police and armed forces from a Bolzano
manufacturer. In February 1985 Craxi made the first official visit in
20 years by an Italian head of government to Belgrade, during which
the Yugoslavs pressed for increased cooperation and financial aid
from the EEC. In June 1986 the Yugoslav Air Force Chief of Staff
visited Agusta's Cascina Costa factory.
China
While military exports were not the major component of
Italy's trade with the Eastern bloc, the business strategies developed
behind the Iron Curtain were put to use in other areas where
defence sales showed greater potential. Italian businessmen had a
strong interest in trade with China beginning in the 1950s; Mattei
had made accords with Peking in 1958. Trade objectives did not
always merge with the positions of Italy's politicians or with US
policy.
The late right-wing Christian Democrat senator and
businessman Teresio Guglielmone actively
promoted trade with Communist China and headed
business missions to Peking when his own party was
denouncing the Chinese Communists for bloody
persecutions of Chinese Catholics. The retired
Monarchist senator and ex-career diplomat Baron
Raffaele Guariglia also worked for economic contacts
with mainland China and visited Peking for trade
58Interview with Mr. Grignolo, Ministry of Defence, Rome 21 April 1988.
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purposes. All Italians, from Left to Right, inside and
outside the government, regard their country's
refusal to recognize Red China as ridiculous and bow
only reluctantly to American pressures on this
issue.59
When China sought to increase ties in the West in the 1970s,
the Italians were cautious about making a public show of support.
Mao's overtures to the West included requests for military-related
trade. Fanfani made a state visit to China in 1975, following Helmut
Schmidt's successful trip. After Soviet premier Leonid Brezhnev
protested Western military assistance to China, West Germany
ceased its cooperation, while France and Great Britain continued
because of the favourable economic returns. Italy initially vacillated
about its policy toward Peking. The government sent Ardito and
Lupo vessels to Shangai for a promotional visit, but did not allow
sales to the Chinese naval forces to go through.
With Peking making commercial deals with major
countries contingent on them agreeing to sell arms,
Italy found itself under even heavier Soviet pressure
than Britain, France and Germany. Moscow was
threatening to withold oil and gas — the Soviet
Union supplies 25 percent of Italy's natural gas and
7.5 percent of its oil [in the early 1980s]. Not
surprisingly, when China began exporting oil to
Western Europe in 1978, Italy was the first country to
be offered some. Italian armaments of interest to
Peking included the OTO-Melara Otomat ship-to-
ship missile, the Selenia Aspide surface-to-air and
air-to-air missile, Galileo target control devices and
Agusta helicopters. Rome was talking of initial sales
of over $300 million.60
In June 1978 the Vice-Chief of Staff Chang Ai-Ping brought a
team to Italy with the specific aim of strengthening channels to the
5977ze Politics of Italian Foreign Policy, p. 94.
60Howe, p. 713.
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Italian defence industries. The long list of the firms visited included
all the major Italian interests in the field: Officine Galileo, ELSAG,
Selenia, Contraves, Elmer, Elettronica, OTO-Melara, Microtecnica,
Aeritalia, Breda Meccanica Bresciana, Simmel, SNIA Viscosa, FIAT-
Aviazione, Beretta, Valsella, Oerlikon Italiana, Italcantieri, and
Whitehead Motofides.61
A Chinese military delegation visited Rome again in 1979.
There were frequent exchanges at the political level, especially
between delegations of the Chinese Communist Party and the PCI
and PSI. The President of the Chamber of Deputies, Communist
Nilde Jotti, visited China in October 1981. But in general, trade
prospects were considered disappointing: less than 1% was used of a
line of credit worth $1 million conceded by the Italian government
in 1979. Trade concentrated in the field of textile plants; ENI also
has good prospects for gaining the rights to explore in Chinese
waters; Olivetti supplied machinery to the People's Bank of China.62
After military ties were increased, relations began to pick up
considerably. An unpublished technical and military accord was
signed by Spadolini and Zhang Aiping in 1984, which was thought
to cover future collaboration in defence electronics, and training of
Chinese military and civil personnel with the Alpine Corps and at
the Scuola Militare di Paracadutismo at Livorno.63
The American industrial world took the news of the
accord rather badly, and for a very simple reason:
outside of the Atlantic area, it was interpreted (and
probably in part correctly) as an alternative on the
part of the Chinese to an analogous accord signed last
year by China and the United States (and which
should have concerned radar, anti-tank and anti-air
missiles and so on), an accord that has remained
dead-letter up to now because the Chinese want to
acquire technologies, while the Americans want to
61L4J 1978-1979, p. 213.
62IA1 1981-1982, pp. 469-470.
63Jane's Defence Weekly, 27 April 1985.
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sell products. In the specialised American press
comments are appearing to the effect that Italy "is too
easily disposed toward transferring technology which
in reality is of American origin...and it is easy to
anticipate that at the next COCOM meeting...planned
to take place in Rome this June, there will be heated
debates.64
In 1985 Chinese officials visited an OTO-Melara factory.
Production of howitzers in collaboration with the Chinese company
Norinco followed,65 and Deputy Chief of Staff Roberto Jucci led a
delegation to Peking in October 1985. Selenia received orders for the
Aspide missile, possibly with an option for local production in
China; the system was chosen over the British Sky Flash system and
the American Sparrow.66
At the same time, China offered new markets to Italian
business. The spate of contracts which followed the military accords
confirmed the belief by some that arms sales were the key to
increasing inter-governmental confidence and overall trade links.
Telettra, a FIAT subsidiary, signed a contract with the Chinese
government to set up a 2,500-km microwave digital radio system,
the longest in China, worth 45 billion lire.67 FIAT also signed a deal
in March 1985 for the production of lorries in China with Flanjing
Motor Company. During the first three years 300 Chinese
technicians were to receive training in Italy.68 China was also
expected to become a major client of IRI as a deal in
telecommunications was under negotiation. Diplomatic relations
increased cautiously toward the end of the decade; Andreotti made a
state visit to Peking on March 24-27, 1988, with little publicity in
Italy; the main topics of discussion were thought to be the Iran-Iraq
64 "La Cina e vicina, la Nato e lontana," Rivista Italiana Difesa, No. 6, June
1985.
65Jane's Defence Weekly, 31 August 1985.
66]ane's Defence Weekly, 21 June 1986.
67Corriere della sera, 11 February 1987.
68La Repubblica, 28 March 1985.
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conflict and increased exchanges in the field of healthcare between
Italy and China.69
69La Repubblica, 23 March 1988.
CHAPTER SIX
Italian Arms Sales Outside theAtlantic Area
Paving the Way for the Trade with the Developing Countries
Italy had a greater dependence on military exports to the Third
World than any other major supplier. This is partly because the
quality of most Italian armaments was more suited to the armies of
the poorer countries rather than to NATO. In addition, Italy was
able to exploit markets than were left open by larger suppliers, either
because of a lack of strategic interest, or the modest quantities
required. In addition some countries were avoided by other
suppliers because of ongoing wars or internal repression.
The Italian arms trade was spurred by the presence of an
independent, export-oriented business community geared toward
expanding relations with almost no geographic coherence or
political strategy. Only in rare cases, such as Libya, were there
attempts to make political support a major part of the trade in arms.
Italian export policies in the postwar period are epitomised by
the strategies launched in the 1950s by oil executive Enrico Mattei.
His techniques still permeate Italian foreign commerce, including tKe.
trade in arms. His ties in Africa, the Middle East and even Eastern
Europe paved the way for future collaborations of other Italian
business interests.
A Christian Democrat and ex-partisan, Mattei was highly
skillful in gaining concessions for ENI's oil exploration and
construction projects from countries of the Third World, at a time
when Italy largely still could be categorized in that sphere. Mattei
sought to detach his company and his country from associations
with Italy's ideologically-driven Western allies. The result was that
ENI was able to bring a steady supply of energy back to the Italian
peninsula, while at the same time assuring expansion of contracts
for Italian construction firms and the export of labour. Mattel's
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approach was not always popular at home and he died in mysterious
circumstances in a plane crash in 1962. But it is generally agreed that
Mattei did much to establish Italy's broad network of contacts in the
Third World on favourable terms for both Italy and the host
countries. Government assistance was not often instrumental in
seeing through these deals, but their success did not exclude a
positive effect on the Italian government's image abroad.
ENI did get in on the ground floor in several
countries, not in spite of its governmental
background but simply because of it; there emerged a
solidarity of governments who felt (rightly or
wrongly) that they had more in common with each
other than any of them had with private-enterprise
oil companies. It became clear in the process that
such traditional revulsion was directed against the
British, American or French governments —
imperialists all — but not for instance against an
Italian government-sponsored operator representing,
one assumes, a country whose overseas possessions
had been lost just in time to wipe off the blemish of
colonialism...[Mattei] shrewdly showed off in Asia
and Africa his impressive achievement at home ~
the petrochemical plant in Ravenna and the
laboratories in San Donato...[which] also housed a
Scuola di Studi Superiori sugli Idrocarburi where
overseas students were taught and kept at ENI's
expense alongside Italians...There could have been
no more persuasive an image than the one he
presented to underdeveloped parts of the world --
that of the successful underdog.1
Mattel's philosophy and techniques (including training of
foreign nationals in Italy) were still at work among business leaders
such as Fiat's president, Gianni Agnelli, in the 1980s, who called for
a departure from standard government and
multinational policies of the past. Greater attention
1Frankel, pp. 100-101.
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must be given to joint ventures, long-term licensing
and cooperation agreements, training programs
emphasizing the role and autonomy of the host
country.2
Aid for the Developing World
The commercially-motivated defence industry was largely a
product of the perennial Italian quest for access to energy sources
and export markets. While Italy's trade relations are still dominated
by its vulnerability in the face of oil suppliers, the country also has
become involved increasingly in humanitarian aid programs,
primarily in Africa and the Middle East. The embryonic programs
of the 1960s, when Italy in recent yearshad itself been a recipient of
aid, were greatly stepped up with the formation of a new department
in the Foreign Ministry and an increased budget in the 1980s. Italy
was one of the few Western countries in this period to be stepping
up its support for developing countries and ranked among the
highest per capita donors in the world.
The Funds for Development
The Department for Development Cooperation was founded in
1979. As in many areas of Italian politics, tasks were distributed
among the parties, as the PSI, the DC, the PRI, and the PSDI each
took charge of a different geographic area, under the overall
direction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the 1980s this post
was often occupied by Christian Democrat Andreotti, but the close
association of the Socialist party with Somalia was one of the most
significant aspects of the Italian foreign aid program.
With a budget of 500,000 billion lire, the Italians were the fifth
largest donors of humanitarian aid in the mid-1980s, in terms of
percentage of gross national product, about the same position they
hold on the ladder of world arms sellers. With a world average of
2"The Strategic Role of the Western Business Community," p. 260.
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0.36% of GNP directed toward aid programs, the Italians are well
over 0.4%. The annual donation amounts to about 100,000 lire for
each Italian.
The ability to be wealthy patrons in problem-ridden areas of the
world reflected a certain prestige on the Italians that was lacking in
their relations with countries that overshadowed them from the
North. Because of their middle position, both in terms of political
weight and their crucial strategic situation between the northern and
southern worlds, the Italians enjoyed a unique level of cooperation
with Third World countries, where political favours were not
automatically expected on either side, and mutual gains appeared to
flow steadily from the Italian commitments.
Through the humanitarian aid projects, Italians participated in
what one Italian commentator termed "a privileged form of foreign
policymaking."3 But the program does not appear to be vehicle for
Italian influence abroad in the traditional sense. Major donors such
often
as the United StatesAattach political strings to their involvement in
the Third World and are concerned primarily with eliminating
Communist power groups, even at the expense of democracy, in
countries where they send aid. The Italians by contrast follow their
own foreign policy directives: they are most concerned with casting
wide ties abroad that will lead to generally friendly relations and
expanded trade opportunities. An economic journal made this
observation about Italian industrialists: "Private businessmen say
they would like their government to give more Third World aid,
which would mean greater government support and spinoff for
their activities in the poorer countries."4 Remarked Agnelli,
There have been many Angolas and few Egypts. It is
imperative for the West to organize industrially and
economically in order to offer acceptable
technologies, sounder development prospects, better
3 "I conti in tasca alia nostra bontd," Corriere della sera, 21 March 1988.
4Middle East Economic Digest, vol. 22 no. 38, 22 September 1978, supplement on
Italian trade, p. viii.
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standards of living, as well as more credible military
support when needed.5
Italy's humanitarian role was both laudable and very limited.
Italian leaders were prone to making contradictory statements in the
field of human rights, since the real actors in Italian international
affairs were guided by a sense of "the market" rather than political
convictions. Italians showed little interest in taking a stand on the
Eritrean dispute or on their relations with South Africa where an
official embargo was annulled by thriving economic relations,
including arms sales In addition, Article 10 of the Italian
constitution states that Italy shall receive all political refugees, but in
reality an estimated 10,000 to 20,000 are expelled annually.6
Military Assistance Programs
Humanitarian aid was balanced by another type of aid: the role
of the Italian military in training and assistance programs.
Although the Ministry of Defence plays down the existence of
training programs, foreign personnel have been trained at Italian
military academies and by Italians abroad since the 1960s. The
programs were not controlled by the Italian parliament. Writes the
Archivio Disarmo in Rome:
Military education, given the ever greater
sophistication that armaments have reached, is
becoming increasingly important. Our country,
which does not regulate this sensitive issue, has
trained and continues to train military personnel
from countries in a state of war (Iran, Iraq, Libya,
Ethiopia, Somalia), with guerrilla movements (Peru
and Guatemala) or governed by military regimes
which reached power through coups d'etat and do
not respect human rights (Turkey, Tunisia, Sudan,
Zaire, Bangladesh, Pakistan, etc.). In fact, the law
5"The Strategic Role of the Western Business Community," p. 259.
interview with economist Alberto Castagnola, Rome, 14 March 1988.
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which regulates the admission of foreign military
officials to Italian military academies, no. 995 of 3
December 1970, does not stipulate any restrictions
about the country of origin. This aspect of our
foreign policy, as with almost everything that is
related to the arms trade, is covered by official
secrecy. In addition, the courses for foreign military
personnel in Italy are even financed by the funds for
cooperation with developing countries (law no.
38/1979).7
A Ministry of Defence official claimed that the training occured
in modest numbers. He could not confirm the sources of funding
for the program, claiming that he and his superior would be "sent to
prison" if he related the information.8
Italian military leaders expressed the same view, speaking
about the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the region surrounding
Italy:
This ideology, which affects all aspects of life, leads to
a de facto intolerance of, and hostility towards, the
Western way of life and systems of government and
could eventually result in attempts upon Italian
national security...from state-sponsored terrorism to
mistreatment of civilians and diplomats, from the
denial of energy resources to threats to vital shipping
lanes. Even when the Iran-Iraq conflict has
hopefully come to an end, there would still be no
real guarantee that further tensions would not arise.9
When linked to arms transfers from Italy, as was often the case,
training probably occurred at the request of Third World armed
forces unfamiliar with Western technology and military practices.
7Archivio Disarmo, Formazione di personate militare straniero in Italia,
Scheda codice F.A. no. 3., 28 February 1986.
interview at Ministry of Defence, Rome March 1988 (interviewee requested
anonymity).
9General Riccardo Bisogniero, "Italian Defence - Evolving to Meet a Rapidly
Changing World Situation," in NATO Review, no. 5, October 1987, p.14.
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But as the Italian state funded its growing humanitarian program, it
often found that recipient countries expected social assistance to be
followed by military transfers. This was often considered the
ultimate show of support for a developing nation. In the 1980s the
Italians were still reluctant to expand their military sales and
training programs, although in many regions, particularly in Africa,
Italians were continually pressed to do more.10
Africa
In the mid-1970s, when the Italian defence industry was still in
a period of relative immaturity, it supplied more arms to Africa in
millions of dollars than the United States, the United Kingdom,
Poland, Czechoslovakia or Canada. Only the Soviet Union, France
and West Germany sold more in the area.11 While the importance
of the continent in the eyes of some of the world's major suppliers,
such as the US, was eclipsed by other concerns in the 1970s, military
conflict was endemic on the African continent and supplies of arms
increased throughout the decade to supply burgeoning,
inexperienced armed forces.
This continent, which is targeted by the great powers
for its enormous mineral resources and its strategic
position, is the area with the largest number of wars
in progress: Morocco against the Polisario
movement, Libya against Chad, Ethiopia against
Somalia, undeclared wars between Angola,
Mozambique and South African-backed forces,
besides innumerable small internal wars. Naturally
in this context the role carried out by different arms
supplier nations, technical assistance and training, is
very important.12
10Interview with Cristina Ercolessi, Rome 18 April 1988.
^Elaborated from Bruce E. Arlinghaus, "Linkage and Leverage in African
Arms Transfers," Arlinghaus, ed. Arms for Africa (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath,
1983) p. 8.
12"G/i aiuti militari italiani ai Paesi Africani,"Archivio Disarmo, Codice
IB, n. 6,10 November 1984.
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Although Italy was probably introduced to some countries in
the area through military deals, defence assistance was so
widespread that the Italian presence made little impact. Italy held
the same place in the world, about fifth, on the scale of
humanitarian donors and exporters of major arms systems. Both
strategies appeared to enlarge the Italian network of trade. As
defence exports declined sharply in the late 1980s, Italy's main
presence was that of benefactor and economic partner.
East Africa
Italy also became one of the largest contributors to the
campaign for drought relief in Kenya, Uganda, Somalia, Ethiopia,
the Sudan and Djibouti. Italian aid was increased to the Sudan in
the 1980s, where allocations of $8 million in 1981 (0.5% of the total
Italian aid program) increased four years later to over $65 million
(8.3%).13 The Sudan is seen as a key actor in the strategic stability of
the Horn of Africa and the development of its agricultural potential
is sponsored by many Western countries. Djibouti has also been
marked as a priority country for Italy in the future.
The Horn of Africa was the area of greatest concentration for
the Italian aid program. Somalia maintained steady relations with
Italy, despite the fluctuations on its internal political scene. Somalia,
Ethiopia, and Eritrea were colonised by Mussolini and stripped from
the Italians in 1941. Italian troops returned to Somalia from 1949 to
1959 to oversee its recovery under a United Nations program. In
1969 Siad Barre came to power and launched a repressive regime.
The Italian Socialist Party has a strong affinity for the Somalian
leadership and Italian firms with Socialist backing have a notable
presence in the country. During his premiership, Bettino Craxi
13Cristina Ercolessi, unpublished paper on "Programmi per i paesi in via di
sviluppo" prepared for Centro per gli studi di politica internazionale, Rome: 1988,
p. 4.
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solidified relations with the government of Siad Barre through an
exchange of visits. The Italians' association with the Somali
president came under fire as evidence of the regime's harsh policies
emerged. Siad Barre was also accused of pocketing part of a $70
million loan arranged by Italy for building a factory with ENI in
1988.14 Italian favouritism for Somalia was diffused with increased
aid to Ethiopia, an attempt to show greater sensitivity to the Eritrean
issue, and allocations of aid to other destinations such as the Sudan
and Djibouti.
In the 1980s, Somalia still received an average of 12.3% of the
Italian development aid budget, or about $288 million in the period
1981-1985. Rome has continued to promote the university founded
in Somalia by Italians, which is responsible for the relatively high
number of Italian speakers in the country.
During the same period, Italy's former colony became the third
largest recipient of Italian arms, despite its meager domestic
resources. Many deliveries may be in the form of gifts since
Somalia's main trading product is bananas. A year after Italian
troops ended the United Nations trusteeship in 1959, eight F-51D
Mustangs were transferred to the Somali government from an
Italian-controlled air force unit. In the 1960s Italy continued to
transfer aircraft on a gift basis. Three Douglas C-47s and four Beech
C-45 planes were delivered in 1960, and eight Piaggio P-148 and two
AB 47G-2 planes in 1962. In 1980 and 1982 Italy delivered from four
to six G-222 transport planes that were built as part of the production
run for Libya. Agusta sold AB-212 helicopters in 1980 with delivery
following two years later; four P-166 transport planes were
transferred in 1981. The latter model may have been directed for
civilian uses, however; the Italian Air Force uses it for aerial
44La Repubblica, 7 April 1988.
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photogrammetry. S-211 trainers were ordered in 1985 but it was
uncertain when delivery would take place.15
In land systems, 100 M-47 Patton main battle tanks were
delivered to Somalia in 1985. Fifty were subsequently ordered.
These transfers formed part of a new technical and military
assistance program launched by Craxi in the autumn of 1985. He
refused the sale of Leopard tanks, however, because of ongoing
hostilities between Somalia and Ethiopia. Craxi made a public
statement regarding the Italian relationship with Somalia, an
unusual gesture when Italian weapons sales were involved.
Somalia is, for us, a great friend, and our position in
the Ethiopian-Somalian war of attrition is not
equally balanced. We think the Cuban forces and
Soviet military advisors should return home [from
Ethiopia]. But we do not think that a superiority of
Somalian armed forces could prevent an Ethiopian
attack. A negotiated solution is needed to prevent a
serious conflict in a vital part of the world.16
All of Italy's 500 M-47s were to be returned to the United States
for refurbishing and thus the exports to Somalia also required
American approval. Somalia also received 220 Iveco lorries. The
shipbuilding industry had one order from Somalia which resulted
in delivery of the Type 6614 attack patrol craft in 1979-1980.
With the aim of effecting a gradual rapprochement between
Ethiopia and the West, Italy made Addis Abeba the primary
recipient of aid funds. In 1986 Ethiopia received 88 billion lire, about
16 billion more than the Somalians.17 In 1988 about 1,500 Italian
nationals were employed as humanitarian aid workers in Ethiopia.
They were the first to furnish direct assistance in resettling refugees,
15Sources of information on Italian arms transfers included the yearbooks of
SIPRI and the Istituto affari internazionali, Jane's Defence Weekly, Rivista
militare, and Rivista italiana difesa.
16"Italian M-47s to reinforce Somalia," Jane's Defence Weekly, 12 October
1985.
17M2 1984-1985, p. 500.
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and sent hard-working crews to the area despite a series of
kidnappings of Italian nationals. Irrigation projects, road
construction and storage facilities for harvested food products were
tackled in ensuing years. Italian workers are said to be extremely
committed and serve long terms in the field.
The Italian presence in Ethiopia is criticised by some political
forces in Italy, namely the Republican Party, which is preoccupied by
the suppression of opposition political groups and the Soviet
Union's renewed interest in the country. Nonetheless, Italy became
Ethiopia's major Western trading partner in the mid-1980s and its
"privileged interlocutor" in the West.18 Ethiopia gave evidence of
its desire to open to Western countries with the signing of a contract
for $200-250 million in credits from Italy.
As a result of the improved relations between the two
countries, new business opportunities materialised. Economic
contracts passed on concessionary terms to the developing countries
are a short step away from aid programs, and can have
reverberations of far greater importance in the recipient country
than in the parent firms. Ethiopian leader Menghistu Haile Mariam
laid the foundations for a new factory for spare parts launched in
Ethiopia by the Italian company La Fata, based in Turin. The factory
was significant in setting the Ethiopian economy back on its feet
since agricultural and industrial development had come nearly to a
standstill because of the impossibility of repairing machinery.
Production of spare parts at home was estimated to save over $50
million per year for Addis Abeba.
In contrast to the Somalians, the Ethiopians were not thought
to have requested arms from Italy.19 There was a limited trade in
aircraft, however. Six Agusta Bell-204 Iroquois helicopters were
delivered in 1968; the next agreement did not come until the 1980s,
with the delivery of SF-260TP trainers. Some of these were stated to
be designated for civilian use.
18MJ 1984-1985, p. 500.
19Interview Cristina Ercolessi, Rome 18 April 1988.
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Other Areas
Italian involvement in other areas of sub-Saharan Africa is
high as well. In 1982-1985, Italy was the second largest source of aid
for Mozambique and Angola. Of aid coming from non-COMECON
countries, Italy provided almost 20% and 16% respectively of total
aid to these countries. In contrast to the Horn of Africa, Italian aid
has tended to go more toward promoting a general process of
economic reform in these areas, rather than supporting specific
development programs under Italian supervision.20
In October 1981 Italy became the first Western country visited
by President Samora Michel since the independence of Mozambique
in 1975. A few months earlier Mozambique had announced its
adherence to COMECON, despite the declaration of a desire to
launch a policy of "active non-aligri^ment."21 Following an
agreement on economic, technical and scientific cooperation, Italy
became the largest trading partner in the West for Mozambique.
Recent collaboration has been based on a $500 million collaboration
with IRI in the construction of a carbon mine at Moatizo and the
reactivation of a railway line linking inland areas to the coast. IRI's
subsidiary Finsider would gain about three million tons of carbon
per year from the operation. Other contracts for expanding
telecommunications, geological, agricultural and industrial projects
have been estimated to be worth hundred of millions of dollars. 22
In this area of high economic concentration for Italy, however,
military contracts do not appear to have been involved.
Italy, and in particular ENI, is an important commercial partner
for Angola, but relations with Italy in the 1980s grew primarily as a
result^Angola's search for European support in isolating South
Africa. The Angolan President Jose Eduardo Dos Santos was
20Ercolessi, p. 1.
llIAI 1981-1982, p. 467-468.
22IAI1984-1985, p. 502.
175
received by President Alessandro Pertini and Foreign Minister
Andreotti, and was a guest of Craxi at Villa Madama during a state
visit in September 1984. The Italian government condemned the
South African attack on Angolan territory in 1981. Italy has not
emerged as an outspoken defender of Angolan rights, however,
partly because of the Italians' trade relations with the South African
regime.
Nigeria
Sales to Nigeria were embargoed by the Italian government in
1968. The Nigerians had been at war for more than a year over the
Biafran secession, which became one of the bloodiest conflicts in
recent African history. Authorities in Rome revoked the licence to
sell 26 MB-326 planes; the Nigerians turned to the Soviet Union to
fulfill their requirement. The reasons for this rare case of a
government prohibition on exports were not clear. Perhaps Italian
leaders wished to make a public stand in an area where large profits
were not at risk.
In 1978 sales from Italy resumed with the order of five
Aermacchi MB-326GB aircraft. The Nigerians also purchased
Italian-French Otomat ship-to-ship missiles between 1977-1981, and
placed an order for Aspide missiles in 1978 and again in 1982.
Twelve MB-339A trainer/strike aircraft were ordered in 1983, and G-
222 transport planes were delivered in 1984. Nigeria also bought
Italian-made Palmaria self-propelled howitzers between 1983 and
1986. In the naval sector, a large order for 15 Intermarine gunboats
was sealed in 1978, followed by a deal for two Lerici-class
minehunters in 1983. The Nigerian police ordered Jet Explorer 530
patrol vessels between 1983 and 1984. In 1987 Fincantieri's yard at
Genoa received an order for a $15 million refit of the Nigerian
Navy's Vosper Mk3 corvette.
A new military government came to power in Nigeria on New
Year's Eve 1984. One of the main goals of the regime was to reduce
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the staggering amount spent on bribes in connection with arms
imports. Discontent was mainly over dealings with Western
suppliers. In recent years, the country was a client of both the US
and the Soviet Union. Its armed forces are small but the country is
by far the strongest military force in West Africa, and because of its
oil revenues, Nigeria is the only nation in the area with continuing
large arms imports. In the mid-1980s, military sales from Italy rose
dramatically. An arms researcher in Rome described Nigeria's
importance for Italian weapons exports:
Nigeria, considered a "giant" among African nations
in economic potential and population, is the fourth
most important African client for our defence
industry, after Libya, Egypt and Somalia. Proof of this
is the fact that in 1984 and early 1985 the aircraft
industry exported a value of 230 billion lire, reaching
almost 20% of all Italian [military] exports.23
About 12,000 Italians work in Nigeria, where there is perhaps
$1 million in Italian business interests.24
Zimbabwe, Zaire, and Other Countries
Zimbabwe also has Italian-made armaments in its arsenal.
Much of this was acquired through transfers from South Africa. The
Rhodesian government acquired six to seven Piaggio P-166 planes in
1967. Transfers of Aermacchi-Lockheed AL-60 planes and seven
Aerfer-Aermacchi AM3C planes from South Africa in 1967 and 1971
have been denied by Italy. Impalas built under Italian licence in
South Africa (see Chapter 7) were also thought to have been in use
in the country since 1976. Most transfers to the country after its
independence in 1980, usually in the form of military aid, came
from China, North Korea and the United Kingdom. Wider
economic trade was opened when Rober Mugabe made Italy the first
23Luciano Bertozzi, "Anche in Nigeria," Nigrizia, October 1985.
24L4/ 1983-1984, p. 509.
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stop on a European tour in May 1982. Italy sold ten S-211 trainers in
1982 as well as five SF-250 Warrior trainer/COIN. Two AB-412
Griffons were ordered in 1983.
Italy sent an Air Force delegation to Zambia in the late 1960s
which was followed by deliveries of MB-326GB and SF-260MX
planes in 1969.25 Agusta also sold a series of helicopters to Zambia in
the following decade. Five Iroquois were purchased in 1969, a
further 25 models between 1973 and 1976, and an additional seven in
1981; one Agusta Bell 212 in 1971; and ten AB-47G in 1977. SIAI-
Marchetti sold eight SF-260s in the early 1970s, and received an order
for 18 more in 1978.
Zaire received military equipment from Italy as part of a 1964
agreement which included 12 (NA) T-6G Harvard, 12 Piaggio P-148
planes, and two Douglas C-47 aircraft. Orders for the Aermacchi MB-
326 in various versions and the SIAI-Marchetti SF-260M trainer
followed throughout the 1970s and early 1980s.
Italian economic activity in Zaire is high; besides about $60
million in annual donations, the Italians are active in projects to
make use of the country's enormous energy potential. Italian firms
participate in power projects on Zaire's waterfalls along the river
Congo; the longest electrical line in the world, the Inga-Shaba,
operates with Italian technology. AGIP also has a 50% stake in the
restructuring of the Moanda refinery to take advantage of recently-
discovered off-shore oil beds.
Tanzania purchased a small amount of helicopters from
Agusta during the 1970s; these included the model 47G-36-2, the
206A Jet Rangerf the 206B-2 and the AB-205.
Chinook helicopters were delivered in 1982. Tanzania also ordered
Seneca vessels from Crestitalia in 1985. In 1978 Tanzania was
invaded by the Ugandans but drove them out a year later. Uganda
has a small number of Italian aircraft in its arsenal, including the
Iroquois helicopter and the AB-206A Jet Ranger.
25Gianluca Devoto, "II commercio delle armi," II potere militare in Italia, p.
239.
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The Congo received 17 MB-326GB jets in 1969 for training and
anti-guerilla functions, and 12 SIAI-Marchetti SF-260MX trainers.26
Three Piranha CPB were ordered in 1979. Ghana and the Central
African Republic were also clients of Aermacchi and SIAI-Marchetti
beginning in the late 1960s. Gabon bought Intermarine patrol boats
in 1977 and Kenya received Otomat-2 ship-to-ship missiles in 1986
for mounting on British-made ships.
North Africa
Besides having a major role in arming Libya (see Chapter 7),
Italy is also one of Tunisia's main suppliers, along with the United
States and France.27 Aermacchi sold eight MB-326 aircraft in 1965,
eight of the MB-326K model in 1977 and an additional 12 in 1979.
SIAI-Marchetti delivered 12 SF-260W Warrior trainers in 1974 in a
deal that included spare parts, training and support equipment.
Aeritalia sold three G-222 transport planes on a credit basis for $4.7
million each in 1976. Agusta delivered 12 of an order of 18 AB-205
helicopters to Tunisia in 1979. One hundred Type 6614 attack patrol
craft were thought to have been delivered in 1979. In the 1980s,
transfers included 100 Iveco lorries, 400 Campagnola jeeps and
Beretta machine pistols. Three thousand FIAT-made tanks were on
order in 1980, but no notice of delivery has been made public. In the
early 1980s several dozen Tunisians were trained at the Italian Air
Force Academy at Pozzuoli.28 An Italian Air Force unit has been
posted in the country as well.
Italy is also an important trading partner for Tunisia, with the
second highest volume of trade among the Europeans. The
Tunisians asked for Italian assistance in improving economic
relations during Italy's EEC presidency, especially because of their
anxiety over the imminent entry of Portugal into the community.
Italy has sponsored loans for agricultural development.
26 "II commercio delle armi," p. 239.
27Brzoska and Ohlson, p. 23.
28 "II nostro mercato di morte," p. 34.
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Tunis also became the headquarters for the Palestine Liberation Organisation,
and during a state visit on the 6-7 December 1984, both Prime Minister Craxi
and Foreign Minister Andreotti met with PLO President Yassir Arafat. The
controversial visit was arranged without prior consultation with the US, and
did not gain the support, as Italian leaders had hoped, of other European
leaders. In June 1984, Arafat had been received privately by Craxi, Andreotti,
and President Sandro Pertini in Rome at the occasion of the funeral of PCI
leader Enrico Berlinguer. As the PLO modified its strategy other European
leaders gradually fell in line with Italian support for the organisation.28a
With a 25-year contract signed between Algeria and ENI, Italy is
the nation's biggest hydrocarbons client and 12,000 Italians work in
the country. Algerian gas is cheaper than Soviet or Dutch products
since Italy receives a 36% discount as part of its status as a major
client. Algerian gas was originally part of an attempt to diversify
Italian energy sources, but the dependence has become
uncomfortably high.
Despite a close relationship with Algeria because of the gas
pipeline to Italy, military transfers from Italian companies remained
at a modest level. Ten Italian-made coastal patrol boats were
delivered from 1976, and OTO-Melara and Breda sold naval cannons
in 1981 and 1982. The Algerians sought to increase war-related trade
with the Italians, but Italy appeared reluctant to create too much
interdependence between the two countries.
Algiers sought a deal with FIAT in 1986 for the construction of
an automobile plant, but in general, attempts to balance trade
relations with a flow of exports from Italy were not successful in the
1980s.
Morocco was a steady client of Italian defence industries in the
1970s and 1980s. Deliveries were heavily concentrated in the field of
helicopters. Agusta first sold 12 AB-205 Iroquois helicopters in 1968.
Sales of the AB-206 and the AB-212 followed in the mid-1970s.
Between six and 18 Agusta CH-47C were believed to be delivered in
1980; the AB-212 and 19 of the AB 206B-2 were ordered in the same
year. SIAI-Marchetti also had a contract to sell 28 SF260 aircraft to
Morocco in 1976; delivery was not confirmed. In 1983 about 24
Aspide missiles were acquired. Between 1979 and 1986, Italy was one
of the Western countries which sent a total of $2.5 billion in military
28a IA1 1984-1985, pp. 60-66; IAI 1983-1984, pp. 502-503.
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assistance to aid Morocco in its ongoing struggle against the Polisario
movement, estimated to cost a total of $1.7 billion annually. The
US, France, FRG, and probably Saudi Arabia and South Africa were
the other countries helping to arm Morocco.29 Italy was also
reported to have supplied arms clandestinely to the Polisario
rebels.30
The Middle East
The Italians had a special advantage in holding long-standing
trade ties, and to a certain extent, a common heritage with the
countries in the Middle East and Mediterranean whose oil
possessions brought them immense power in the 1970s.
Italy's relations are balanced on a thick network of economic
ties that flourish even in moments of deepest political conflict.
Exchanges occur mainly in two spheres: the supply of hydrocarbons
to Italy and the export of various Italian goods. As one researcher
points out, Italy has not been able to balance these exchanges with
certain areas: Italian exports to the countries like Libya and Algeria
are generally less dynamic than markets in the most populated
countries such as Egypt and Morocco, or the richest ones (in the
Persian Gulf).31
An active presence in the area was necessary to help offset the
costs of energy imports, but Italy had a dynamic trade in the Middle
East long before its economic importance came to have the global
effects of the 1970s. Rich interaction continued after the region's
economic power was established. In 1973 the region received
perhaps 5% of Italian exports; the figure rose to 13% in 1978. Exports
to OPEC rose 43% in 1977, a 25-30% increase in real terms. During
29Stephanie Neuman, "Arms and the Superpowers," Foreign Affairs, Summer
1988, p.1049.
30Interview with Falco Accame, Rome 20 March 1988.
31Maurizio Cremasco and Giacomo Luciani, "The Mediterranean Dimension of
Italy's Foreign and Security Policy," The International Spectator, vol. XX, no. 2,
January-March 1985, p. 29.
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that year Italy marked a 73% increase in trade with Ethiopia, and
20% with Egypt.32 By the end of that year Italy still ran a trade deficit
with many oil countries, including $1,866.2 million with Saudi
Arabia, $1,883.4 million with Iraq, and $294.1 million with Libya.33
In the mid-1980s the Arab countries received 12-13% of Italian
exports, and were the source of 15% of Italy's total imports.34
An Italian industrial official described the difficulties in
engaging in business with the oil-producers:
They are the absolute arbiters. If they decide to stop
the contract, to cut off payment, or to kick you out,
you have no defence...There are no agreements
between governments to protect you. You go at your
own risk.35
In the late 1970s the Italian foreign trade ministry launched
new efforts to assist Italian businessmen in the oil-producing
nations, and in socialist countries. Over two years, Minister Rinaldo
Ossola travelled to more than 20 countries, mostly in these two
areas. He made these remarks on the special role of Italian
businessmen in the Middle East:
The biggest private Italian groups have in fact their
own representatives in all of these countries, and
only avail themselves of government support in
particular cases. But it is just these smaller firms that
form the backbone of the Italian economy, both
because of their efficiency and because of their
operational flexibility. Our firms have found very
interesting outlets in these markets because they are
extremely pliable in meeting momentary
requirements. So it is not surprising if we look at the
Italian market share in this area, that we find
32MEED, 22 September 1978, p. viii.
33MEED, 22 September 1978, p. iii.
34Pier Giovanni Donini, "Gli interessi economici: una concentrazione
pericolosa? " Politica internazionale, no. 1 January 1986, p. 35.
35MEED, 22 September 1978, p. xiii.
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perhaps only Japan has been more successful in trade
and industrial collaboration in the last five to six
years.36
However, ties in the political and military field show different
trends. Italy's trade ties are so deep-rooted that it has developed a
political network which operates at a different level from that of
other forces competing in the area. Italy generally supports the Arab
cause and prominent leaders such as Andreotti and Craxi played
down Italy's American connections when promoting the interests of
their own country in the Mediterranean in the 1980s. Italy's
"greatest efforts seem to be directed toward remaining neutral and
impartial with respect to the many conflicts in the Arab world, thus
giving rise to perplexities and misunderstanding among both the
Arab countries and our Western allies."37
But Italy has extended help at the diplomatic level to mediate
in political rivalries in the area, and its long-standing support for the
Arab side in the Palestinian question was brought to fruition in the
Venice Declaration in 1980, in which the European Community
members declared their support for the rights of the Palestinian
people. Italy's intervention is seriously sought by many North
African and Arab nations looking for a voice in Western Europe. By
keeping open relations with all the countries of the Mediterranean
littoral and making frequent tours of the area, Italian leaders
generally enjoy a high level of esteem among governments in the
region. When efforts to improve the local political climate failed,
Italian economic relations seemed to suffer very little.
Italy's military presence is almost antithetical to its
economic presence. Apart from its membership in
NATO, which in itself causes distrust in Libya and
Algeria basically because they do not believe in the
geographic limits of the Alliance, Italy is in any case
36MEED, 22 September 1978, p. viii.
37"The Mediterranean Dimension of Italy's Foreign and Security Policy," p.
29.
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inserted in a Western context for "out-of-area"
operations and has actually deployed military forces
in the Sinai in support of the Camp David accord and
in Lebanon to contain not only Israel but also Syria.
Its most recent commitment in the Gulf of Suez is
less significant from all points of view, but was
certainly perceived as a move in support of Egypt. In
line with this schizophrenia, Italy's diplomacy has
wavered over the past few years between seeking
closer ties with countries like Egypt, Jordan and
Saudi Arabia and attempts to revive political
relations with countries like Syria, Libya and Algeria,
interspersed with half opening toward Arafat,
without any indication of an overall design.38
Italy did have a "military presence" in the Middle East, in the
form of its steady supply of weaponry. Here Italian arms
manufacturers responded to the commercial opportunities that were
already bringing enormous profits to many areas of Italian industry.
Although Third World military spending levelled off in the 1980s,
according to US government sources, the Middle East was still
spending an average 18% of GNP on weapons between 1985 and
1988, and received about two thirds of the arms sent to the Third
World. This reflected a 12% drop between 1984 and 1987 and a 15%
decline in 1987. In the Third World the USSR continued to be the
largest supplier, following closely by the US. The next largest
suppliers, at a significant distance from the major sellers, were
France, China, the UK and Italy; the place of the FRG dropped more
rapidly than any of the major suppliers over the 1980s.39
Egypt
Egypt became one of Italy's top five defence clients by the early
1980s. One of the staunchest supporters of the movement of non-
aligned states in Africa and the strongest single military power in
38"The Mediterranean Dimension of Italy's Foreign and Security Policy," pp.
29-30.
39Jane's Defence Weekly, 12 August 1989.
184
the Arab world, it was one of Italy's most reliable allies. Although
Egypt still maintained a trade surplus because of heavy oil sales to
Italy, Italian companies carried out a wide spectrum of industrial
activity inside the country. Italian firms won a UNESCO contract for
6,500 million lire (about $7.49 million) in the 1970s to salvage
ancient Egyptian monuments on the Nile. ENI's subsidiary AGIP
was active in Egypt from the early 1950s, and discovered two of the
country's main oil fields in the Sinai (later occupied by Israel). Egypt
and AGIP carried out joint exploration and production of oil in the
Nile delta and Sinai peninsula in the late 1970s. Cooperation also
includes Italian funding for food programs, telecommunications,
health and transport, to improve areas neglected because of the
heavy Egyptian military budget.
Assistance was also sought from Italy in the field of military
exports. There were some ties in the aircraft field: 20 SIAI-Marchetti
Bravo trainers made with Switzerland were probably delivered in
1977, and CH-47C and SS-61R helicopters were delivered in the early
1980s. But transfers were concentrated above all in the naval sector.
Six fast attack patrol craft were ordered by the Egyptian coast guard in
1980 and a delivery of Lwpo-class frigates was projected for an
indefinite date. Missiles for naval use included Otomat ship-to-ship
missiles (1978-1979); and Aspide missiles. Eighteen Skyguard air
defence systems with Oerlikon 35mm cannons and Sparrow or
Aspide missiles were delivered by Contraves in 1982-1983, and
Selenia/ELSAG took on modernisation of two frigates, the Najim
Alzafir and the Al Nasser, with two Albatros/Aspide missiles, two
anti-air defence systems and various equipment made by Breda and
OTO-Melara in 1985. Laser and anti-air systems were ordered in
1984-1985, along with Luigi Franchi rifles.
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia was another major Middle Eastern customer for
the Italians. Transfers began in 1968 with 16 AB-206A Jet Rangers
and 24 Iroquois helicopters. Before the eruption of the Lockheed
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scandal, Italians acting as "go-betweens" with diplomatic passports
were given the tasks of setting up a triangular aircraft consortium
between Lockheed, Italy and Saudi Arabia, sealing a deal to supply
the Saudis with a tanker fleet, and guaranteeing oil supplies for Italy.
One acted with the support of President Leone and the foreign
minister but without the knowledge of ENI, in a similar
arrangement to secure oil supplies in the period 1973-1975. The
contracts were lost after the death of King Faisal.40 The revelation of
this activity was one of the reasons behind the resignation of
President Giovanni Leone.
In the mid-1970s other types of industrial collaboration
expanded. Saudi Arabia became Italy's top client in construction by
the end of the decade, with 523,000 million lire ($603.2 million) in
contracts in 1977. Italy won a contract to build a complex in Riyadh
called Prince Fawaz City, to include a power station, a hotel,
university facilities, a municipal centre, and housing for 12,000
people. In addition, by this time more than 30% of Saudi roads were
built by the Italians.41 Sauro-class submarines and the construction
of a new naval base were also under consideration.
Although the Saudis were apparently cautious about widening
economic collaboration because of reservations about Italy's political
stability in the 1970s,42 military sales from Italy continued. Further
deliveries of Agusta-made helicopters came in 1977, 1978 and 1985.
Italy began delivery of an order of 200 VCC-1 attack patrol craft, some
armed with TOW systems, in 1982. Beretta won a deal to supply the
Pm 12/S machine pistol in 1983, and the Firos 25 launcher system
made by BPD was under consideration by the Saudis in the same
period. Italy has also participated in various lucrative contracts with
Saudi Arabia through European consortia. A sale of 72 155/39
howitzers, made through a partnership between OTO-Melara and
German and British manufacturers, delayed delivery of the model to
40MEED, 22 September 1978, p. v.
41MEED, 22 September 1978, p. xiii.
42MEED, 22 September 1978, p. vii.
186
the Italian Army. Italy also had a 10% stake in the Tornados sold to
Saudi Arabia in 1984 and 1988. By this time, the country had become
Italy's most important trading partner in general in the Middle East,
replacing "risky" partners such as Libya.43
Syria, Israel, Lebanon, and Other Clients
Syria was an early client of the Italian defence industry; FIAT
first sold 26 of its G-59 aircraft in 1950. Later sales came mostly in the
form of helicopters. Syria bought Chinook and Sea King helicopter
along with more than 40 Agusta AB-212s and A-109 helicopters in
1977. Further orders for these models continued into the early 1980s.
Lockheed Hercules transport planes co-produced with Italy were sold
to Syria in 1976. These military agreements were also part of a
broader economic relationship: by the late 1970s Italy was Syria's
biggest single export market, with $307.6 million in purchases. This
left Italy with an $87.7 million trade deficit. The Italians attempted
to offset imports of Syrian oil and cotton (in the latter field, Italy was
second only to China for the Syrians) with construction of hotels
and a $140 million thermal power plant. Arms sales may well be
another important factor, although transfers are left unreported as
much as possible because of Syria's role in Middle East conflicts.
Israel purchased three motor torpedo boats from Italy in 1956-
1957 at a cost of $300,000 each. Twenty-five Iroquois helicopters were
bought from Italy in 1968-1969. One hundred M-113 tanks were
thought to have been "triangulated" from Italy to Israel through
Greece.44 In 1985, Italian-Israeli defence cooperation was raised to a
more legitimate plane as the chiefs of staff of the two countries
agreed to meet regularly in the mid-1980s and joint ventures in
technology were discussed. Israel's consternation over Italian
assistance in the Iraqi nuclear program and steady Italian support for
the Palestinian cause was partially quelled during a state visit by
43Donini, p. 38.
44Panorama, 10 April 1988.
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Shimon Peres, Israel's Prime Minister, with Craxi in Rome in March
1985. Peres also met with Agnelli during the visit. 45
Nonetheless, Italy had wider involvement in supporting
Israel's foes, among them Palestinian forces, who were believed to
have received Italian helicopters and Beretta arms since the early
1970s.46 Lebanon began purchasing Italian military equipment,
including Aermacchi and Marchetti planes, in the 1950s. Orders for
fast patrol boats, Aztec patrol vessels and AB-212 helicopters made it
an important client for Italy in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Fifty
armoured transport vehicles made by OTO-Melara were ordered in
the early 1980s. Both Jordan and Kuwait have purchased arms from
the United States as well as the Soviet Union in the 1980s. Italian
sales to Jordan included Aspide missiles, Beretta rifles, and
"triangulated" armoured tanks and bombs; Kuwait received Agusta
helicopters between 1968 and 1970.
Other Middle Eastern sales included collective contracts from
the United Arab Emirates, which placed large orders for the OF-40
main battle tank (which carries the NATO-standard 105mm gun and
is a close copy of the German Leopard tank). The order for 30 A-129
Mangusta helicopters was expected to be the first export sale of
Agusta's multi-purpose helicopter, and represented the first time
the Italian government actively assisted export efforts of the arms
industry. Oman also ordered a number of AB 206 Jet Rangers, as
well as Iroquois, Sea King and AB-212 helicopters between 1970 and
1977. Palmaria 155m SPH and OTO-Melara compact cannons, as
well as Breda 40/70, were on order in the 1980s. Oman later
purchased eight Tornados, with some of the profits directed to Italy.
45Jane's Defence Weekly, 9 March 1985, p. 392.
46Panorama, 10 April 1988 and Corriere della sera, 16 March 1988.
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Latin America
In Latin America and the Far East, where Italian political
relationships were less active than in Europe and the Middle East,
broad trade ties were generally slow to develop. Italian defence
exports there show that industrialists pursued openings in specific
markets rather than following a coherent strategy. In many cases,
however, inter-governmental links were strengthened in the 1980s.
Italy received a series of naval contracts from Latin American
countries early in the postwar period, and some of these nations
were responsible for propelling Italy to its peak in arms exports
because of the acquisition of a number of large systems. Italy
identified more closely with these countries than did other major
suppliers, because of some similarities in the countries' positions
with respect to the international system. Brazil and Argentina
already had budding industries searching to widen a military-
technological base after the Second World War. Unlike the Italians,
however, Latin American nations did not have channels through
which they could have continuous access to new technology.
Instead many turned to Italy for the acquisition of licences to build
their domestic industries.
The Latin American military sector occupies an
important power position, with the result that
demands for armaments are usually met. In many
cases, the military actually forms the government, so
that the procurement of weaponry presents less of a
problem.47
During the 1970s when Italy launched a number of important
licence agreements with these countries, the Italian industry itself
consistently held the highest number of foreign licences,48 but it was
still able to assist third parties in increasing their military-industrial
47David K. Whynes, The Economics of Third World Military Expenditure,
(London: Macmillan, 1979) p.94
48 See SIPR1 Yearbook various years; Italy has since been overtaken by Japan.
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strengths. In the late 1980s many Latin American countries were
important exporters of weaponry in their own right and have
become competitors in markets where Italy traditionally was strong.
At the same time, as Romiti predicted, they began to decrease
purchases from countries like Italy, because of the enormous
external debt ($360 billion in 1985), a decline in regional tensions,
and the replacement of military dictatorships with civilian rule.49
Venezuela
In the early postwar period, Italian military sales to Venezuela
were probably limited to the sale of frigates between 1955 and I960.50
Although the Venezuelan government was wary of cooperation
with firms such as ENI in the Venezuelan oil production, trade in
other areas was more successful. By the end of the 1970s Venezuela
became the second largest recipient of Italian arms, after Libya.51
Venezuela had bought three fast Almirante-class frigates in 1956
which were later modernised in Italy in 1961-1962. Cantieri Navali
Riuniti (CNR) built six Lupo-class frigates for Venezuela beginning
in 1975. The deal caused an uproar in Venezuelan politics over the
alleged bribes associated with the contract.52 This was not the first
incident of alleged Italian meddling in Venezuelan politics: the
Italians had been unpopular in the country in the late 1950s after
pressuring the Italian immigrant population there to support the
dictator Jimenez, who had arranged $1 billion in contracts (probably
non-military) for Italian firms but was subsequently overthrown.53
The Italian sale to Venezuela's Navy in 1975, however, opened
the way for close cooperation between the two countries.
Venezuelan shipbuilders obtained the licence to produce 21
additional frigates, and to arm the vessels ordered a large delivery of
49S/PRZ Yearbook 1986, p. 342.
50 "II nostro mercato di morte," p. 26.
51Archivio Disarmo, Codice IB n. 13, 15 May 1986.
52Armz: nuovo modello di sviluppo? p. 274, n. 27.
5377ze Politics of Italian Foreign Policy, p. 94.
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Otomat Mk2 ship-to-ship missiles (an Italian co-production with
France), two Agusta-Bell 212A helicopters (co-produced with the
United States), and 48 Selenia Aspide-IA air-to-air missiles.
In March 1982 the Venezuelan foreign minister Zambrano
visited Rome, and following talks with his Italian counterpart
Colombo, as well as Spadolini and President Pertini, signed two
cooperation accords. The Venezuelans favoured Italian businesses
in their country, and allowed IRI to become the first foreign country
to receive special financing agreements for industrial projects.54 In
1983 a contract for five military patrol craft was under negotiation.
Venezuela also bought eight G-222 planes with an option to order
eight more; S-61R helicopters were delivered in 1984 along with 54
Breda anti-aircraft cannons 40/70 for the Venezuelan Army. An
undisclosed number of Beretta machine pistols were also delivered
in 1983-1984.55
Brazil
Brazil was one of only four emerging countries, along with
Argentina, India and South Africa, with some capacity to produce
more than simply light arms after the Second World War.56 Most
Latin American nations had been embargoed during the war and
had little contact with modern military industries. Brazil, however,
had sent an expeditionary corps to Italy57 and thus made an early
contact within the European military establishment, albeit with one
of its weaker links.
In the postwar period, Brazilian-Italian military cooperation
had focussed on co-production agreements or licenced production in
naval and aircraft projects. Licenced production dates to 1970, when
54L4I 1981-1982, p. 475.
551AI, 1983-1984, p. 178.
56Armi: nuovo modello di sviluppo? p. 254.
57 Peter Lock and Herbert Wulf, "Economic Consequences of the Transfer of
Military-Oriented Technology," in Mary Kaldor and Asbjorn Eide, eds., The World
Military Order (London: Macmillan, 1983), p. 210.
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Brazil acquired the licence to begin a ten-year stint of making 200
AT-26 armed trainers (which took the name Xavante). In 1972 the
Brazilian company Embraer began a long relationship with the
Italian aeronautics establishment. The first project was licenced
production of MB-326GB planes; about 112 were built in Brazil.
About three Silvercraft SH4 planes were imported in 1973 prior to
the beginning of another round of licenced production. Some of
these were re-exported to Togo and Paraguay.58 Embraer also
acquired the licence to build the MB-326K to replace the Xavante.
The first outside sale of the aircraft went to Togo in 1976, and
included a training mission. In the mid-1980s Libya became a major
customer for Embraer and other Brazilian arms manufacturers. A
dozen colonels and other members of a Libyan delegation visited
Brazil in January 1988 to order more than £1 billion worth of tanks
and missiles in a proposed weapons-for-oil deal.59
In 1980 Sauro-class submarines and Maestrale-class frigates
were sold to the Brazilians, and H-3D Sea King helicopters were
probably delivered in 1983 and 1984. During the same period the
Brazilian Navy bought the Orion radar system produced by Selenia
and Ferranti of the United Kingdom. Beretta machine pistols were
also delivered in 1983-1984.
Italy's cooperation with Brazil beginning in 1980 on the AMX
fighter/ground attack plane represented defence cooperation of a
new kind. After initial interest of Sweden's Saab was eliminated,
the project's proportions were set at 48% for Aeritalia, 30% for
Embraer, and 22% for Aermacchi. The sharing of the development
and production with a less advanced industry had not occurred
before in the launching of a major aircraft. The project was
reinforced by a 1983 government-to-government accord. The plane
was designed to replace the G-91 trainer, and its producers claim that
it was an aircraft "without any competitors" because of its advanced
58Armi: nuovo modello di sviluppo? p. 252, note 15.
59The Independent, 22 January 1988.
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design. 60 China, Spain and Argentina expressed interest in acquiring
the AMX, which entered service in Italy in 1988, and was scheduled
for delivery in Brazil the following spring. In launching the co-
production, Italy could tap into markets where Brazil had
established itself, for instance in Egypt and Peru.
Peru
Peru purchased five Piaggio P-136L aircraft in 1956-1957, and
four Rio-class patrol boats in 1960 worth $120,000 each. After the
Italian industry began to accelerate its exports in the 1970s, Peru
became a major customer for a variety of Italian military systems.
Italy was probably the main supplier to the Peruvian Navy in the
1970s. In the same period the Peruvian Air Force and Army
purchased most of its equipment from the USSR.61 Italy sold a
number of Lupo-class frigates to Peru in 1974, as well as an estiamted
15 AB-212 helicopters to equip the frigates. SH-3D Sea King
helicopters were also delivered in 1978. Two additional Lupo-class
ships were to be built under licence production beginning in 1979.
In the mid-1970s Italy also sold approximately 100 Otomat missiles
for the Lupo frigates, and the same number of Selenia Albatros/
Aspide missiles. Two Superalpino-class frigates were built in Italy
for sale in Peru, followed by the licence production of an additional
four for the Peruvian Navy. A similar arrangement involved the
Maestrale-class frigate, which was also built under licence, beginning
in 1980 after the acquisiton of two ready-built models. The licences
were held by SIM Callao in Peru.
In the mid-1980s, Peru took the initiative in cutting military
spending in Latin America by cancelling licensed production of 66
Italian MB-339AK trainer/ground attack aircraft; President Garcia, in
6(1 "AMX: La risposta ad un'esigenza," Difesa oggi, n. 91-92, November 1985.
61Brzoska and Ohlson, p. 32.
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power since the summer of 1985, simultaneously annulled part of a
French order for Mirage-2000 fighters.62
Argentina
Italy has always been an important trade partner of
the Argentine Republic and Italian immigrants have
made up the largest single ethnic group in the
nation. From 1857 to 1958 Italians constituted
approximately 46% of the total immigration into
Argentina, leading even the Spaniards who made up
33%...they also brought badly needed new industrial
skills...Italian blood has given Argentina some of its
greatest men in the past century and a half, including
the patriot general Manuel Belgrano in the
independence period, intellectuals like Jose
Ingenieros and Risieri Frondizi; several presidents,
including Carlos Pellegrini, Juan Domingo Peron,
Arturo Frondizi, and Arturo Illia; industrial giants
and...shipping magnates, and generals of the caliber
of Pablo Ricchieri.63
As a consequence of the high number of Argentines of Italian
origin (estimated at 1,300,000 out of 28 million in the early 1980s),
good relations with Italy are seen as a way of improving the
domestic mood in Argentina. President Alfonsin visited Rome in
October 1984 and Pertini visited Argentina twice. Argentina is very
important for Italy for both imports and exports; Italian investments
in Argentina are second only to those of the United States.64
Argentinian-Italian relations were solidified through increasing
government-to-government contacts in the 1980s. The Italians
observed only temporarily the EEC directive calling for a moratorium
on trade with Argentina following the Falklands-Malvinas conflict.
62SIPRI Yearbook 1986, p. 342.
63Ione S. Wright and Lisa M. Nekhom, Historical Dictionary of Argentina
(Metuchen, NJ and London: Scarecrow Press, 1978), p. 429.
64M/ 1981-1982, p. 477 note 139; IAI '84-'85 pp. 510-511.
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Italy aimed for Argentinian military markets as early as the
Fascist era, when Italo Balbo's transatlantic flight had served a
promotional function for Italian-made aircraft in the Americas. In
the 1950s the Italians finished delivery of 70 FIAT G-46 aircraft. In
1951 Argentina also purchased three transport vessels for military
purposes. Sales of aircraft increased in the 1970s. In 1974 Argentina
purchased two to three Aeritalia G-222 transport planes, and eight
Aermacchi MB-326GB planes for the Navy; these aircraft were
delivered in 1975 and 1976. Agusta A-109 Hirundo helicopters were
ordered in 1977; 10 MB-339A trainer/strike aircraft were delivered in
1981. The delivery of S-61R helicopters in 1984 in unconfirmed.
Defence Minister Spadolini visited Argentina in September
1985 to discuss possible joint production of strike fighter aircraft,
similar to the AMX program between Italy and Brazil. In 1988,
Defence Minister Valerio Zanone signed another treaty during a
visit to Argentina paving the way for further military cooperation.
A platoon of Italian mountain troops was expected to visit
Argentina in 1989, followed by a return visit by their Argentine
counterparts. In addition, joint naval exercises were projected for
1990, with an exchange program for the air forces to follow.65
In 1987 Aeritalia and the Fabrica Militar de Avione signed an
economic accord to increase cooperation during a visit by the
Argentine Minister of Defence, Jose Juanarema, to Aeritalia's factory
in Torino-Caselle. Joint development of aircraft with Italy was seen
as a possible way to modernise the Argentine Air Force, which was
still equipped largely with American-built Skyhawks acquired
between 1966 and 1976. Nineteen of this model were destroyed
during the Falklands-Malvinas conflict. Aeritalia could not rely on
British cooperation for the motors for the aircraft project, and aimed
at cooperation with General Electric. Argentina had already rejected
an offer to receive A-4 planes from the United States, a more
advanced aircraft similar to the AMX. This was possibly a gesture to
65Jane's Defence Weekly, 29 October 1988.
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relax tensions between the Argentine government and its armed
forces, which had recently undergone trials against generals of the
former military dictatorship. The president of Aeritalia, Renato
Bonifacio, saw the contract with Argentina as evidence of his
company's status as a world aircraft manufacturer: "The choice
made by the Argentine government confirms the levels attained by
Aeritalia, whether in terms of international credibility or in
quality."66 In the 1980s Argentina became a client of the Italian
electronics industry, and purchased Palmaria 155mm SPH, OTO-
Melara 127/54 cannons for arming German Meko frigates, and Breda
torpedoes and cannons, among other systems.
The FIAT subsidiary SNIA-BPD was allegedly involved in the
Condor II intermediate range ballistic missile project developed in
Argentina with West European technology and partial Egyptian
financing. The Condor's range of several hundred miles would
make the Falklands, for example, an easy target. The Italians were
implicated when the United States issued protests against SNIA and
the West German MBB for their part in the violation of the Missile
Technology Control regime (MTCR), a treaty launched in April 1987.
The treaty aimed to enforce export controls for rocket propellants
and electronic guidance systems for missiles, not just nuclear
material. SNIA had been suspected in the 1970s, before FIAT
acquired the firm, of assisting Brazil and South Africa in missile
programs, but had never been brought to account. Pakistan, India,
Libya, South Korea and Taiwan were the other countries with
suspected missile programs which the MTCR aimed to check.
SNIA was believed to have sold most of its technology for the
Condor project between 1984 and 1986. The company has one of the
most sophisticated rocket-testing and nuclear-reprocessing facilities
in Europe, at its Colleferro laboratory near Rome. The company was
slow to respond to US government enquiries and when the
Americans continued their protests at the diplomatic level, the
66Rivista italiana difesa, no. 5, May 1987.
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Italians responded that the cooperation was intended for the
purpose of building sounding rockets for atmospheric research.
SNIA was persuaded to withdraw from the project only when
success in other areas was threatened by American reprisals. One of
SNIA's most important future prospects was the SDI program.
American officials made it clear that space contracts would be
cancelled, not only as a reprisal against SNIA's activity in Argentina,
but also because they would not be willing to entrust the company
with sensitive new technology.67
A combination of circumstances allowed Italy to withdraw
from the project without the public condemnation that MBB
received. In 1988, the Italians agreed to accept F-16 jets expelled from
Spanish bases and to accept the associated costs. They were also only
one of a very few European countries fully supporting the SDI
program at the government level. In addition, US attention was
probably side-tracked by Chinese missile sales to Saudi Arabia, also
in early 1988. By April of that year, the US lifted an unpublicised ban
on American technology transfers to SNIA and the incident ended
quietly.
Other Latin American Recipients
Among Italy's smaller clients in Latin America were Ecuador,
Paraguay, Bolivia, Chile and Colombia. Ecuador was an important
client for the Italian shipbuilding industry in the 1970s; six corvettes
of the class Esmeralda were ordered in 1978, and deliveries
continued into the 1980s. These vessels were similar to the Wadi-
class ships built for Libya. Ecuador also purchased 12 SIAI-Marchetti
SF-260 trainers in 1977, and ordered approximately 72 Aspide A-l
air-to-air missiles in 1979. Before the rise of Pinochet, Italy sold two
newly-built Midget submarines to Chile in 1972. Bolivia purchased
six SIAI-Marchetti SF-260C trainers in 1978-1979. Colombia
produced Midget assault submarines under Italian licence beginning
67Friedman, p. 228. For a full account, see "The Missile Case," pp. 221-234.
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in 1972 and was thought to have acquired AB-212 helicopters for use
on naval vessels. At an unknown date sometime between 1971 and
1984 Paraguay acquired Beretta-made SC-70 rifles. In the Caribbean,
Haiti received SIAI-Marchetti trainers in 1983 and 1985.
ASIA
Italian sales in Asia increased dramatically in the 1980s.
Collectively, the Far Eastern nations were a significant source of
business for the Italian shipbuilding industry. In the 1950s Italy sold
frigates to Indonesia, an oiler naval vessel and four Savitri-class
defence craft to India, and six patrol boats of the Seruwa and Hansaya.
classes to Sri Lanka. Pakistan bought Italian-American ships for
military uses in the early 1960s; the Philippines and Indonesia
bought patrol boats. Malaysia and Indonesia each acquired four
Lerici minehunters for delivery in the 1980s; the vessel was also in
service in South Korea. In 1983 Pakistan ordered 18 Crestitalia patrol
craft. India purchased Italian electronics systems for its Vikrant
aircraft carriers and frigates.
Thailand
Thailand was the major client in the Far East, with purchases
varying from SIAI-Marchetti trainers in 1973, to Ratchar it fast patrol
boats, made by Breda, in 1976-1979, and the MV-400 fast attack craft
in the early 1980s. Thailand also purchased a wide variety of Italian-
made naval electronics systems, including Selenia, Breda and OTO-
Melara weapons. The Italians set up a consortium with Thai
producers to carry out some of the work.
Malaysia
Malaysia purchased Agusta helicopters and 12 Mb-339K trainers
in the early 1980s, with an option for 14 additional units. In the
mid-1980s Marconi Italiana and the Malaysian government created a
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military consortium with a 30 and 70 percent share respectively.
Italian military personnel provided on-site training following the
delivery of the Lerici minehunters; the Malaysian Navy requested
the continued presence of Italian advisors.68 In February 1987
Deputy Defence Minister Vittorio Olcese completed a fact-finding
mission along with Italian industrial leaders to explore the
suitability of the Malaysian capital as a base for producing defence
equipment to be sold in Asia.
Other Asian Clients
Singapore was a major customer for SIAI-Marchetti beginning
in the 1970s; transfers included the SF-260X, the SF-260W, and the S-
211. Twenty-four of the latter were made with local assembly by
SAMCO. The Singapore-run company exacted high demands on
SIAI-Marchetti, including financial concessions which almost
caused the Italian firm to back out of the deal. Other Italian trade in
the area was limited to two firms, a semiconductors concern, SGS,
with 2,300 employees, and Olivetti, which employed 1,900 in
Singapore.69
The Philippines bought 48 units of the SF-260 model in 1973-
1974. A year later the XT-001 model, a virtual duplicate of the
Marchetti trainer, appeared in the Philippines, which suggests that a
licensing agreement may have gone through. South Korea
produced FIAT equipment and attack patrol craft under licence in
the late 1970s and early 1980s; an unspecified number of Lerici
minehunters were also in use. The South Koreans purchased 30
Breda cannons and an underwater de-mining system. Taiwan
bought Otomat ship-to-ship missiles in 1977. Burma acquired a
number of armed SIAI-Marchetti trainers between 1975 and 1985; Sri
Lanka brought in further orders for the aircraft in 1985.
68Jane's Defence Weekly, 14 February 1987.
69Corriere della sera, 10 October 1988.
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In other fields, Italian imports were only about 1% of the total
purchased by India, but relations took on new momentum with the
extension of $400 million in new credits from Italy to India.
Shortly before the death of Indira Gandhi, Spadolini visited
India in October 1984 during his term as minister of defence.
In this case as well, the exchange of "merchandise"
discussed was directed to the military arsenal, and in
the end the economic and financial accord resulted
in the furnishing of Italian armaments to India at a
value of 900 billion lire. According to sources in the
Italian delegation, the political content of the contract
was no less important than the economic side, in
that New Delhi was demonstrating the desire to
diversify its sources of armaments which until then
were supplied in large part by the USSR (of which
the defence minister Ustinov had visited India a few
months earlier with an entourage of 50 people.)70
An accord for increased technical and military cooperation
provided for anti-terrorist training of about 100 Indian Army officers
in Italy.71 Italy was hoping to receive orders from India, as well as
from Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines, for the A-129
Mangusta helicopter. American military offers, however, continue
to win much of Italy's potential business in Southeast Asia.
70IA1 1984-1985, pp. 507-508.
71 Jane's Defence Weekly, 11 April 1987.
CHAPTER SEVEN
The Italian trade in ArmsWith Pariah Nations
Italy's biggest markets for arms were among nations which
were officially embargoed by other countries. Although many
countries violated these embargoes, Italy was perhaps the only
country with a major dependence on "illicit" trade for its
industry's survival. For the Italians, the trade was often not
illegal because prohibitions were often non-existent or appeared
in the form of loosely-worded public relations statements. In the
1970s, the Italian trade was characterised by heavy concentration at
either end of the African continent, with transfers significant
mostly for their quantity to Libya on the Mediterranean littoral,
and a program of military cooperation with South Africa which
afforded qualitative enhancement to that country's military
establishment. Sales from the Persian Gulf war in the 1980s
provided a further outlet for Italian armaments.
Libya
Colonial Ties
The name Libya itself was introduced by the Italians in 1934
when they controlled the regions of Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and
Fezzan.1 The Italians controlled Libya from 1911 until they were
driven out by the Allies in 1942. Under Fascism, one of the ablest
men in Mussolini's regime, aviator Italo Balbo, acted as governor
of the colony. The Italians left little of value, apart from some
construction of roads and buildings, and reaped equally few
1Bernard Reich, "Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya," David E.
Long and Reich, eds., The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North
Africa (Boulder, Colo.:Westview Press, 1980), p. 360.
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benefits. The discovery of large quantities of oil occurred after the
departure of the Italians.
Although the Italians were not popular in Libya under King
Idris, anti-Western feelings heightened even further after
Moammar Ghedaffi took over in a bloodless coup in 1969. The
British were expelled from bases in Tobruk and the Americans
from Wheelus Field. In July 1970 the property of Italians and Jews
was confiscated. The Libyans also exhumed Italian cemeteries, an
act still not forgiven by Italians.
Unlike countries such as the Shah's Iran, Libya aimed to
build a military establishment without relying on one source of
support, and rather than being a major regional ally of one of the
superpowers, attempt to fashion itself as the fulcrum of an Arab
union. Ghedaffi tried repeatedly in the 1970s and 1980s to unite
Muslim nations in an anti-bloc, anti-Zionist federation. Part of
this drive included earnest Libyan support for an Arab nuclear
bomb, and for an international terrorist movement to undermine
Israeli and American interests. Plans for a union of Libya and
Egypt under a single leader (initially to be Anwar Sadat) reached
an advanced stage; after the collapse of the plan a similar union
with Tunisia also failed. Ghedaffi's fanatical approach alienated
many Arab leaders. Libya's determination to remain free of
international power blocs eventually was compromised by its
dependency on Soviet military hardware and training.
During the formative years of the Ghedaffi regime, Italy
gradually became an important^ It was a close neighbour
geographically, and ranked among the advanced countries of the
industrialised world. Most of all, its leaders showed a keen
willingness to cooperate with Ghedaffi. Italian commercial
agreements were vital in setting in motion aspects of the
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developing Libyan economy, and a decade after Ghedaffi's rise to
power, Italy was Libya's most important trading partner.2
Italian Military Assistance to Libya
Military support was an especially strong feature of the
Italians' relations with Ghedaffi. Soon after the colonel's faction
took over, Italy again sent its aviators and was instrumental in
organising and equipping the Libyan Air Force. The supply of raw
materials, especially crude oil, was undoubtedly an important
return on the relationship for Italy. But because of the geographic
proximity of Libya, the Italians felt a greater need to forge mutual
good relations than in many of their commercially-motivated
connections in the Middle East.
The Italian-Libyan relationship had many of the markings of
a patron-client relationship that characterised the policies of other
countries, including training of troops and the mutual desire to
influence each other's actions through the arms relationship. In
helping to build Libyan Air Force officials, Italy sent advisors for
many years to man facilities in Libya. The Italian supervisors
worked mostly with Italian-made equipment, and in the 1970s
Libya became the largest recipient of Italian arms.
The extent of the arms transfers to Libya shows the lengths to
which the Italian government went to bolster its special relation
with Libya. The first transfers date to 1971. Fifteen years later,
General Viviani gave this account of Italian aid to Libya:
We sold Ghedaffi arms - and a great many arms; we
organised his secret services, we furnished advisors
for the modernisation of the armed forces. Libya
asked for arms through diplomatic channels. The
Foreign Minister gave the assignment to the secret
services...This was how we flooded them with M-113
tanks, 105mm howitzers and machine guns, rifles,
2MEED , 22 September 1978, p. iii.
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bombs and other goods, all after having bitterly
disputed with the Americans.3
The transfer of 152 M-113 tanks is an interesting case in the
Libyan-Italian relationship. In order to meet the quantities
needed for the deal, the Italians disarmed several of their own
military units such as the Folgore and the Ariete, and returned
them to OTO-Melara. The government then authorised their re¬
sale to Libya under the cover of new equipment. While officials
quelled the protests of the armed forces, whose chronic
complaints about equipment shortages were justified this time,
they also took on a battle with the United States over the deal.
The Italians also had a significant oil agreement at stake at
the time of the tank transfers. On 30 September 1972, Italy and
Libya signed an agreement for the concession of 50 million barrels
of crude oil. For every barrel ENI also allegedly set aside three
cents on the dollar for payoffs to intermediaries, or padriniA Italy
also sold six two-tonne attack submarines (known as maiali, or
pigs) and two 70-tonne submarines, considered some of Italy's
most "secret" systems of that time, according to an ex-member of
the Italian intelligence services. American opposition
disappeared apparently after Italy purchased American anti-tank
TOW and Lance missiles produced by Hughes, amounting to 42
billion lire.
Libyan military personnel were trained at the Centro
Incursori at La Spezia and at a centre established in Libya. In
gratitude for the assistance by the Italian secret services and armed
forces, Ghedaffi was reported to have "sent precious gifts to the
men of the services, [and] jewels for their wives that could not be
refused for fear of offending the colonel."5 Ghedaffi was indeed
3cited in Falco Accame, "Alia faccia dell'Italia!" Nigrizia, July-August
1986.
4"Alia faccia dell'Italia!"
5 "Alia faccia dell'Italia!"
204
offended when he discovered that the shipment of tanks had been
entirely second-hand, and attempted to seek damages. The fact
that the Italian government disarmed operative military units for
the sake of the Libyan sale was also protested during an
interrogation of Defence Minister Spadolini by left-wing deputies
in June 1985, when an investigation by the Roman magistrature
was opened. However in 1987 a 15-year period would have
elapsed since the events had taken place and it was unlikely that
prosecution could be undertaken before the wrongdoings were
annulled under the Italian system.
Reinforcing Ties in the Face of US Opposition
The Italians also pushed through a controversial deal to
export 20 G-222 transport planes to Libya, against the wishes of the
United States. When American hostilities toward Ghedaffi were
on the rise, US officials attempted to block Western military trade
with Libya from any source. In the case of the Aeritalia transport
planes, the US vetoed export licences for the planes' General
Electric motors in 1978. Italy went through with the deal,
substituting Rolls Royce motors. Despite the Italian dependence
on American technology, exporters retained a considerable ability
to evade US control of its use.
In December 1976 Ghedaffi bought a $415 million stake in
FIAT, just under 10% of total stock. The deal came as a surprise in
Italy, and was reported to have been arranged when Ghedaffi and
Agnelli were both guests of Moscow. The deal made Libya the
second largest shareholder after the Agnelli family and rescued
the company from a period of crisis. Libya offered more than
three times the price it would have paid on the Milan stock
exchange, and its investment represented about a quarter of Italy's
total balance of payments deficit in 1976.6
^Friedman, pp. 173-178.
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By 1972 Libya had become Italy's most important economic
partner in the developing world. ENI and IRI both had lucrative
contracts there. About 20,000 Italians worked in Libya under
Ghedaffi. AGIP extracted about 40,000 barrels per day of Libyan oil.
Another deal involved collaboration in developing untapped oil
wells 120 km northwest of Tripoli. The IRI firms Italimpianti and
Nuova Italsider also secured significant contracts for increasing
steel production in Libya.7 By the mid-1980s, Italy exported to
the equivalent of
LiDyc^about BU% of its total exports to the EEC.® Even so, an Italian
head of government did not visit Libya until Andreotti, as Prime
Minister, took a delegation including Foreign Minister Forlani in
November 1978. Andreotti's standing invitation to Ghedaffi to
visit Italy so far has not been accepted.
Italian-Libyan relations went through frequent periods of
strain because Ghedaffi was increasingly associated with
international terrorism. An embargo on arms shipments to Libya
was officially announced in 1979. Military and economic ties with
the Libyans had not prevented attacks on Italian soil and against
some of the 20,000 Italian nationals living in Libya. Ghedaffi
periodically reopened the issue of reparation payments for Italy's
colonisation of the territory, a topic that the Italians were unable
to bury despite repeated gifts to the Libyans, including a heart
surgery hospital. Italian resentment against Libya also flared up
periodically, as when reports that Italian fishermen were taken
prisoner and forced into slave labour for two years by the Libyans.
Relations at the diplomatic level were again smoothed over
in 1982 when important Libyan officials visited Rome. At that
time Italy was the only country which had not completely severed
relations with the Libyans. The Army Chief of Staff Umberto




reopened the possibility of furnishing arms to Ghedaffi's regime.9
In the same month, Andreotti attempted to bring out Italy's role
as conciliator as tense American-Libyan relations threatened to
de-stabilize the entire Mediterranean. Andreotti's conversation
in Ghedaffi's camp were reported by the Italian minister a few
days later to President Reagan in a meeting in Los Angeles after
the Olympic Games. Neither the Americans nor Ghedaffi was
willing to alter the US-Libyan standoff, but the Italians were
momentarily a focus of interest for both countries.
Cultivation of Libya was not backed unanimously even in
Italy, however. The Republican Party in particular repeatedly
called for stiff public protests against Libya; they challenged the
decisions to put forward the exchange of Italian hostages for Libyan
terrorists held in Italy and a new treaty for cultural and scientific
exchange during the time of heightened hostility in 1986.10 Craxi
reproached his European allies for their unwillingness to identify
openly Ghedaffi's role in fomenting terrorism.
In return, Libyans remain uneasy with the Italians, especially
because of their close ties with the Americans. The installation of
cruise missiles in Sicily was a major worry for all of the North
Africans, and became a source of contention between Craxi and
Ghedaffi. After the Americans bombed Libya in April 1986, the
Libyans targeted the Italian island of Lampedusa, which housed a
LORAN NATO facility, for their reprisals. The missiles landed in
the sea near the island. After the Lampedusa incident, Ghedaffi's
shares in FIAT were forcibly bought over at the urgent request of
the Americans, who threatened to take reprisals against FIAT in
field of arms and space contracts. The investigation of the
representative of the Libyan bank holding the shares in FIAT for
terrorist acts in Rome further cooled Italian-Libyan relations.
9IAI1984-1985, p. 484.
Repubblica, 11 October 1986.
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Libya has since diversifed its source of arms suppliers, but military
transfers from Italy may not have ceased completely.
South Africa
The UN Embargoes
The Italian government has issued formal diplomatic
protests against the South African regime on several occasions. In
the 1980s it has sent steady funding to front-line states such as
Mozambique which shelter South African refugees and are
vulnerable to economic and military pressure. However Italian
arms sellers began violating bans on exports to South Africa from
the beginning of the United Nations campaign to isolate the
regime of apartheid. On 7 August, 1963 the UN adopted
Resolution 181 condemning the racist policies of the South
African government and issued a "solemn appeal to all states to
cease immediately sales and gifts of arms, munitions of any type
and military vehicles to South Africa."11 France and Great Britain
abstained from the vote.
When another resolution was passed in December
condemning a number of nations for assisting South African
domestic arms production, France and Great Britain approved the
measure with the stipulation that they would not refuse South
Africa equipment for its external defence. The United States
continued openly to supply war materiel which could be claimed
to have civilian applications. It was clear, however, that all of
South Africa's military aims were concerned with defending its
internal racist policies.
The Republic of South Africa provides the most
graphic example of the expansion of defence for the
11 cited in Gianluca Devoto"II commercio bellico tra Italia e Sud Africa,"
Le esportazioni italiane di armi: due casi , p. 65.
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purposes of internal repression. The annual
domestic defence budget tripled during the 1960s and
arms importation likewise grew — by the late 1960s,
South Africa was purchasing more foreign arms than
the nations of the rest of sub-Saharan Africa
combined. One factor in explaining this growth,
therefore, is the desire to protect vested interests
against newly-independent neighbours hostile to the
apartheid regime. However, as the Minister of
Defence observed in 1963, "the first task of the
defence forces is to help the police maintain law and
order"...The defence forces' "hardware" is also
orientated towards anti-guerrilla warfare, comprising
tanks, personnel carriers, ground-attack aircraft,
helicopters and so on.12
The retreat of South Africa's former major suppliers,
especially Britain, made room for expansion in military trade
with the French and Italians, who confirmed the condemnations
of South Africa but did not observe the international sanctions.
In the period 1966-1970, the value of arms exports to South Africa
from the UK, US and Canada dropped from 68% to 17% of the
total, or from $450 million to $180 million, while the French
share of the sales increased from $200 million to $640 million, a
rise from 30% to 61%. The Italians, who had previously sold no
arms to South Africa, jumped to a 22% share of the total, which
meant about $230 million by the end of the period.13
The percentage of Italian arms supplying South Africa
appears low: at their height they were just 5% higher than the
share of the Anglo-Saxon countries when they had almost
disappeared from the market. But Italian involvement in South
Africa in the 1960s was very significant for a number of reasons.
Precisely during the time that the first embargoes were to be in
12Whynes, pp. 22 and 24.
13Elaborated from "II commercio bellico tra Italia e Sud Africa," Table 1,
p.48.
209
effect, the South African government succeeded in effecting a
tremendous expansion of its domestic arsenal. Because of the
marked growth in procurement, the Italians' 22% share
represented a greater volume of arms by the mid-1960s than a few
years previously.
Most importantly, the Italians aided the South African
government in several ways in its attempt to shield itself from
the international embargoes. Besides directly transferring aircraft,
Italy assisted the South African military in what it was looking for
the most: the ability to expand domestic production of armaments
and thus avoid political conflicts with foreign suppliers.
Italian Assistance to the South African Defence Industry
Aermacchi first signed a contract in 1964 for the sale of MB-
326 aircraft that would later be produced in South Africa under
the name Impala. Two hundred were sold, and in the same year,
the Italians also sold the licence to the Atlas Aircraft Corporation
to produce an additional 234 units in South Africa. While Italian
transfers of complete systems probably ended in 1969, licence
production continued through several phases. A contract signed
between Aermacchi and Atlas in late 1971 or early 1972 launched
local production of one of Italy's most advanced systems, the MB-
326K, known as the Impala 2 in South Africa, to be fitted with
two cannons, external attack pylons and advanced motors.
Macchi's role consisted in providing the frames for four models
and furnishing a steady supply of components. The production of
perhaps 100 models in that series was conducted in 1982-1983.
Italy and Australia each had a requirement for about 100 units for
training purposes, a third of the number in the possession of
South Africa. According to the Military Balance, the South
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African Air Force assigned the MB-326 to the following missions:
80 for ground attack, 24 for attack, 39 for training, 93 on reserve.14
The creation of an affiliate company in South Africa
absolved the Italians of some of the responsibility for arming the
regime. But Italy also provided a steady supply of components
and spare parts, with a current value of about 5 billion lire in
1966-1975, and 25 billion lire in the following decade. In 1985 a
member of the FIM-CISL union, Elio Pagani, described the
relations between South Africa and Aermacchi:
As far as licence production of the MB-326 and MB-
326KC is concerned, certain pieces of machinery
(central plating, longerons, landing gear) and certain
machine-produced fusions were sent to South Africa
(mostly through the Gondrand firm in Como). In
any case a flow of information and spare parts still
continues even if the assignment of Aermacchi
personnel at South Africa's Atlas ceased as of
December 1982 with the return of Mr. Raffaini,
whose task was to dispatch to the head firm bi¬
monthly reports on the production situation and the
flight activity carried out by the airplanes in South
Africa. There are also still direct relations betwen the
South African Air Forces (SAAF) which use the
Aermacchi aircraft...Constant contact is also
maintained between the commercial director and the
office in charge of dispensing licences with the Atlas
Aircraft Corporation, which has offices in number 9
via Staurenghi in Varese (200 metres from the
Aermacchi offices).15
At the same time, Aermacchi assisted the British in selling
the Rolls Royce Viper II turbojet engines. It is not clear how
much value-added the Italians claimed in the transfer of this
technology, or whether they in effect acted as a "triangulation"
14Tlze Military Balance 1987-1988, p. 138.
15 "II nostro mercato di morte." p. 37.
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point for the British. The engines were produced under licence by
Piaggio, which in turn exported the licence to South Africa.
Between 1966 and 1975, Italy exported about 165 Viper motors
worth 10 billion lire, according to the Italian government statistics
bureau, ISTAT. Even Labour governments in Britain were not
willing to prohibit the transfer of the engines.16
The other aircraft supplied during the period were delivered
in smaller quantities, but nonetheless amounted to a substantial
addition to the Italian aircraft already in South African military
hangars. All of the aircraft had the option of being armed and
some were re-exported to other areas of tension in sub-Saharan
Africa. After the MB-326 transfers, the most significant of the
aircraft deals was a series of bi-motor P-166S planes made by
Piaggio. Two orders signed in 1968 and 1971 provided for the sale
of about ten models for maritime surveillance. Deliveries
occurred in 1969-1970 and 1973-1974. Ten single-motor transport
planes of the model AL-60 were bought from Aermacchi in 1967;
this plane was built in Italy under licence from its American
designer Lockheed. At least seven AL-60s were re-sold to
Rhodesia. Along with Aeritalia, Aermacchi sold 40 AM-30
aircraft (renamed Bosbok in South Africa) between 1973 and 1974,
and a similar model, the C-4M, was built under the name Kudu
by Atlas under Italian licence beginning in 1975. About 40 of these
came into use in the South African Air Force. The motors for
these planes were of American origin, but it is not known how
much work Piaggio carried out on the equipment before
transferring it to South Africa.
The Italian defence industry provided a number of other
systems during the same period. Italian shipyards modernised
two vessels in 1964-1966, and South Africa bought three Italian
frigates in 1968-1969. Fire control systems made by Elettronica-San
16Asbj0rn Eide, "South Africa: Repression and the Transfer of Arms and
Arms Technology," The World Military Order, p. 204.
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Giorgio were also purchased with Selenia radar systems. In land
systems, South Africa acquired anti-air batteries made by Oerlikon
Italiana, with Super Fledermaus fire control systems made by
Contraves.
In addition South Africa has received massive quantities of
small arms since the early 1960s. These sales often were of
relatively low commercial value compared to systems such as the
Impala, but it was often through public exposure of some of the
many smaller shipments that the existence of a booming arms
business was made public in Italy. Representatives of the Danish
Seaman's Union, who were often responsible for transporting the
equipment, revealed the thriving trade in small arms between
Italy and South Africa in an Italian publication in 1986. Ships
with destinations stated as Portugal, Belgium or South American
countries instead often sailed to South Africa, frequently with
cargoes of Beretta pistols. Beretta's association with South Africa
dates to 1963 when the sale of 1,400 pistols was followed by the
concession of the licence to Musgrave, a South African firm, for
indigenous production. This fact was not made public until an
Italian business daily printed the information in November
1978.17 Various types of munitions and explosives were also
regularly transported and a new model of Valsella mine was
recorded as patented under South African law in August 1980.18
Pressures to Halt Cooperation
Throughout this period the United Nations continuously
condemned the policies of the South African regime and the
cooperation of other states in providing armaments. The
Resolution 282 of 23 July 1970 caused Canada to discontinue its
supply of spare parts, and France declared that it would no longer
17"II commercio bellico tra Italia e Sud Africa," p. 60, n. 54.
18"II commercio bellico tra Italia e Sud Africa," p. 60, n. 55.
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export systems such as light armoured vehicles and helicopters
which could be used for anti-guerrilla purposes. However the
flow of arms to South Africa was still to reach its peak between
1972 and 1976. On 4 November 1977, Italy was condemned in
various international fora for its disregard of the embargos, but
repeatedly denied that it had ever granted licences to South Africa
for military production. In June 1979 the Italian representative at
the United Nations published a response to the Security Council
about the issue of Italian assistance with the MB-326 aircraft:
The last export licence relative to this contract was
granted by the Italian authorities before the approval
of Resolution 311 (1972), although the operation was
carried out at a later time, and related to four frames
of the model MB-326K produced by Aermacchi (and
not complete airplanes, as was erroneously
published). From that time, no other export licence
has been granted to the Italian company, nor
complete licences regarding spare parts. Thus the
technical cooperation between Aermacchi and Atlas
is completely terminated and today Aermacchi has
neither investments nor offices or personnel in
South Africa. Following the ban on authorising
export licences for armaments to South Africa,
imposed by the Italian government in 1972, Atlas
Aircraft has autonomously developed its own
version of the MB-326K, known as Impala 2, the
design of which derives only in part from the Italian
prototype.19
Despite official restrictions on Italian activity in South
Africa, the assistance in supplying the know-how and equipment
to launch some types of independent military production in the
late 1960s was irrevocable.
^"Lettera di risposta del rappresentante dell'ltalia all'ONU," 29 June
1979, cited in Cespi study, p. 69.
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The Persian Gulf States
The arms build-up conducted by the Shah of Iran in the
1970s and the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s provided two of Italy's
most lucrative outlets for weapons production. In the first case,
Italy capitalised on the Shah's drive to modernise the Irani Air
force, and subsequently the Italians supplied both sides in the
Persian Gulf War. Economic relations with both sides also
remained fairly steady during the conflict.
Iran
Like Italy itself, Iran stationed American personnel on its
territory beginning in the mid-1940s. The United States also
began to provide a massive program of arms donations to Iran, as
part of a strategy to thwart Soviet access to Irani oil sources and to
the Indian Ocean. US military aid rose from $166 million in the
period 1949-1953 to $387 million during the years 1953 to 1960.
Over the full arc of this period, 1949 to 1970, American aid to Iran
equalled the $1,500 million sent by the US to South Vietnam
(excluding the cost of American forces).20
Despite the attempt by the Americans to make Iran a barrier
against Soviet expansion, the build-up never became a real
military challenge to the Soviets. The weaponry was prized by the
Shah primarily for the stature it brought him among Middle
Eastern powers, and for its use in internal repression. In the years
1967 to 1977, the Shah's ambition to become the foremost military
power in the area sparked off an unprecedented procurement
program. The Shah acquired American equipment, such as the
Tomcat jet fighter, that was considered too expensive or too
sophisticated by West European armed forces. On other occasions
20Ulrich Albrecht, "Militarised Sub-Imperialism: The Case of Iran," The
World Military Order, pp. 163-167.
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Iran received American aircraft even before delivery to US forces,
or put costly systems into production (such as the Condor missile)
which had been cancelled by the US Congress. "By 1975," wrote
one observer, "the Shah possessed almost all conventional
weapons systems below the nuclear threshold."21
A small part of the acquisitions was covered by the American
funding, but most of the $14.8 billion worth of equipment ordered
between 1950 and 1979 in this phase was purchased with the
Shah's fortune in oil revenues.22 The Americans were also
heavily involved in the extraction of Iranian oil. By the mid-
1960s the Shah had begun to look for ways to restrain the
dominating American presence in Iran.
The most powerful of the firms using Iranian oil
were based in the US. Hence the obvious way for the
Shah to increase his own bargaining position in the
long run seemed to be the reduction of a one-sided
military-technological dependence on the US. The
Shah first ordered more than 200 helicopters from
Italy; these were manufactured under American
licence.23
The Shah also invested in new destroyers, hovercraft and
supply ships from Britain and West Germany, and helicopters
and rocket launchers from France. Military transfers from the US
were still to reach a peak and the status-conscious Shah preferred
to purchase the more sophisticated American equipment. But by
diversifying his sources of supply, the Shah eased his total
dependence on the United States while still building a high-
quality arsenal. The Italian weaponry he acquired consisted
mainly of advanced American designs produced under US
licence.
21 "The Case of Iran," p. 167.
^Jane's Defence Weekly, 2 September 1989.
23 "The Case of Iran," p. 166.
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Italy was eager to pursue its connection as arms seller to Iran
for a number of reasons. Iran became an important Middle East
trading partner in the 1970s as the Italians increased energy
imports from the Gulf. At the time of the fall of the Shah in 1979,
Italy's crude oil imports from Iran accounted for 13.2 % of its total
oil imports.24 When combined with Iraq, the Persian Gulf area
furnished a quarter of Italy's requirement. Italy was also Iran's
fourth largest client in non-oil products, after the USSR, the FRG
and the United States, and had the seventh highest level of
exports to Iran. Iran became the third largest importer of Italian
goods in the Middle East in the 1970s, but Italy was unable to cut
back oil imports as the UK had done, and still carried from an
acute trade deficit.25
Italy had begun its tradition of supplying arms to Iran by
selling warships to Reza Khan against the wishes of Great Britain
in the 1920s.26 In the 1970s, the Italian firm Contraves fitted four
British-made frigates with Sea Hunter systems, and a Sea Killer
anti-ship launcher made by Sistel. The equipment was supplied
through two orders, in 1970 and 1975, which were worth 42 billion
lire to the Italians.27
Italian firms expanded sales to Iran at a tremendous rate in
the 1970s, building on contacts made in the previous decade.
Aircraft was the main emphasis.
In 1969 Agusta began to honour its commitments
with Teheran dating to the year before. According to
the information released at that time, the deal
comprised a series of contracts including 70 AB-206,
56 AB-205, 11 AB-212,10 SH-3D and about 20 CH-47C.
It is not an exaggeration to say that at the beginning
24Istituto Affari Internazionali, Paper 1784, Italia e Iran: Opzioni e
politiche, p. 1.
15MEED, 22 September 1978, p. xxvi.
26 "The Case of Iran," p. 160.
27"Le esportazioni di armi italiane a Iraq e Iran," p. 4.
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of the 1970s this firm had pratically two clients, the
armed forces of Italy and of Iran.28
The delivery of helicopters continued throughout the
decade. A total of about 450 Italian helicopters reached Iran from
Italy between 1969 and 1981. The largest single deal was signed on
24 February 1977, in which 50 Chinook CH-47 units with a value
of $425 million were to be built in exchange for 5 million tonnes
of oil to AGIP. 29
Iranian military personnel were also brought to Italian
academies for training during the time of the Shah. Massive
international assistance in the technological and strategic training
of the Shah's armed forces included help from major NATO
countries and Israel.30 The number of Iranians trained in Italy is
not known, but the practice was extensive enough that Italian
minesweepers making radio contact with Iranian patrol boats
during the Gulf War were answered enthusiastically in Italian.31
Under the Shah, Iran's interest in Italian arms was extended
also into the fields of energy and civil construction. At the time
of the fall of the Shah about 15,000 Italians were working in Iran.32
The state-run firm SNAM received a contract to lay a pipeline
from Iran through the USSR, West Germany and Northern
Europe. Other Italian activity included the construction of power
plants, a 450-km highway, enormous grain silos, 1,600 flats in
Teheran, and 500 schools.33
In one of the biggest contracts ever awarded to a single
country, the Italians also took on construction of the Bandar
Abbas complex. The $900 million contract involved dredging an
28"Le esportaziotii di armi italiane a Iraq e Iran," p. 3.
29Armi: nuovo modello di sviluppo? p. 279.
30"The Case of Iran," p. 169.
31 Interview with Minister Guido Lenzi, Diplomatic Counsellor to the
Minister of Defence, Rome, 11 March 1988.
32MEED Vol. 22 n. 38, 22 September 1978, p. iii.
33MEED Vol. 22 n. 38,22 September 1978, p. xiii.
218
expanse of sand and constructing 8 km of quays, 7 km of
breakwaters, housing for 2,000, schools, shops, sports facilities, as
well as road and railway access to the new port. Planned for
completion in 1980, the site had five docks for large container
ships; a pipeline and shipyard were in the design stage.34
Construction continued during the war.
Economic activity continued despite the freeze in political
relations after the fall of the Shah. IRI received a technical and
commercial delegation in Milan in October 1983, led by a member
of the Iranian government, Shekaniez; Italy's foreign minister
and trade minister also met with the delegation to discuss
possibilities for increasing trade. Officially the Italian government
continued to protest against the Gulf War and the activities of
Iranian opposition groups in Italy.35
When Iran made new overtures to the West at the
conclusion of the war, Italy was one of the first countries to
respond. Foreign Trade Minister Renato Ruggiero visited
Teheran in August 1988 and sealed contracts for Italian companies
worth about 2,000 billion lire. Disputes over the debts owed to
Italy because of the Bandar Abbas project were settled when
Iranian Prime Minister Mir Hussein Moussavi visited Rome in
January 1989, his first official visit to a European government.36
Iraq
Italian assistance to Iraq was more sporadic but no less
significant. Before Iraq became a significant customer for the
Italian arms industry, the country was targeted as an outlet for a
wide range of economic ventures. In January 1977 Ministry of
Industry Carlo Donat-Cattin visited Iraq and returned with $600
34MEED Vol. 22 n. 38,22 September 1978, p. xv.
35M1 1983-1984, p. 506.
36"Italy and Iran agree debt deal on Bandar Abbas," Financial Times, 18
January 1989.
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million in contracts for Italian businesses. The ENI subsidiary
SNAM also was contracted to produce a 100,000-tonne-per-year
refinery, worth $138 million. Italy was the largest importer of
Iraqi oil after France. In the late 1970s Italy's trade deficit with Iraq
matched that with Saudi Arabia, at about $1,000 million.37
Until 1980, military contracts consisted of a delivery of two
twin-engine Piaggio P-166DL2 aircraft in 1977, together worth 1
billion lire, and equipped for aerial photogrammetry; the transfer
of the licence to produce two outdated models of Beretta pistols to
Iraq's General Organization for Technological Industries; and
several hundred OTO-Melara howitzers, model 105/14. 38 The
absence of aircraft deals was notable, compared with the heavy
emphasis in in this field in trade with other countries in the
region. The Italians profited briefly from the Soviet embargo in
1982 to supply the Iraqis with aircraft, but encountered a number
of obstacles. President of Agusta Teti expressed this complaint in
a hearing before the Italian parliament:
I would like to recall that for about two years we
have been waiting to obtain the licence to export
seven helicopters to Iraq, but the Americans have
always tried to impede this export of ours, justifying
their behaviour by citing the sensitive international
position of that country. Incidentally, however, the
American company Bell has sold 44 helicopters to
Iraq.39
Nuclear Assistance and the Italian-built Fleet
The most significant military deal betwen Italy and Iraq went
to the shipbuilding industry. In 1980 the Iraqi government
ordered an entire fleet from Cantieri Navali Italiani (CNI).
37MEED Vol. 22 n. 38, 22 September 1978, p. xxi.
38"Le esportazioni di armi italiane a Iraq e Iran," p. 5.
39Testimony of R. Teti, Atti parlamentari, 7 March 1986, p. 5.
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Researchers in Rome recorded the extent of the deal, which
meant about $2.6 billion for Italy.40
It comprised four frigates, six corvettes and a supply
ship, as well as support equipment (among which a
floating dock), spare parts, training of technicians and
officials, all for a value estimated at around 1,500
billion [lire] at that time. In filling out the contracts,
almost all the Italian defence industries took part.41
When the Iraqis provoked the outbreak of the Gulf War a
few month after the signing of the deal, the agreement became an
embarrassment for Italy. Payment for the fleet had already been
arranged but the Italians almost certainly did not go through with
the transfer. The Foreign Minister Andreotti reported that "We
have blocked delivery on the ships which Iraq has paid for: they
are still in Italy, except for two which are docked at Alexandria in
Egypt."42 Unlike small munitions, for instance, the massive
delivery would be almost impossible to disguise, and the harbour
where the ships were to be received was blockaded since the
outbreak of the war.
In the 1970s Italy assisted the Iraqis with the beginnings of
their nuclear program. The Italians themselves had not
developed an independent nuclear force in the 1950s, as France
and the United Kingdom did. Even with a high energy
dependence on foreign sources, civilian nuclear programs had not
thrived in Italy either. After a 20-year program, Italy's three
nuclear power stations furnished just over one percent of the
nation's energy requirement in the 1980s,43 and after a
referendum in November 1987, Italy opted out of maintaining
40Steve Weissman and Herbert Krosney, The Islamic Bomb (New York:
Quadrangle, 1981), p. 266.
41 "Le esportazioni di armi italiane a Iraq e Iran," p. 5.
42"Le esportazioni di armi italiane a Iraq e Iran," p. 6.
43Financial Times, 24 February 1987.
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civilian plants and pursuing nuclear research.44 While Italy
never exploited nuclear power either as a source of energy or for
military purposes, its period of experimentation in the field
produced a body of highly-skilled engineers who had worked with
fast-breeder reactors and an advanced prototype of the Candu
natural uranium reactor. The Italians were reluctant signatories
of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in July 1968, and included
as a condition of their adherence the stipulation "that Italy could
apply its own controls to the exports of nuclear materials."45
In the 1970s the Italian nuclear energy agency, the Comitato
Nazionale per I'Energia Nucleare (CNEN) won a series of
contracts from Iraq. CNEN harnessed the cooperation of
engineering teams at SNIA Viscosa, which had already built hot
cells, or laboratories for working with radioactive materials. In
August 1975 SNIA accepted the sum of $1,670,000, which it
considered very low, to eliminate competition from Poland and
India. The Italian firm agreed to build
three small inter-connecting hot cells (2 x 1.5 x 4
meters each) ten glove boxes for remote
manipulation of radioactive materials, and some
Pyrex Micromixer-settlers with Tygon or Teflon
tubes. The lab would permit easy and safe handling
of highly radioactive substances. It could also be used
for dissolving irradiated uranium oxide, such as in
spent nuclear fuel, and extracting the plutonium. Or
in other words, reprocessing — one key to a bomb.46
A CNEN delegation, led by senior official Enzio Clementel,
signed a ten-year agreement in January 1976 to assist the Iraqi
Energy Commission in the development of peaceful atomic
44Antonio Ciampi, "Exit the Mostra Navale," in Defense and Armament
Heracles International, No. 69, January 1988, p. 15.
45Ilari, p. 131.
46Islamic Bomb, p. 98.
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energy. Two years later, SNIA embarked on a much bigger
agreement, worth $67 million. The Iraqis were to receive a highly
sophisticated complete set of facilities including a fuel fabrication
lab, all for working with uranium or other substances in the
nuclear fuel cycle. The four new labs were scheduled to open in
late 1980. In anticipation the Italians trained about 100 Iraqi
scientists and technicians.47
In 1980s the United States launched a public attack on the
Italians after observing the activity of SNIA for five years. The
Italians were taken aback at the American reaction. They had
never made any secret of their cooperation with the Iraqis. They
were also less important for the Iraqi nuclear program than the
French, who supplied the bulk of the know-how and equipment, a.rA,
had been assisting Middle Eastern countries in nuclear programs
since the 1960s.
In attempting to block the cooperation between SNIA and
the Iraqi Energy Commission, the Americans held a bargaining
chip. In February of the same year, the Iraqis and Italians had also
sealed the contract for the purchase of the 11 new Italian ships and
related electronic equipment. The purchase of the fleet was seen
widely as a payment for the willingness to supply Iraq with
sensitive nuclear technology. The Lupo-class frigates included in
the deal were intended to be used with General Electric gas
turbine engines acquired with export licences from the US. The
American authorities were taking
a new look at Iraq's ambitious military build-up,
including its fast-moving nuclear program. In the
end, Washington granted the export licences,
possibly because the Italians could have gotten the
engines from G.E.'s British competitor Rolls Royce.
At the time, however, the Italians saw the public
attack on their nuclear sales to Iraq as carrying with it
47Islamic Bomb, p. 100.
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a hidden threat. Either they cut their continuing
nuclear ties to Baghdad, or Washington would deny
the export licences on the naval engines. Yet if
Italian officials showed any hint of giving in to
American pressure on the nuclear contracts, the
Iraqis could cancel the lucrative naval order.48
CNEN's generally pro-American director, Umberto
Colombo, emphasised Italy's reluctance to withdraw from the
nuclear assistance program, and told an interviewer, "The point
is, should we not respect the contracts, could we ever sell the
frigates? We are not the only supplier of frigates, you know."49
In the wake of the dispute, the science attache following the
case at the American Embassy in Rome received a threat on his
life. The case began to receive considerable publicity in Italy and
the United States. Colombo claimed that it was ridiculous to
believe that a country like Italy, without the capability or desire to
build a nuclear weapon of its own, would be able to supply the
technology to a third party. Subsequently a SNIA official partially
retracted Colombo's statements but insisted that it was unlikely
that the laboratories could yield sufficient levels of plutonium to
produce a bomb. A SNIA official claimed that the labs could
produce "with difficulty" 300 to 500 grams per year.50 A
plutonium bomb of the size that destroyed Nagasaki would
require five to eight kilograms. However, the official speculated
on the possibility that the Iraqis could adapt oil industry
equipment to expand their "hot cell" laboratories.
Dr. Colombo had been a university classmate in the US of
the Vice-Chairman of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission, Dr.
Abdul Rizam el-Hashimi, and through his contact with the Iraqi
minister claimed to believe that the Iraqis were looking ahead to a
48Islamic Bomb, p. 267.
49Islamic Bomb, p.267.
50Islamic Bomb, p. 101?
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time when the depletion of oil would lead to a dependence on
civilian nuclear power. But this notion was contradicted by public
statements made by the Iraqi government at the highest level. As
early as September 1975, President Sadam Hussein gave an
interview to the Beirut magazine al-Usbua al-Arabi describing the
purchase of reactors as "the first Arab attempt at nuclear
arming."51 After the Iraqi program was severely damaged by the
Israeli attack on the Osirak reactor in 1981, Hussein was even
more outspoken. "Peace-loving nations should now help the
Arabs to acquire atomic bombs as a counterbalance to those
already possessed by Israel."52
Even though the Italians had not developed nuclear
armaments for themselves and considered nuclear power plants a
limited and essentially civilian pursuit, their clients in the Middle
East bought the Italian technology evidently for its military and
political applications. As in many cases, such as the arming of
South Africa, the cooperation of the Italians was not enough to
meet all of the needs of the client state; Italy's role in Iraq could
have been filled by a number of other countries including some
in the Soviet bloc. But the Italians' partial contribution to the
program allowed the Iraqis to attain a level of technology which
eventually disturbed the balance of power in the region enough to
bring a response from the Israeli Air Force. In the 1980s Arab
countries are still seeking ways to acquire nuclear technology and
Iraq has allegedly become involved in the Argentine Condor II
missile project.
Italian Arms Sales in the Iran-Iraq War
In the long conflict in the Persian Gulf in the 1980s, Italian
military trade increased with both sides. The opportunities of the
51Islamic Bomb, p. 27.
52Islamic Bomb, p. 27.
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war, rather than any loyalties to the nations involved, guided
Italian transfers. Toward the end of the war, cooperation was
weighted more heavily with the Iraqis, but never became as
concentrated as French sales, which reached such a high level that
France had a vested interest in seeing Iraq emerge as the victor.
Iraq spent about four times as much as the Iranis on defence
during the period.53 The Persian Gulf War, one of the longest
conflicts in modern times, provided a surge for most of the
world's arms suppliers, including emerging exporters such as
China, Brazil and Spain. Despite widely-declared embargoes,
deliveries came from nearly every part of the world, from the
socialist bloc as well as Western suppliers, from several Arab
nations, Israel, the Far East and South America.
At a time when most other Third World nations,
supplied by dropping oil earnings or foreign debts,
were curtailing their arms purchases, the Iran-Iraq
war kept the arms market from dropping sharply.
Several dozen nations were involved in arms sales
to Iraq or Iran, including all five members of the
United Nations Security Council.54
The $27 billion (1985 dollars) worth of major weapons
delivered during the eight-year war sparked an upturn in
acquisitions by all of the other Persian Gulf countries: some of the
contracts led well into the 1990s. All of these countries, along
with the protagonists of the war, were expected to continue their
modernisation programs. The prospects of rising procurement
budgets in the Middle East offered the possibility of reversing an
economic trend which had severely oat back the export power of
Western industries, as Teti described in 1986:
53Jane's Defence Weekly, 29 May 1987.
54SIPRI, Information Sheet on Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988: Military Costs
and Arms Trade, 17 August 1988, p.4.
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The recent episodes concerning the lowering of the
cost of petrol generate some degree of perplexity in
us. It is known that the press has placed great
emphasis on related events; one hears of a miracle
for Italy, of a marvelous moment out of which we
must derive the maximum benefit. Our evaluation
of all of this is rather different. For the present, the
sharp decline in the price of oil represents a notable
advantage for our country. For the middle and long
term, however...the result that will come of it is that
those same oil-producing countries will no longer
acquire products from the industrialised countries,
including Italy.55
After 1981 the arms trade between Italy and Iran consisted
mainly of delivery of spare parts, and the trade in secondary
equipment was intensive enough to show little contraction in
military trade figures between the two countries. Foreign
Minister Andreotti reported that the last set of helicopters paid for
by Iran had not been delivered because of the outbreak of
hostilities,56 and an embargo on sales to the Gulf was declared in
the Italian parliament on 4 June, 1984. The Iranian ambassador in
Rome affirmed that the Italians had adhered to the embargo and
had prevented the delivery even of equipment for which they
had received payment.57
However Italy, along with many West European countries,
was eventually implicated in the "arms-for-hostages" scandal
which was made public in November 1986. It is possible that the
helicopter delivery was released as part of the American plan to
bring about the release of hostages and a rapprochement between
Iran and the West.58 During the same time, extensive Italian
military trade to the Persian Gulf was exposed. Some of this was
55 Teti, Atti parlamentari, 7 March 1986, p. 5.
56"Le esportazioni di armi italiane a Iraq e Iran," p. 4.
57La Repubblica, 14 April 1988.
58La Rqjubblica, 14 April 1988.
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shipped by air from Rome's Leonardo da Vinci airport directly to
Teheran, such as a shipment of 48 cases of spare parts for machine
guns and anti-aircraft cannons, probably labelled as agricultural
supplies. Arms were also thought to be diverted to the Persian
Gulf on Danish merchant ships calling at the Italian ports of
Talamone and Ortona. The Vice-President of the Danish
Seamen's Union, Henrik Berlau, said in an interview in late 1986,
"For all of the shipowners and the sailors involved in
these transports, a stopover at Talamone automatically means
knowing that we will be loading arms."59 Berlau described the
loading process in Italy of one of the illegal shipments:
Two military customs officers in green
uniforms...remained on board throughout the time
of loading, and spoke with the captain, I think in
English because the captain does not know Italian.
We were told not to smoke once the cargo was
loaded and to have the extinguishers at hand at all
times. At the end of the loading operations, the
crates were closed inside the containers, at a total of
80 tonnes.60
According to Berlau, the cargo never reached the Italian-built
port at Bandar Abbas in Iran, because of danger of bombardment
from Iraq.
Italy was also involved in a European consortium supplying
the Gulf War which was exposed by a Swedish customs
investigation in 1987. An international group of arms
manufacturers banded together to take advantage of Iran's
monthly requirement for an estimated 500,000 to 1 million
artillery shells and 50 to 100 tonnes of gunpowder;61 a few
contracts were undertaken for Iraq as well. Subcontractors
59L'Espresso, 23 November 1986 and Panorama, 25 January 1987.
60L'Espresso, 23 November 1986 and Panorama, 25 January 1987.
61T/je Independent, T7 May 1987.
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allegedly were hired to fill a stream of orders without being told of
the destination of their products. In 1984, Tirrena Industriale of
Italy accepted a £30 million contract for 5,300 tonnes of
gunpowder for Iran and found it could not meet the requirement.
It subcontracted work to Nobel Krut, Nobel Explosives in
Scotland, Belgium PRB, Holland's Muiden Chemie and France's
SNPE. When Italian officials clamped down on exports to Iran,
the deal was sidetracked to a South African source which also
used Swedish, Dutch, Norwegian and Finnish manufacturers,
with the Swedish businessman Karl-Erik Schmitz acting as
intermediary. Yugoslavia was stated as the official recipient.62
Iranian students at the Faculty of Architecture in Venice and
at other universities were thought to have come to Italy with the
main purpose of assisting arms transfers to their home country.63
When questioned on the military trade to Iran, the Treasury
Minister Giulio Amato claimed that there had never been an
official embargo, only "guidelines which can be translated into
government directives;"64 the Minister for Foreign Trade
responded that he had never been informed of an embargo.65
Despite a long history of close trade ties, Italian backing of the
Iranian cause was still tentative. Support for Khomeini's regime
was seen by some in Italy as a possible countermeasure to France's
support for Iraq, so that West European countries could maintain
contact with all of the important actors in the region.
Commercial trade remained the most salient aspect of Italian-
Irani cooperation; political links yielded few fruits, despite the
recommendations of the Institute for International Affairs in
Rome in a 1984 study:
6277ze Independent, 29 May 1987.
63"PooZ europeo per Khomeini," II Messaggero, 23 March 1988.
64L'Incontro, January 1987, p. 2.
65"Italy implicated in Iran arms supply debate," Jane's Defence Weekly,
29 November 1986.
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A presence which is in some sense friendly and
cooperative by the Western countries which are in a
position to carry this out is necessary and invaluable
for the interests of all of the West. Limitations arise
in the political and military conditions. A policy of
economic cooperation, assisted by the cautious
supply of military means, appears thus to be an
option open to Italy, in its own interests and in those
of the Atlantic Alliance.66
The extent of Italy's support for Iraq was also made public
during the same period. In 1988, when Iraq was spending about
50% of its GNP on defence,67 it was revealed that it had placed its
first order in 1981 with the FIAT subsidiary Valsella for about $100
million worth of land mines. With only a third of the first
contract delivered, the Iraqis hastened to order a new shipment
worth an estimated $124 million. The business with Iraq
amounted to about 90% of Valsella production.68 The company
was so overwhelmed by the orders that it was required to export
the shells to a subsidiary in Singapore to fit explosives. One
commentator described the dimensions of the mine deal which
went unhindered by Italian government regulations:
The exact number of mines (pardon: shells!) which
were sent to the East is not known: but judging from
the account of the final value of more than $120
million, the number must be at least a billion. Quite
a few, for Singapore, which is after all an island of
little more than 500 km2; it would be as if the Italian
Army, in order to defend the island of Elba against
disembarkments, ordered half a million mines, a
quantity which you probably will not find in all of
the arsenals of our country. The truth is, whoever
granted the permission certificates must have had a
prodigious knowledge of history, which tells us that
66/fah'a e Iran: Opzioni e Politiche.
67Jane's Defence Weekly, 26 August 1989.
68La Repubblica, 11 March 1988.
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in early 1942 in spite of the body of water which
separates it from Malacca, Singapore was invaded by
the Japanese.69
Other Italian sales to Iraq since 1984 included radar systems
from Selenia and Marconi Italiana, munitions and howitzers
from OTO-Melara, five Agusta helicopters (model AB-212) and
30,000 munitions from Beretta.
When Iran and Iraq suspended fighting in August 1988,
France and Britain were thought to be replenishing the Iraqi
arsenal; the USSR sent defence equipment to Iran. Beginning in
August 1988, Italians sent representatives as part of a group of 350
unarmed military observers to monitor the Gulf War ceasefire.70
69Leone Grimaldi, Panorama Difesa, No. 43, April 1988.
70/ane's Defence Weekly, 12 August 1989.
CHAPTER EIGHT
Government roles inRegulating and Promoting The
ItalianDefence Industry
Arms Exports and the Italian Legal Process
Although the Italian state was not instrumental in the rise of
the military industry, it has primary responsibility for controlling
exports. As the arms commerce increased rapidly in the 1970s, the
government gradually was forced to take a more active and more
public role in the sector. Explained the Italian international
relations yearbook of 1974-1975 :
The pressures of the industry are beginning to give
fruits. In the past the policy of the government was
not to encourage the exports of arms, or at the very
least not to encourage them officially, to put up with
them, and at any rate to make their existence as little
known as possible. But in the past two or three years,
spurred by the economic crisis and the trade deficit,
the situation has almost reversed.1
During the industry's commercial phase, the official
government policy on exports remained understated or often
completely secret. This appeared to be to protect the industry from
public disapproval rather than to control the destinations of Italian
arms. When public intervention was necessary to stall the
industry's decline in the late 1980s, political controls of every kind
became more strict and government officials became more candid
about the trade in arms. This was part of an attempt to present the
defence industry as a necessary and legitimate extension of the state





A committee for "examination of questions concerning export
of special materials and products" was established on 24 March 1974
to oversee the flow of arms from Italy. The guidelines under
which it worked remained confidential, as did its membership. It is
likely that high-ranking representatives of the Ministries of Trade,
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Finance sat on the committee.
Legally, firms are required to obtain authorisation even in the stage
of commercial negotiations. The Defence General Staff receives the
request from the defence company, and then consults with the
political departments concerned, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs,
Industry, and Foreign Trade. SISMI and the Secretary General for
Defence (who also acts as National Armaments Director) are
consulted on "military and technical aspects." According to the
White Paper 1985 all of these groups "evaluate the political,
technical and economic advisability of the export in question and
can, if necessary, prevent the opening of negotiations."2 If a deal
has been concluded, an export permit must be obtained. The
Ministry of Foreign Trade conducts the first review, in cooperation
with the interministerial committee on exports. The Ministry of
Finance is also heard.
These policies were backed up by sparse legislation in Italy. In
1926 and 1931 laws were passed in Italy requiring licences to sell war
materiel. The Law 1161 from 11 July 1941 was still in effect and
allowed the industry and the military to withhold information
about the Italian arms business from Parliament and the public. A
law in effect since 1931 required that a licence be obtained from the
Ministry of the Interior for the import of all military equipment as
well.3 This did not prevent the use of Italy as an important
stopover base for illegal "triangulations" sales. Law 801 of 24
2White Paper 1985, Appendix 15, p. 186.
^Interview with Minister Formica, La Stampa, 20 November 1986.
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October 1977 reinforces the state secrecy on documents and
information relating to the military. The bill number 610 of 6 July
1987, introduced by the deputy Masina and others, attempted to
define more closely government regulations surrounding
production and exports of armaments.
Long-standing legislation has not prevented illegal trade by
other countries, sometimes with the collaboration of politicians.
Although the Italians began exporting armaments on a modest
level under American supervision before the end of the 1940s,
West Germany for instance officially had a ban on selling arms
until 1955. This prohibition was in fact broken many times,
because, according to Ulrich Albrecht, "The authority of the state is
simply not sufficient to enforce a veto over the will of powerful
economic actors."4
State and industry in Europe find themselves in a
commonality of interests looking to expand arms
exports which renders traditional political
determinants of delivery or non-delivery to certain
countries obsolete. All West European nations stress
reservations, even scruples, towards shipping arms
outside the Atlantic Alliance. In comparing these
pronouncements, it is difficult to determine whose
language is most restrictive. At the same time, it is
noted among the internal and international elites
that assurances of non-delivery to crisis areas are a
necessary faqon de parler designed to address the
moral concerns of large segments of the public.
There is hardly an area in West European politics in
which the discrepancies between what is said and
what is done are greater.5
In the West German constitution, for instance, government
control over military exports is officially established, with a policy
4Ulrieh Albrecht, "The Federal Republic of Germany and Italy: New Strategies of
Mid-Sized Weapons Exporters," Journal of International Affairs, New York, Vol 40 (1),
1986, p. 136.
5"New Strategies of Mid-Sized Weapons Exporters," p. 134.
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that states that weapons are not to be sold in areas of tension.6
However when the rules were re-drafted in April 1982 under
Helmut Schmidt, the prohibition against exports to areas of tension
was lifted. Exports were to serve West German "vital interests,"
which could be interpreted as commercial interests rather than
considerations about supplying repressive or belligerent regimes.
In Italy no such public declarations were made and then
contradicted. Article 11 of the Italian constitution, which
condemns force as a means of solving international conflict, does
not mention arms sales. The secrecy of regulations in Italy, or their
non-existence, did industrialists and politicians the favour of not
being forced to contradict official policy.
The Italians are known to have had one of the most lenient
export policies in Western Europe. But the 1980s saw an end to the
legitimacy of nearly every country's arms exports policy. Many
Western suppliers were implicated in the Iran-Contra scandal, and
even sellers which were presumed to have followed relatively
scrupulous policies, such as Sweden, were shown to have
contradicted their own self-imposed codes of practice.
Paradoxically, the continuing reliance on a number of
outdated laws and the ambivalence of Italian politicians over
supporting this controversial but lucrative sector sometimes made
the export process difficult and extremely time-consuming for
companies seeking to sell their products legally. Italian exports are
also sometimes slowed by the necessity of gaining American
approval, for systems made under licence. The process can take up
to two years. According to an anonymous client, the Italians
became notorious among their recipients for "their fixation for
wanting to circumvent laws, which leads them to resort to
subterfuge even when it is not necessary."7
6Regina Cowen, "West German Transfers to Sub-Saharan Africa: Commercialism
versus Foreign Policy," Arms for Africa , p. 162.
7 Armi: nuovo modello di sviluppo? p. 274, n. 27.
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Arms and Political Scandals
The involvement of the parties and the political support
network for the arms industry is not well-documented, beyond the
well-known divide between the Christian Democrat supervision of
IRI and the control of EFIM by the socialist parties. With the
astronomical prices associated with weapons deals, the industry has
also tempted politicians to have a hand in the clandestine activity
of the field.
While the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is considered to be fairly
inactive and "apolitical" in this field,8 the secret services are widely
believed to be much more involved. There are no restrictions
against the common practice of intelligence personnel acting as
intermediaries.9 Falco Accame, formerly associated with the secret
services, suggested that the intelligence services enjoyed relative
impunity and operated widely in the Third World for Italian
interests (especially in Libya); at the same time they were not often
equipped to assess wider considerations of international politics
when dealing in arms sales.
The experience of recent years in the sector of
armaments shows that the secret services often
avoided any formal control, enjoying the privilege of
administrative responsibility...tenaciously defending
their position with the continual invocation of
military secrecy. It appears more and more likely
that the generalised recourse to this institution
(which is never regulated in Italy) has acted as a
means of covering possible violations of laws.10
"Kickbacks," or tangenti, which amounted to perhaps five to
20 percent of a weapons contract in the 1970s, rose to about 30% on
interview with Gianluca Devoto, Rome 18 April 1988.
°Falco Accame, "Controllo sulle armi, una legge-groviera," II Manifesto , 9 December
1987.
10"II nostro mercato di morte," p. 31.
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average in the following decade.11 The Italians experienced their
first major arms-related scandal in the Lockheed affair. In the wake
of a $60 million deal for the sale of 14 C-130s to the Italian Air Force
in the 1960s, top-ranking Christian Democrat ministers were
accused of receiving bribes. A total of $1,680,000 was transferred to
various members of the party, using accounts in Liechtenstein,
Panama and Switzerland. Ex-Defence Minister Mario Tanassi
(PSDI) was sentenced to 28 months in prison; five others also
received jail sentences.12
Officials at Aeritalia were accused of transferring $2.5 million
to Turkish politicians to favour a deal for local production of the
MB-339, which later fell through. Elevated tangenti paid to
Venezuelan Christian Democrats in relation to the acquisition of
Cantieri Navali Riuniti's Lupo frigates caused friction in
Venezuelan politics.
Other contracts whose values seem inexplicably high probably
involved intermediary fees, such as the $425 million deal for 50
Chinook helicopters sold to Iran in 1977, and two sales to Libya in
the mid-1970s involving $150 million for 200 SF-260 planes and 160
billion lire for 200 armoured cars made by FIAT. 13 in one of the
Libyan deals, a number of Italian and Libyan officials were
suspected of misusing funds related to the arms-for-oil deal. These
included officials of ENI, including Andreotti's brother, various
high defence officials, a foreign ministry official charged with
armaments, the diplomatic advisor at the Italian Embassy in Libya,
a SNIA armaments executive, as well as the director of Italconsult,
who was the son of former president Antonio Segni. An
11IAI 1976-1977, p. 432 n. 19; Battistelli, "Tendenze e Contraddizioni del Mercato
delle armi," Politica Internazionale, no. 5, May 1987, p. 117.
12Howe, pp. 454-455.
l3IAI 1976-1977, p. 432, note 19.
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investigation was carried out in Rome which failed to find
evidence of wrongdoing.14
Andreotti himself was considered to be a staunch defender of
the industry, as this picture,published in the review
Osservatore politico in 1977, attests:
Prime Minister Andreotti has a passion, rather a
hobby...He is extraordinarily attracted to tanks,
cannons, missiles and military equipment in
general...To satisfy his interest, Andreotti has opened
in La Spezia an office in Piazza della Libert^ which he
has entrusted to the direction of the Hon. Pietro
Zoppi...Through this office Andreotti is constantly
kept up to the minute on everything happening in
the factories and above all in the offices of OTO-
Melara. As soon as a new tank is put into production
or a cannon is modified, Andreotti is informed of
it.15
Exiled Prince Vittorio Emanuele was involved as a mediator
for Italian business in Iran from his base in Switzerland in the
1970s,16 possibly in the field of military contracts. To seal the
famous accord for the sales of ships to the Iraqi government a
Syrian mediator was employed at the cost of 130 to 180 billion lire.
This payment was authorised by former Defence Minister
Giovanni Spadolini after some hesitation; other government
ministers disapproved of the payment, hoping to discourage the
possibility that the funds could return to Italy in the form of
payments to politicians and their parties.17 The contract with Iraq
was also associated with the PSI and Ferdinando Mack Di
Palmerstein in particular.18 Eight billion lire in middle-man fees
14Osservatore politico, 13 November 1976, 9 February 1977, 11 March 1977 and 13
November 1977, cited in Galli, pp. 158-159.
15Osservatore politico, 18 February 1977, cited in Galli, p. 159.
16MEED, p. iv.
17Gianluigi Melega, "Armi che scottano," Politica internazionale, n. 5, May 1985, p.
15.
1 interview iwth Gianluca Devoto, Rome 18 April 1988.
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for the sale of Intermarine minesweepers to Malaysia also caused a
brief uproar in Italy.19 The existence of mediation fees were
impossible to justify with regard to contracts, including probably
the Iraqi fleet deal, which were negotiated directly on a
government-to-government basis. "Payoffs" probably occur within
the national procurement process as well.
As in every industrialised country, there is also considerable
mobility between the top ranks of the military and industry
management. Since military leaders and arms company executives
have been among the prime targets of left-wing terrorists in Italy,
even the harshest critics of the sector have been reluctant to
publish names. But ex-generals and admirals have been appointed
to high posts in Aerfer, Contraves, Finmeccanica, and more
recently, OTO-Melara.20
The New Arms Exports Bill: A Turning Point?
In December 1986, responding to national disapproval over a
number of highly publicised cases of illegal trafficking, the Minister
of Foreign Trade Formica introduced tighter guidelines on exports.
The decree demanded more meticulous paperwork on the quantity,
type of weapon, means of payment, country of destination, and
other details of each transfer. Exporting companies were also
expected to provide information regarding:
Any special characteristics of the transfer (inclusion
of foreign materials, temporary transit or national
importation, foreign expenditures, payments for
intermediation, and conformity to the regulations
encoded in the Ministerial Decree of 12 March 1981
19 "Controllo sulle armi, una legge-groviera." I
20Ilari, pp. 32 and 89; Miggiano, "Alia fiera delle armi," Scienza-Esperienza,
November-December, 1987.
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and successive modifications; transfers not requiring
verification of payments, training courses, etc.).21
Information such as the amount of value added, and the
importance of sales in counter-trade agreements (such as arms-for-
oil deals) would be obtainable if the regulations were implemented.
For the first time, the government also stressed the fact that the
purposes for which the weapons would be used in the recipient
country would now be considered.
The subsequent phase of investigation, to be carried
out in conjunction with the other ministries and
associated departments and if necessary with the
assistance of other consultative organs, will be
devoted to verifying the reliability of all of the
documentation presented, and to estimate the
feasibility of the operation in economic, political and
national security terms, with particular regard to
assessing the possibility that the importing country
may use the materiel to be exported.22
As Italy's arms trade gained more publicity, mostly for past
illegal trade which had long since slackened, a bill was introduced
by Minister of Defence Valerio Zanone, Minister of Foreign Trade
Ruggiero and other representatives of the government. The aim
was to examine more rigorously the political consequences of
Italian arms sales, "in observance of the UN Charter, the Statute of
Human Rights and the Non-Proliferation Treaty."23 The bill also
called for the establishment of a register of all arms exporters in
Italy, and of an Interministerial Committee for the Exchange of
2^Decreto 4 December 1986, Ministero del Commercio con VEstero, (Legge Formica) ;
Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana.
22Ibid.
2^Disegno di Legge, Camera dei Deputati, X Legislatura, number 2033, 9 December
1987, "Nuove norme sul controllo dell'esportazione, importazione e transito dei materiali
di armamento, nonche dell'esportazione e transito dei materiali di particolare interesse
strategico. "
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Defence Material (CISD) under the supervision of the Prime
Minister, to
inform the public administration and the firms, in
the framework of policies and general directives, of
the limits of our exports of war materiel. It will also
be the committee's duty to intervene swiftly in the
case of unexpected international crises which might
require modification of the directives in force.24
The bill also proposed to prohibit the import and export of all
NBC weapons, and to control the transfer of state employees,
including military officials, to posts within the defence industry
under a limited period of time. It also proposed to make
negotiations for exports a purely government-to-government
responsibility. In the past, private officials had in effect acted as
Italian ambassadors in conducting sales with state representatives
in foreign countries. The indications on punitive measures to be
taken against Italian companies infringing upon the regulations,
and the stress on verifying "end-users" showed that until that time
control of the industry's exports had not been legally enforceable.
Cases of "triangulation," especially the Valsella mines transferred
through Singapore to the Gulf War, attest to the laxity of this aspect
of state controls. The new bill also favoured European trade by
offering reduced red tape for exports with European destinations, in
the hopes of discouraging the industry from resorting to the "dirty"
markets of the past.
Company officials considered the proposed legislation an
attack on the industry. The bill was perceived as a blow to the
sector by many industrialists. Teti attributed the steep drop in
exports, and the resulting threat to employment levels, to the
government's negative approach.25
24Disegno di Legge, number 2033, 9 December 1987.
25Jane's Defence Weekly, 8 October 1985.
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I wonder why the state took on the burden of the
defence industry — the majority of which is in the
state-holding companies ~ and then imposes so
many restrictions, that will in practice impede
exports.26
The proposals were designed to present the industry as a
legitimate sector of the Italian state, but one military analyst
commenting on its uncertain future complained,
As exporters, we find greater difficulties today
internally than on the foreign market...The defence
industry has become progressively criminalised, with
the confusion between arms traffickers and
companies which operate fully within the limits of
the law.27
Promotion of Arms Exports:
The Role of Italian Politicians and the Armed Forces
In the actual marketing process, representatives of the Italian
state did not aggressively encourage weapons sales. Its commercial
strengths aside, the international activity of the industry was
reportedly considered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the early
1970s as "a destabilizing factor and thus globally damaging for other
exports."28
Various types of "promotional" activity were nonetheless
carried out by representatives of the government and armed
services. One indirect but highly important form of support for the
arms industry was the acquisition by the Italian armed services of
Italian-made products. The presentation of the legge navale related
that "it is universally known that the first thing that a foreign
client wants to know is whether the armed forces of the producer
26cited in "Un'lndustria in Via d'Estinzione," Interarma News, Number 3, 1988, p. 79.
27"Un'Industria in Via d'Estinzione," p. 77.
28 '7/ commercio delle armi," p. 242
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nation intend to be equipped with the materiel being offered."29
The first Italian White Paper, published in 1977, also acknowledged
the importance of "showing faith" in Italian products for the
purposes of sales abroad, as "an indispensable condition for
promoting contracts and bringing about their positive
conclusion."30
In addition, exhibitions and demonstrations conducted by the
armed forces constituted an important source of advertisement for
the industry. Defence attaches abroad were officially not allowed to
"advertise" for the industry, except in the capacity of putting local
armed forces in contact with Italian firms.31 The Italian Navy
however maintained an ufficio promozione industrie navali, and
the secret services have circulated instructions among military
personnel abroad to do what was in their power to help Italian
arms exports.32
The Navy made a two-month tour of Mexico, Panama,
Ecuador, Peru, Columbia and Venezuela between 1974 and 1975.
The tour was officially for promotional reasons, and was followed
by the acceleration of Latin American contracts with Italian
shipyards.33
After participating in rescue operations of the Vietnamese boat
people, the Italian Navy embarked on another promotional tour
with its Ardito and Lupo ships. The tour lasted from 18 July 1979 to
3 February 1980, and involved visits to 21 countries at a cost of 9
billion lire. The tour was probably responsible for sparking Iraqi
interest in acquiring the Italian-made fleet.34
The government also attempted to assist the industry by
creating a Defence-Industry Committee in response to the
29cited in IA11974-1975, p. 402.
3®White Paper 1977, p. 306, cited in Armi: nuovo modello di sviluppo? p. 262.
31 Interview with Mr. Grignolo, Ministry of Defence, Rome 21 April 1988.
32Armi: nuovo modello di sviluppo? p. 260.
33L4J 1974-1975, pp. 403-404.
34Armz: nuovo modello di sviluppo? p.271, note 25.
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Conferenza Difesa-Industria of July 1984. The committee's tasks
included overseeing R&D and procurement processes, and
coordinating these activities with developments within NATO.
The document published at the Committee's establishment also
stated these objectives among its main responsibilities:
—to make proposals for promoting, in an organic and
ccordinated framework, possible specific
interventions of various Ministries to sell abroad
those products exceeding domestic requirements;
—to make proposals for directing and coordinating
the activity of military attaches abroad in the specific
sector.35
Aside from its regulatory and occasional promotional roles,
the government assisted the military industry in a number of other
ways. One of its major tasks was to bring a sense of legitimacy to
the sector by lending political support more openly. The
government attempted to step up the presence of politicians at
events such as first test flights of new Italian aircraft, and public
statements about the economic contributions of the industry to the
Italian economy were heard with greater regularity.
The government attempted for a long time to rationalise the
aircraft sector, which suffered from fragmentation and keen
competition. The polo aeronautico was first discussed after the
Caron Commission recommendations in the 1960s. But since the
top posts in the state-owned industries are divided among party
appointees, none was eager to see the elimination of competing
firms and a reshuffling of power with uncertain results. Although
an investigation into rationalisation was renewed in the late 1980s,
industry and party leaders did not agree on concrete plans.
The government attempted to shield the military industries
from public criticism by citing the 80,000 jobs provided during the
35VWn'fe Paper 1985, Appendix A.14, p. 184.
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1970s and 1980s, as well as other jobs in secondary industries. The
employment issue was a powerful weapon in the face of pacifist
objections to military production. An industry official defended his
case to critics in this way:
We are wretched people, who without any help,
from the government or from anyone else, keep
afloat our industries, and attempt to maintain these
jobs. You must not look upon us as fanatical
merchants of cannons, absolutely not, we are people
seeking work and that is all...For us, the thousand
tanks or the hundred tanks or the ten missiles
represent work hours...If we could truly make
tractors, I give you my word, we would prefer to
make tractors.36
Supporters also attempted to depict this largely peripheral
sector of the thriving Italian economy as a potential fuel for
industrial growth in a broader sense, as it had been perceived in the
United States for several decades.
The fact that the Ministry of Defence can count upon
national sources of production to satisfy its own
needs permits on the other hand the synchronisation
of the military with the economic growth of the
country, [the possibility of] devoting to it a
predominant part of available financial resources. In
fact, the funds assigned to defence re-enter the cycle
of the Italian economy.37
In fact, many of the funds assigned to defence simply went
into arms production, which for its survival remained geared
toward exports, with little productive effect on Italian industry.
36G. Stefanini, Sul modello dei nostri partners-concorrenti europei, il ruolo
dell'industria italiana dei prodotti militari per la necessaria ripresa economica del paese,
in Aviazione di linea, difesa e spazio, 1977, n.113, pp. 161-162, quoted in Battistelli, Armi,
p. 265.
37Riccardo Bisogniero, "Programmi nazionali d'armamento e iniziative dell'industria
Italiana," Difesa-Industria, Quaderni dell'Istrid, Rome, 1987, p. 12-13.
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Italian state assistance usually stopped short of financial aid for
exports in the 1970s and 1980s. For many years when Italian firms
were negotiating a deal with Saudi Arabia worth at least $3 billion
for the purchase of nine Sauro-class submarines and the
construction of a completely new naval base, including
warehouses, barracks and a mosque, the Italian government was
unwilling to offer any financial or political backing for the
proposal.38
Italian chances in a bid to sell nine other submarines worth $1
billion to South Korea in 1988 were certainly low compared to the
opportunities for a West German competitor which counted on the
support of its government for finding credit arrangements. As long
as Italian sellers had open channels to ample markets in the Third
World, they were able to keep sales high with little government
financial support. But industrialists became critical when
competition for foreign contracts became acute.
In 1989 it was revealed that a major Italian bank, the Banca
Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL), had authorised export credits to Iraq
through its office in Atlanta, Georgia. The credits amounted to
3,700 billion lire, or about $3 billion, exceeding all of the credits
issued legally by Italian banks in 1988 (2,800 billion lire).39 The
credits to Iraq were thought to be associated with the Iraqis attempt
to finance part of the Condor II missile project with Egypt and
Argentina.40 This affair brought on the resignation of the head of
the BNL and investigations in Italy. Whatever the involvement of
the Italian authorities may have been, the illegal credits did not
constitute a case of public support for the Italian arms industry, as
did financing arrangements of other foreign governments.
38Massimo Zamorani, "Meno armi all'estero, piu disoccupati qui," II Giornale, 11
March 1988.
39"II caso BNL: scene di truffa," L'Espresso, 17 September 1989.
40Lawrence Freedman, "Arms deals and burned fingers," The Independent, 22
September 1989.
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The government's policies were not always welcomed by the
defence industry's leaders, who like their French counterparts
"remained jealous of their autonomy while energetic in their
pursuit of government subsidies and support."41 The President of
the Associazione delle Industrie Aerospaziali (AIA) Enrico Gimelli
gave this explanation for the decision of the Italian companies to
pull out of the Farnborough Air Show in 1988:
It has become impossible for Italian firms to
collaborate and compete with the firms of other
countries which are given substantial government
aid. It is more and more difficult for us to maintain
the market shares which have been laboriously
obtained.42
Gimelli broadened his criticism to include all Italian
industries aiming at export markets: "The government has not
given the financial and economic help which has been given by
other governments to their national industries and it is to the
credit of Italian industry to have reached fifth place among
Western industrialized countries."43
Official Rationales for Maintaining the Italian Defence
Industry
When the industry faced a steep decline in orders, it could not
be maintained without increased public support. This required
leaders to publicise justifications for the sector. Defenders of Italian
military production attempted to depict the industry as an essential
element of Italian national sovereignty, an important means of
assuring technological progress, and as a tool of foreign policy for
influencing Italy's allies.
41Making and Marketing Arms, p. 237.
42Defence and Armament Heracles International, no. 71, March 1988.
43Jane's Defence Weekly, 12 December 1987.
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Just as a military-based economy had failed to assure
technological advances and increase foreign affairs leverage in
other countries where it was implemented, the weapons industry
did not perform these functions to a marked degree in Italy.
Instead the industry complemented two diffuse elements of Italy's
international activity: its ability to carry through trade agreements
with a diverse array of foreign countries, and its aspirations to be
treated as a political and economic equal among its major Western
allies.
These two goals of the industry were not reconcilable. During
its rise to economic success, the Italian arms trade seemed to
eschew any political code in response to the sector's tremendous
commercial potential; at its turning point in the late 1980s, it
appeared to discard considerations of cost and efficiency in favour
of politically-inspired European joint ventures. While the industry
appeared to have a future in European cooperation, the thriving
trade with the Third World, which had been responsible for its
expansion, decreased dramatically.
Arms Production and National Security Goals
As the defence industry in Italy expanded, its supporters began
to refer to it as an extension of the armed forces in the press and at
occasional conferences on the topic. The aim was to make the
industry's existence appear indispensable for the nation's security.
In theory, this is the prime function of any defence industry, and it
was the main reason cited in the Italian Defence White Paper in
1977 for the industry's existence in Italy. The Head of the Chiefs of
Staff, General Riccardo Bisogniero, described the industry in these
terms:
The defence industry, just like the centres for
research and technology, constitutes in fact a
fundamental component of the national defence; it
represents an essential element of the public service
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rendered by the military for national
independence.44
The attempt to justify the industry as an instrument of
national security, after it had grown in response to economic
stimuli, is fraught with contradictions. The industry clearly did not
come into being with the aim of attaining this goal, and it is
unlikely ever to bring Italy military self-sufficiency, even at a
modest level. The assertion that it existed to contribute to the
country's independence is disproved by the fact that the sector's
major growth came in response to foreign markets, not only to
national demand. The Italian Defence White Paper of 1985
acknowledged this fact:
The national armaments industry, consisting of a
number of remarkably heterogeneous firms,
developed in the 1960s and 1970s as a consequence of
entrepreneurial efforts to meet the increasing foreign
demand rather than within the framework of a
specific industrial development plan 45
At theConferenza Difesa-Industria in Rome in July 1984,
Sergio Rossi presented one of the major introductory papers with
the assertion that a strong Italian defence industry is an
indispensable element of Italian sovereignty, but that such an
industry should never been expected to exist without participating
in "technological and industrial alliances in the European and
Atlantic spheres."46 The following statements are what Rossi calls
the "three levels" at which the industry functions:
In the first place, an efficient and technologically
advanced defence system constitutes an
indispensable premise for guaranteeing an adequate
level of national self-sufficiency in supplying the
44"Programmi nazionali d'armamento, " pp. 12-13.
46White Paper 1985, p. 74.
46 "II sistema economico delta difesa," p. 4.
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means and materials necessary for the operabilitv of
the armed forces. This is an objective which can only
be renounced with great difficulty, within reasonable
limits, lest we lose the capacity to conduct an
autonomous defence and security policy.
Secondly, a modern economic defence system must
take account of the need to reach technological and
production accords with other members o f
NATO...This is necessary, above all in the next few
years, to maintain the national defence and its
industry at the most advanced industrial and
technological levels in the West. Such levels are not
in fact attainable or maintainable in certain sectors
using only Italian resources and know-how.
To realise the economies of scale necessary for a
sufficient rationalisation of production, satisfied only
in part by limited internal military demand, the
defence sector must be able to continue to export to
other areas of the world a consistent portion of the
national production of armaments. Such a policy,
however compelling, must be conducted not within
the framework of an anachronistic desire for power,
but rather in a spirit of cooperation and of
consolidating international security on the critical
axis of instability of North-South relations.47
In effect, the first statement outlined a goal for the arms
industry in Italy, but the other remarks underlined the difficulties
in attaining any degree of self-sufficiency because of the weaknesses
of the Italian industry at every stage of production. In the early
1980s the Italian industry was dependent on external factors to a
greater extent than other Western producers, for technological
input, know-how in the production process, and ample demand in
foreign markets to absorb the finished product. Rossi is one of the
most prominent Italian specialists in defence and his theses, despite
47 "II sistema economico della difesa." pp. 5-6. Emphasis in original text.
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their contradictions, appeared in almost exactly the same form a
few months later in the same Italian Defence White Paper which
described the industry's mainly commercial origins.
The Industry and Military Self-Sufficiency
The Italians did begin to supply their forces with a greater
quantity of nationally-made materiel in the 1970s. When the
interest in national strategy and improved defence in Italy surfaced
in the 1970s, the industry was already well established, especially in
the field of exports. Italian military strategy developed more slowly
than the industry itself, and remained ill-defined even in the late
1980s when arms production was on the wane.
The re-equipment programs of the 1970s attempted to
improve the nation's ability to react to threats from the
Mediterranean and to move closer to NATO standards in general.
The experience in Lebanon, when the armed forces lacked adequate
air cover, and the Libyan attack on Lampedusa in April 1986 were
among the events which prompted renewed infusion of funds for
Italian military procurement.
In the 1980s, the Garibaldi aircraft carrier and the CATRIN
battlefield communications system were two examples of Italian
industrial developments responding to national military needs. In
1984, by one estimate the Italian industry provided the national
armed forces with 80 percent of its requirement.48 This figure
represented a reversal of the Italian situation in the 1960s, when
the industry only satisfied 30 to 40 percent.49 But as the armed
forces finally came to grips with lacunae in their defence, the main
improvements were made by turning to systems produced
internationally. The major modernisation plans for the Air Force
48 "II sistema economico della difesa," p. 53.
49"Programmi nazionali d'armamento p. 13.
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are based on the Tornado and future acquisition of the EFA, both
manufactured only partially by Italy.
Italy was the largest importer of armaments in the world,
including production under licence, in the early 1980s.50 Italy had
11 percent of the share of arms and arms technology imported
within the industrialised world in 1982, followed by Greece, Japan,
Spain, and the Netherlands. At one point the Italians appeared to
be importing fewer arms, because they were exporting
proportionally much greater quantities. As Rossi observed, "The
deficit in 1972 [in the balance of trade in the armaments sector] was
transformed into a surplus of 250 million (1981 constant dollars) in
1976-1977, which then almost quadrupled to $825-1,000 million in
1981-1982, mostly as a result of Italian exports to the developing
countries."51
In addition, usually at least a quarter of the manufactured
product which was exported -- often including crucial components
such as the motor — was made up of equipment of foreign origin or
made under foreign licence.52 Writes another Italian researcher,
Prof. Michele Nones, "the incidence of foreign ownership is also
significant, at about 30% if indirectly-controlled industries are
included, which confirms the high level of internationalisation of
the Italian economy."53
The notion that Italy would ever be able to fulfill defensive
roles entirely with Italian-made equipment is not credible, even at
the peak of its military-industrial production. Italy still turns to
foreign suppliers to meet national requirements at tremendous cost
to the Italian state. Twenty Patriot surface-to-air missiles are being
acquired from the United States in the late 1980s, at a cost of $3
billion, to replace the NIKE missile systems defending the
511 "II sistema economico della difesa," p. 56, derived from SIPRI data.
51 "II sistema economico della difesa," pp. 53-55.
52 Armi, nuovo modello di sviluppo? p. 276.
53 "Difesa-industria-ricerca," p. 4.
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northeast border. This was the largest new order placed with the
US military industry in 1987.54
Most importantly, since the industry developed in response to
demand from foreign markets, production for national purposes
was sometimes made a secondary priority. The armed forces
themselves did not make demands on the industry to serve their
needs first. The industry's state of development at its peak showed
that it did not develop primarily as an extension of the Italian
military establishment.
Italian dependency on its exports to absorb about 50% of its
production was high; by comparison the FRG exported about 11%
of its output and France 36% in the mid-1980s.55 The Italian
industry as a result developed programs far in excess of its own
needs. As Rossi explained later in the Defence-Industry Conference
presentation,
As the figures themselves demonstrate, the industry
is over-developed with respect to the needs of our
armed forces: but if this is a physiological
characteristic arising out of the need to rationalise
and effect economies of scale, it is also true that the
industry, especially in the past, has advanced
according to its own independent strategies. It has
planned and produced largely with an eye to exports,
often adapting new projects only later to the real
needs of national defence.56
In many cases, it is clear that the exigencies of the arms trade
often dominated the interests of the Italy's own armed forces.
Besides the case of the disarming of an Italian unit in order to sell
tanks to Ghedaffi, the Italian military was known to acquire
systems which were not essential for its own defence for the
purposes of promoting sales abroad. Sometimes the Italian
54SIPRI1988, p. 180.
55IAI1984-1985, pp. 201-202.
56 "II sistema economico della difesa," p. 84.
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military had to wait to receive orders until foreign customers could
be accommodated. For instance, Malaysia received four Lerici-class
minehunters before the Italian Navy, although Italy had ordered
the ships from Intermarine earlier.57
In the US and USSR export weapons were often
"downgraded" versions of the technology reserved for national
forces. The American defence industry has produced systems
especially for export, such as the FX fighter designed for Third
World markets, and the XM-1 turret and F-16 aircraft, whose
original features were altered in order to attract European buyers 58
The practice of gearing production for export can be seen to a much
greater extent in the Italian industry. When Italian producers
developed systems to meet the demand of foreign military forces,
the result was that they developed both lower quality weaponry
aimed towards some markets, but also developed technology which
went far beyond national strategic needs, including a ballistic
missile capability (marketed in the Condor II in Argentina) and
nuclear know-how (transferred to Iraq).
A Technological Asset?
At a conference at the Centro di alti studi per la difesa (CASD)
in 1967, the president of Finmeccanica announced, "From now on
it will be necessary to consider the defence budget not only as a
complex of strictly military expenditures, but...also as an
investment for the technological progress of the country."59 Italy
indeed underwent an increase in R & D programs in the following
20 years, and in the process military research was overshadowed
and in some cases surpassed by other priorities. In a study on the
57IAI 1983-1984, pp. 185-186.
58Baroque Arsenal, p. 199.
59S. Magri, L'apporto delle produzioni per la difesa alio sviluppo tecnologico ed
economico del paese, CASD 3 May 1967, cited in Armi: nuovo modello di sviluppo? p. 135.
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state of scientific research in Italy by the national research centre,
CNR, the main reasons for funding R & D in the 1970s and 1980s
were listed. Among the rationales were "improvement of the
economy (including energy, agricultural and industrial
productivity)," "general fostering of knowledge," "improvement of
living conditions (including ecology and human health)," followed
by defence and space research. Although the share of public
funding for defence research grew from 3.4 to 6.1% between 1975
and 1985, it evidently remained a modest national goal. With such
a small part of such a small budget devoted to military research,
technological progress did not stand out as a compelling reason for
the maintenance of the Italian industry.
Nonetheless, many supporters of the Italian defence industry
claimed that civilian industry could profit from stronger national
military capabilities. The arguments used were mostly borrowed
from debates in countries where military applications came to
dominate national scientific communities. As the Italians spoke of
harnessing a military-industrial model for economic growth, its
long-term application in other countries, especially the United
States, had already shown few positive effects on national
economies.
In the United States, where significant amounts of funding
were infused in the military-industrial establishment, very few
major developments arose from military research. Government
support was shown to be important in early or late stages of
technological development, when a product was not sufficiently
cheap or efficient to meet commercial standards. Overall,
government funding for military industries led to wasted
resources, grossly inflated spending, and a decline in performance.
Most major contributions to civilian technology in the postwar
period, such as the transistor, the integrated circuit, and the
microprocessor, were all financed by private funds.60
60Baroque Arsenal, p. 91.
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Among the perennial problems encountered by companies
seeking to survive through military orders was the requirement for
ultra-high performance, uncertainty about future orders, and keen
competition. Many of the big innovating manufacturers in the
United States and elsewhere moved out of the military market and
sought high volume, non-military users which they considered
more accessible and less encumbered by constraints of military
systems.61
Riding the crest of the arms boom in its middle years, Italy was
not in a position to foster significant scientific research with wide
effects outside of the military industry.
The argument for military R & D as a technological
"flywheel" for the entire economy is more an axiom
or a myth coming from the mouths of its supporters
than a thesis based on proven facts...The great
commitment to military shipbuilding in the last 20
years in Italy does not seem to have sparked a
corresponding improved capacity for
competitiveness in the sector of large civil
shipbuilding. In the aeronautics sector, strong
support on the military side has resulted in the fact
that Italy has only recently, with the ATR-42, put its
capacity for civil production to the test. Other sectors
in which the spinoffs in the civil sector could bring
results, such as that of biomedical equipment, have
yet to be subjected to the test of the market. The
process of spinoffs from the military to the civil in
Italy seems slow and bristling with difficulties, to the
extent that one wonders whether the choice of
directly funding civil research might not have given
better results...The experience of the civil defence
program, with outlays directly to the Ministry of
Defence of about 600 billion lire to buy and develop
certain equipment, should make one reflect. Those
61Baroque Arsenal, pp 93-95.
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funds, with few exceptions, were in fact used for
developing armaments.62
Technological communication with other industrialised
countries was certainly an effect of the arms industry: but this is
largely for the purposes of maintaining the defence industry itself
and rarely had a "spinoff" value. Three of eight major research
projects in the late 1980s involved foreign collaboration: the EH-
101, the EFA, and the NFR NATO frigate.63 Official statements
surrounding the defence industry's technological aspects exposed
two conflicting goals in Italian policy. Italy became more self-
sufficient but simultaneously narrowed its channels abroad.
When Italian leaders cite the wide-ranging benefits of military
high technology, a comparison with Japan is useful. As a
percentage of GNP, Japanese defence spending is low among the
industrialized countries. As one of the defeated nations after the
Second World War it began its national reconstruction with strong
moral prohibitions against rearmament. Like the Italians, the
Japanese renounced military force as a means of solving conflict, in
the Constitution of 1947. Like Italy, Japan was an important focus
in American strategic thinking, and remained a loyal and
cooperative ally throughout the postwar period. The Japanese
remained much more detached, however, from American military
programming than Italy.
In the field of military production, the Japanese case shows an
interesting reversal of the process that characterized much of
Western technological planning of the postwar period, that Italy
belatedly tried to emulate in its defence industry of the 1970s and
1980s. Japan grew to be the second largest economy in the world
without building its economy on a military-industrial base, and
without relying on a defence establishment to spur the wave of
62Paolo Miggiano, "La ricerca militare non produce sviluppo," Politica ed economia,
February 1987, p. 57.
63"La ricerca militare non produce sviluppo," p. 57.
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technological innovations that came out of the country. In recent
years the Japanese have come to be technological leaders in many
fields of defence production because of the applications of civil
technology to military products, not the reverse.
An example is a kind of paint developed in Japan which,
when used on high-rise buildings, protects against electronic waves
and brings better television reception. This is used as part of the
technology for allow the American B-2 Stealth bomber to evade
detection by radar.64 The Japanese have also developed anti¬
submarine warfare (ASW) systems for their own anti-Soviet
defence which, as one writer said, "if marketed internationally,
would put other countries' products in the shade."65 Japanese
manufacturers are now increasingly tempted to market their
technology in the defence world, but the technological lead they
have achieved in many fields was not based on a military-
industrial model.
West Germany, which also had a self-imposed taboo about the
military industry after the war, later entered the sector using
technology which had been successful in their civilian industry,
such as "engine, transmission, tracks and so on in the case of tanks,
cold metal drawing technology in the case of small arms
production, rather than advances in what are considered 'military
technologies,' that is, military electronics, airframe design, jet
engines, or large guns."66
Despite the well-known difficulties of applying military
development to the civilian world, and examples of other
countries which based unparalleled economic success on
specifically non-military economies, the Italians as late as the 1980s
64Reinhard Drifte, Arms Production in Japan (Boulder and London: Westview Press,
1986), p. 6.
65Malcolm Mcintosh, Japan Rearmed (London: Pinter, 1986), p. 33.
66Michael Brzoska, "The Federal Republic of Germany," in Ball and Leitenberg, p.
115.
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still considered encouraging the defence research sector as a
investment in national technological strength.
The real issue, when making international
comparisons in this field, becomes that of making
explicit political and military goals. Technological
development is crucial for our economic and social
system. Even in the military field, technological
developments are necessary, and above all
collaboration with other countries, to be able to
reduce the cost of armaments and exports to the
Third World. Much could have already been done
without any increase in the outlays for military R &
D, if only the authorities were concerned with
checking the results of the funding assigned to them.
The way of focussing on the military for
technological development is misguided, with
negligible returns to the civil sector, which shows
either the power of military pressure groups and the
defence industry, or the existence of whimsical desire
to carry out the role of military "middle power."67
Italian Arms and Foreign Policy
Until the 1960s, most countries exported arms for security and
foreign policy reasons. A national armaments industry was rarely
seen primarily as an economic asset. In France, for instance, "the
economic activity of the arms industry was not included in
national accounts. Producing arms was viewed as a necessary
public expense to provide for France's security, to underwrite its
foreign policy objectives, and to restore the nation's lost
grandeur."68 The desire to maintain a strong national defence and
influence strategic developments at an international level was at
the root of many of the major national armaments industries
relaunched in Europe after the Second World War. In the 1970s
and 1980s when the effectiveness of arms transfers as a tool of
67 "La ricerca militare non produce sviluppo," p. 58.
68Making and Marketing Arms, p. 135.
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foreign policy was increasingly in doubt, arms industries were
supported for their other perceived advantages, especially their role
in adjusting foreign trade deficits.
Italy entered the field in earnest, however, when the economic
potential of arms exports had become the sector's most salient
aspect. The Italians went through a reverse process, in
which the government was forced to acknowledge the political
power and foreign policy connotations of arms exports as a result of
their economic viability. As a result the government also
encouraged a shift to more acceptable markets, namely stable
NATO arsenals.
The Italians do not use their arms exports as a tool of foreign
policy in the traditional sense. But the existence of their weapons
industry, the technological and industrial cooperation with other
Western countries, and the ability to offer armaments abroad all act
on Italy's foreign trade and international reputation.
Arms Sales and Political Leverage
Some industrialists and analysts close to the defence
establishment began to realise the implications of the large arms
trade for Italian foreign policy.
Every other state, of whatever its type, from East to
West, considers this one of the most important
instruments of its foreign policy and thus promotes
the expansion of this industry according to political
directives which parliaments and governments are
called on to develop, to use as an instrument which
can serve to reinforce the international friendships
of our country, to reinforce export channels, to
reinforce the possibility of gaining contracts of any
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type in the countries with whom these relations are
cultivated.69
The arms trade, however, could not be fully integrated into
Italian foreign policy for a number of reasons. The Italians simply
did not have a traditional foreign policy at the state level which an
arms policy could complement. They also lacked several factors,
including the status of monopoly seller and the willingness to
exhibit restraint in selling, that normally allow countries to exert
leverage through arms sales.
The Italians delivered arms to Somalia under Socialist
Defence Minister Lelio Lagorio and Prime Minister Bettino Craxi
with the apparent objective of consolidating cooperation on diverse
levels, from university education to construction works. The
African country's inability to pay for the military equipment attests
to the fact that Italy saw the transfer as a political gesture. The
Italians also used military sales and training as a major feature of
its friendship with Ghedaffi's Libya. This did result in favourable
trade relations, including the supply of oil to Italy. But Italy's stark
dependence on what Libya offered — namely a steady source of
energy and an outlet for Italy's swollen military production — made
the country more of a trading partner in the traditional sense than
a political client-state.
The notion that arms transfers can fulfill foreign policy
objectives is highly disputed.71 The American expulsion from Iran
in 1979 and the Soviet break with Egypt in 1972 are two examples of
military policies which have failed. In the Horn of Africa, Somalia
and Ethiopia changed allegiance with respect to the superpowers,
sparking a reshuffling of military arsenals. Increasingly, the United
States and the USSR also find themselves on the same side in
69 Sen. Paolo Battino Vittorelli, "Politica di Esportazione dei Materiali per la
Difesa," Difesa-Industria, Quaderni dell'Istrid, Rome, 1987, p. 157.
7®Baroque Arsenal, p. 198.
71 see Pierre, pp. 18-24.
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conflicts, especially in the Middle East, when there is a common
objective to see an end to hostilities.
The Italians also openly sold to countries, especially in Africa,
because of the lack of political pressure. This was one way of
increasing sales for Italy, and helped regional powers diversify their
source of supply, usually from American domination. This
practice in itself is paradoxical for a country like Italy which, if it
makes any official statements of foreign policy, usually backs
American policy to the letter.
It remains difficult for the mid-sized industrial
nations to define a coherent foreign policy position
regarding arms transfers because of possible conflicts
with the positions of the superpowers. Simply
adhering to American positions is not an attractive
policy; in that case Italy and the FRG would only be
able to deliver arms to those nations which are
eligible for US weapons, thereby limiting their
markets to direct competition with often superior
American producers. Italy's foreign policy interests,
in particular the need to maintain balance vis-a-vis
Libya and the Arab coastal states of the
Mediterranean run counter to American policies. In
contrast to the global calculus of the superpowers, the
European nations are regional powers with limited
foreign policy objectives. Very rarely will a European
administration come to the conclusion that there is a
shortage of arms in some area of the world and
encourage its defence industry to fill that gap.72
The distance between Italian foreign-policymaking organs and
the self-propelled industry also precluded an active coordination in
the field of arms policy. FIAT, the largest manufacturer of war
equipment in Italy, evidently felt little sense of obligation to the
military establishment. The firm absorbed new companies and
expanded production as market opportunities presented
72"New Strategies of Mid-Sized Weapons Exporters," pp. 131-132.
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themselves, and left the field just as readily, as soon as profits
dipped.
It was often difficult for the Italian government to align its
interests with the pull of the industry towards Third World
exports. Situations which the political world in Rome greeted with
a sigh of relief, such as a decrease in Libyan or Iranian military
activity, or a drop in oil prices, represented bad news for companies
like Agusta with large export dependencies. The industry's
successful trade could not be termed as completely favourable for
Italy when Italian relief workers in Africa treated casualties of
Italian-made mines and guns, Italian-trained Libyan pilots
attempted to drop missiles on Italian territory, and when shipping
lanes in the Gulf heavily travelled by European vessels were
endangered by Italian mines and missiles.
One will recall that when the problem of the mines
laid by unidentified terrorists in the Suez was
presented to Palazzo Chigi [the Italian prime
minister] in the summer of 1984, and the decision
was taken to send an Italian Navy unit to participate
in the de-mining operations, initially the Radical
Member of Parliament Francesco Rutelli and later
the Egyptian press revealed that the mines had been
clandestinely laid by Libya and were of Italian origin.
Our government denied this, stating that mines of
that type had been sold to a company not in Libya, but
in Bolivia. This did not exclude the possibility that
through an intermediary the mines had found their
way into Libyan hands. This gave rise to a grotesque
and disconcerting paradox: Italian sailors assigned the
task of eliminating the risk presented by explosives
made in Italy (with profits for the producer firm and
losses for the national defence budget).73
73Sergio Turone, Partiti e mafia: dalla P2 alia droga (Rome and Bari: Laterza, 1985),
pp. 63-64.
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In some of its exports, the fact that Italians might be losing
control over their own foreign affairs occurred to some leaders.
When Italy was used as a "triangulation" point, it sometimes
risked becoming an outpost for other countries' industries and
foreign objectives, especially of the United States. This was evident
in the case of South Africa, where the Americans officially declared
an embargo in protest of apartheid. When American-designed
aircraft were sold to South Africa through Italy, the Italians were
the ones who received the formal condemnation of the UN.
Ever since the first UN embargo was imposed in
1963, South Africa has been able to obtain US
military hardware and technology of "third
countries" which produce US arms under license or
which incorporate US components into
domestically-produced weapons. Because certain
countries have relatively lax arms-export controls
(such as Italy), or because they are predisposed to
ignore the embargo (for example Israel, which has
been the victim of embargoes itself), they have
become major conduits for arms transfers to South
Africa. (Many of these countries are also centres of
the "black market" trade in arms to the pariah
countries or to underground guerrilla groups)...To
appreciate the significance of such transfers, it is only
necessary to turn again to the inventory of the South
African air force, as compiled by the IISS. Of the 156
fixed-wing aircraft incorporating at least some US
technology, some 77 were acquired directly from the
United States...while the remainder were acquired
from third-country sources. Included in this category
are 19 Piaggio P-166S maritime patrol planes, 40
Aermacchi AM-3C Bosbok light transports, and 20
Atlas C-4M Kudu scout planes. In addition, the
SAAF possesses some 25 US-designed Agusta-Bell
AB-205A troop-carrying helicopters.74
74Michael Klare, "Evading the Embargo: Illicit Transfers to South Africa," Journal of
International Affairs, vol. 35, no. 1, Spring-Summer 1981, p. 25.
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Frustration over the reverberations of sensitive arms transfers
was evident in an interview with Foreign Trade Minister Formica
in 1986, at a time when Italy was increasingly coming under public
attack for involvement in the Iran-Contra scandal. By this time,
said Formica, if there was any foreign policy guiding Italian arms
transfers, it was
the foreign policy of others...We do not want to
become a crude instrument of undeclared
maneuvers of international politics. We must say
frankly that it is a violation of the spirit of the
Alliance to damage political commitments which
have been publicly and solemnly adopted. One
cannot on the one hand send Whitehead [missiles] to
Italy with the request from Washington not to
supply arms to Iran and then use Italian channels to
do just that. It is a matter of principle: it is an issue of
political coherence and national sovereignty. The
same also applies on the level of practical, concrete
actions.75
The Arms Industry: Industrial and Political Prestige
Italian arms do not act as a traditional instrument of foreign
policy, but they do affect Italy's international relations in a number
of ways. In the 1980s, Italian leaders represented national interests
more actively in international economic summits, sent Italian
troops to the Middle East and developed greater expertise in world
affairs. The Italian foreign policy profile became more distinct. The
near-complete resemblance to other NATO countries in standard of
living and economic output also gave Italians the confidence to
assert more political weight abroad.
At its peak of development, the military industry served the
purpose of representing Italy's industrial progress and its ability to
75"Armi, ci usano per traffici sporchi," La Stampa, 20 November 1986.
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act on the same stage as other advanced Western countries. One
important reason for maintaining defence production was not the
output of the industry as much as its existence and growth, as an
economic "process," and as a symbol of Italian industrial progress.
This is important for other countries including France, as Edward
Kolodziej explains:
The arms industry may also be seen not as a product
but as a process. The engineers and technocrats in
control of the arms complex are particularly attracted
to this characterization. Under this guise, the
lethality of the product or its commercial possibilities
are of lesser consequence than the scientific,
technological, and industrial processes — or the
collection of these processes — that animate the work
of those engaged in designing and producing
arms...Fallout is measured by the advancement of
technological units and economic agents capable of
survival and growth in an international market.
From this perspective it is more important that the
arms complex survives and grows as a competitive
system than that it simply sells goods and services,
classified as military or civilian end-items. Both
arms products and processes may also be seen as
status symbols of a nation's power and position. The
arms industry becomes as much an end in itself as a
tool of foreign policy.76
The industry in Italy did gain a high reputation in the 1980s;
even American military leaders acknowledged an Italian world
lead in advanced helicopters and some types of electronics
manufactured by Selenia.77 Italian researchers in the 1980s
recommended increased government investment in the military
because of the prospects for advancing Italian industry:
^^Making and Marketing Arms, p. 215.
77Interview with Colonel Robert Costa, Chief, Office of Defense Cooperation, United
States Embassy, Rome, 22 April 1989.
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The experience of the promotional laws
demonstrates that in terms of costs, it is necessary to
promote military and financial planning which takes
into account requirements, availability and
productive capacities. The outcome must be not only
the satisfaction of the needs of the armed forces, but
also indirect results, namely a more solid and
efficient industrial structure.78
The country's traditional image of military weakness and a
low international profile had favoured the Italian trade in arms in
the early years of its expansion. But after a rapid development
through the semi-legal trade, the sophistication of Italian-made
arms achieved parity with other Western industries supplying
NATO forces. Defence cooperation became a vehicle for increased
participation with Italy's allies. Defence Minister Spadolini openly
supported projects such as the EH-101 helicopter co-production
with Westland with public statements such as this:
[The EH101] offers a new contribution to the building
of a European industry capable of producing high-
technology systems which can compete on the
international market. More intensive joint
industrial activity between the Europeans will bring
only greater technological and industrial
impetus, but will also be an important opportunity
for political unification for the Europe of the
future.79
The sector grew sufficiently in Italy to become a "common
denominator" in areas such as European helicopter and jet fighter
production, which were designed for the more acceptable export
outlets of European defence forces. This brought a greater measure
of respectability to the Italian industry than when its main
recipients were embargoed nations of the Third World.
78Nones and Rolfo, p. 73.
79 "Dall'alleanza Agusta-Westland nasce Velicottero plurioso EhlOl," Sole-24 Ore, 13
January 1987.
267
Industrialists tried to transform the sector from a mainly
commercial asset into a vehicle for European integration and
increased technology acquisition for Italy. The political world in
Italy came to acknowledge arms production as part of a broader
international identity, and as one concrete and successful area of
cooperation with allies from which it still sought acceptance. The
Italians also saw this as a way of tackling the problem of stiff
competition with other Europeans for arms contracts.
Spadolini, perhaps in an attempt to emulate other NATO
defence leaders, began to involve Italy's defence producers in his
active relations with foreign armed forces. As defence minister, he
signed a number of Memoranda of Understanding with countries
such as China and several African nations which included
mention of contracts for the sale of weapons technology. Zanone
appeared to continue the trend towards the end of the decade. As
individuals, however, Italian politicians are much less active than
their counterparts in other European countries in the promotion of
military hardware abroad. The Italians have no counterpart to
Margaret Thatcher as an aggressive seller of aircraft in the Middle
East. The French Socialist president Francois Mitterrand was also
active in promoting arms, and toured Southeast Asia, for example,
with the specific aim of expanding French strategic sales there.80
Despite the attempt to embrace the arms industry as an
extension of the Italian state, its expansion and period of success
unfolded in the context of the Italian entrepreneurial wave which
renewed many sectors of the Italian economy. IRI officials claim
that there is a primato della politica or a "pre-eminence of politics"
regarding arms exports, and maintain that destinations of Italian
weaponry are ultimately under the jurisdiction of the Minister of
Foreign Affairs.81
&Q"Meno armi all'estero, piu disoccupati qui."
81Romario Prodi, Atti parlamentari, IX Legislatura (Camera), 25 March 1986, p 16.
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However, during the "boom" period, Italy's arms exports fell
into essentially the same category as its other trade. The commerce
in arms was conducted with a wide variety of international actors,
including countries which have tense relations with other NATO
allies; it was often related to deals to secure energy imports; and
most of the essential operations were negotiated and carried out by
businessmen, with low participation by representatives of the
Italian state.
The Future of Italian Defence Production:
An Industry on the Road to Extinction?
By the late 1980s, when employment prospects were called into
question by the industry's crisis, it became clear that one of the
most effective solutions for the crisis in military production was its
gradual elimination.
The industry began to decline much faster than it had
expanded. The major importers, notably Iran and Iraq, had
stabilised their purchases; many other Third World countries had
reduced imports or sought to upgrade existing systems. In response
to the drop in demand, many Italian defence firms began
considering cutting back personnel or leaving the field completely.
In 1986 most of the private firms were in deficit, and few were able
to convince the state holding companies to bail out the industries
in crisis.82 The public companies enjoyed greater security, but
prospects of a return to the productivity of earlier years were poor.
Defence firms were increasingly wary of searching out
sensitive export outlets. Negative publicity had not enhanced
Italy's reputation abroad, and weighed heavily in the minds of
politicians seeking re-election.83 The industries were also reluctant
to defy US controls and cause controversy with their major allies
82Interview with Mr. Grignolo, Ministry of Defence, Rome 21 April 1988.
83Interview with Michele Nones, 15 March 1988.
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since the Atlantic area provided the most promising arena for
future activity for the industry. Weapons were symbols of political
solidarity in Europe, and as such represented a much more
palatable endeavour to present to the Italian public than the earlier
policy of supplying wars in the Third World. This also went along
with Italy's desire to be firmly established in the most sophisticated
political and industrial circles: the high-technology SDI program
brought much greater prestige than the Italian deals in Libya and
elsewhere.
Companies which secured a significant share of domestic
orders did not feel an immediate crisis; EFIM's subsidiary OTO-
Melara counted on steady national contracts for the new C-l Ariete
armoured car; FIAT's Iveco had numerous orders for armoured
transport cars including the Centauro and the Puma. SNIA and
Aeritalia also reported sufficient numbers of orders to sustain
business. But since about 60% of Italy's industry was geared to
foreign sales, much of the sector was struck by the rapid drop in its
ability to sell abroad.
In one year [the defence industry] dropped...among
world exporters by 67%, while turnover stands at
about 6,500 to 7,000 billion lire. Faced with this crisis,
many companies are taking steps: some are thinking
of reducing personnel, others are studying
reconversion possibilities. The President of IRI,
Romano Prodi...has spoken of the necessity to
proceed with a rapid industrial reconversion. The
Minister for State Holdings is thinking along the
same lines: in fact a commission to study the
reconversion of the public armaments industries has
been established.84
Reconversion had taken place successfully at an earlier time in
the history of the defence industry. FIAT, Macchi, Piaggio, and
Agusta had all converted their war production after the Second
84"Addio alle armi," L'Espresso, 4 June 1989.
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World War into civilian fields, mostly automobiles, and
motorcycles. They were attracted back to military production by the
new economic incentives which appeared when the Italians were
absorbed into NATO. However, most firms did not become
completely dependent on military sales for their survival. The
Italian defence-industrial sector had an advantage in not being a
mature industry in comparison to the major sellers. Italian firms
were able to adapt quickly, and to skip over stages that had been
shown to be unprofitable in other national industries. By the same
token, the industry had not become the national commitment that
it represented in many other countries; thus it appeared to be a
relatively simple decision for some of the firms to branch out into
civilian production.
The possibility of diverting military production to civilian
applications was first explored by groups with long-standing moral
objections to the Italian defence industry. The Archivio Disarmo
conducted a study on the economic viability of reconversion
programs, aimed at the cluster of electronics companies near Rome
with heavy dependence on defence. The goal was to
establish contacts with professional associations,
(such as geological groups), agencies for civil defence
and aid to the Third World, associations which care
for the handicapped and promote research on
particular illnesses — all organisations with express
important social needs which are not addressed,
which could offer a real demand for the production
of alternative goods by the converted industries. The
next phase of the research will result in a more
detailed plan not for individual companies, but for
the whole ensemble of electronics industries in
Latium.85
Calls for the elimination of the industry had long been heard
from Catholic leaders as well as representatives of various leftist
85Mario Pianta, "Esplosivo: La conversione del militare," Politica ed economia, n. 11,
November 1987, p. 56.
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groups in Italy. Pope John Paul II spoke about about the need for
arms dealers to "subordinate profit to moral criteria."86 Several
left-wing and Catholic groups, including ACLI, Mani tese, MLAL,
Missione Oggi and Pax Christi formed the Committee against the
Merchants of Death to condemn Italian arms sales, especially to
South Africa.87
Italians are now witnessing a real "people's crusade"
against the "merchants of death," highlighted by the
mass demonstrations against and political resistance
to the Italian naval detachment sent to the Gulf, by
continuous interceptions of loads of military
equipment and supplies on third-country ships
transiting by way of Italy, by the jailing (and later
release) of the senior managers of the Valsella
Company -- accused of clandestine arms sales to Iran
and Iraq (charges that will probably be dropped) - and
by the abrogation via referendum of some laws
regulating Italian nuclear activity, particularly the
possibility of taking part in international cooperation
programmes in this sector — including for civilian
purposes.88
Political leaders could not be said to have played an
instrumental role in guiding the field through the time of crisis.
When given the political choice of promoting an arms industry or
placing priorities elsewhere, early Italian governments, as we have
seen, had not been attracted to military production. Perhaps the
most "militarist" politicians came from the "lay" parties, who
enjoyed miniscule popular support but came to hold high office in
the 1980s (among them defence ministers Lagorio, Spadolini, and
Zanone).
The party that was the most closely associated with the
industry was the largest one, the DC. Although many DC leaders
86"Wojtyla contro i mercanti di morte," Corriere della Sera, 18 April 1988.
87"I cattolici contro i mercanti di morte," La Repubblica, 11 March 1988.
88Antonio Ciampi, "Exit the Mostra Navale" Defense and Armament Heracles
International, No. 69, January 1988, p. 15.
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had strong ties within the defence industry, the sector was never
fully accepted as a product of the political sphere. Politicians from
all the parties were uncomfortable coming to the sector's defence,
even when the military enjoyed a higher profile in the 1980s.
Members of the DC, for instance, were seen to be among the arms
exporters' harshest critics, and had introduced the most restrictive
proposal for exports controls in the Chamber of Deputies.89 There
was a basic reluctance to be associated with the armed forces. The
military was a fundamentally unpopular organisation, because of
its associations with Fascism and the Second World War, the
experiences of the country's young males who were forced to pass
through the backward, harsh system as part of the national service,
and public cynicism over its tendency toward subversive schemes.
The decline of the defence industry was not a sign, on the
other hand, that pacifist forces had made particular gains in Italy.
The Communists had always opposed any measures linking Italy to
Western-inspired militarism. But the PCI did not make Italy's
status as an arms seller the crux of its opposition to the ruling
parties, and preferred to concentrate on domestic policies such as
trade relations and the corrupt practices of the DC. Supporting
NATO and the West had become an inextricable part of the party's
search for legitimacy and its hope of future government
participation. As Sen. Vittorelli observed, the stance of the PCI
became almost identical to that of the other parties (except the
extreme left). Those who call for disarmament are often seen to be
asking for further subordination to the US.90 The peace movement
never moved from a cultural undercurrent to a powerful lobby.
Criticisms of government military policy were muffled even on
occasions such as the installation of cruise missiles on Sicily.
Further, there was the persistent conflict of interest within the
Italian left between the desires to uphold a moral code and to
89Interview with Sen. Paolo Vittorelli, 28 March 1988.
^Interview with Vittorelli, 28 March 1988.
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maintain employment at its maximum levels. Opponents of the
defence industry, who saw in the arms race a continuing means of
oppressing the working class, were often in the same "camp" as
those representing the thousands of arms industry employees in
the unions, especially the metalworkers.
A large part of the industry was filled with engineers and
highly-skilled workers; conversion plans would also have to
concentrate on replacing jobs in scientific areas. But there was also
a section of the workforce at the assembly level with representation
from the unions. Most of the defence industry workers were not
aware of the moral and political implications of their production
until union leaders of the Federazione dei Lavoratori
Metalmeccanici (FLM) began a program of continuing education
called Cento Ore (100 Hours). German researcher Ulrich Albrecht
describes one of the union's attempts to bring home the realities of
the arms trade to its workers:
The newly-federated FLM has a unique structural
element: in firms above a certain size it can appoint a
permanent secretary for "international matters."
Naturally, in the armaments sector these
international secretaries are immediately confronted
with the question of weapons exports. Several of
them have reacted in unusual ways. In the large
helicopter plant of Count Giovanni Agusta in
Gallarate in northern Italy (where Bell helicopters
are produced under license for export to countries
which would probably be unacceptable as clients of
the US government), the international secretaries
presented the employees with parts of a helicopter
which had been shot down in Africa and asked them
if they really wanted their handiwork to help
suppress liberation movements. The workers, who
recognized their own work in the riveted tail end of
a Bell UH-1D, had to answer uncomfortable
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questions from the representatives of the liberation
movement whom the secretaries had invited.91
Opposition to the arms industry began to grow slowly among
its employees. The unions made a number of initiatives on the
topic of reconversion that, as one observer wrote, "were often
reticent, sometimes courageous, but never succeeded in making
reconversion a primary theme of trade union politics."92 Instead,
modest efforts such as a conference held in November 1987 and the
call for a Reconversion Fund attempted to keep alive the moral
issues surrounding the industry.
It was not the peace groups or the left-wing unions, however,
that finally sparked an interest in reconversion, but the firms
themselves. The stimulus for significant changes in the defence
sector was the realisation of its decline in economic value. The
decline in figures was confirmed by the withdrawal of the Italian
group at the Farnborough Air Show in 1988 (except in international
projects), and the cancellation of the International Naval Show at
Genoa, the Mostra Navale.
Assertions that the military industry might soon become
unviable in Italy were not merely threats to the state; other
industries in Western Europe had reached the critical stage where
national military production was called into question.
Mid-sized industrial countries are increasingly
confronted with the question of whether, given the
resource costs of modern weapons, they will
continue to have a national arms industry or not.
Some countries, such as the Netherlands, have opted
out of the arms race. The legendary Dutch firm
Fokker no longer produces fighter planes of its own
design (but continues with the production of small
passenger aircraft). England finds itself forced to give
up the production of large-caliber guns, once the
symbol of its maritime power, for reasons of cost.
91 "New Strategies of Mid-Sized Weapons Exporters," p. 136.
92Pianta, p. 57.
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The Federal Republic of Germany and Italy, on the
other hand, insist on maintaining an independent
armaments industry, not for the traditional reason of
autarky, but for reasons of technology and
employment policies.93
The industry had arisen essentially as an export phenomenon
in Italy, as an extension of the country's foreign commerce in
general. Defence industries are normally sustained by the presence
of active military and foreign policy goals. The Italians did
experiment with new roles in the 1980s: they rehabilitated their
military, both in material terms and in public image, and they won
greater respect for their place among the industrialised countries of
the world. Supporters attempted to include the defence industry as
in this context of Italy's wider national responsibilities. General
Jean remarked at the Defence-Industry Conference in 1984,
"Decisions for the future of the industry must be integrated with
the general policies of the state, which constitute the primary
unifying factor of the strategies of all the different sectors."94
But the arms industry did not appear to function as an
extension of the state. The economic side of the industry had
matured more rapidly than strategic thinking in Italy. The
industrial sector began to decline perhaps before Italian leaders had
learned to exploit it fully for its political weight. Nonetheless the
short-sightedness of adopting it as a national responsibility just as
world military exports declined sharply was clear. Further,
individual progress in the military field could not be developed as
a national objective. While arms sales gave many countries, like
France, the means of being independent, Italy did not really want to
be independent: its higher goal was to "belong," and to gain the
recognition it felt its loyalty and prosperity deserved.
93"New Strategies of Mid-Sized Weapons Exporters," p. 142.
94 "La strategia industriale del sistema difesa," p. 11.
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Once the limits on the opportunities for new technologies,
exports and profits had become clear in the late 1980s, there seemed
to be few justifications for keeping alive a defence industry of the
same dimensions in Italy in the future.
CONCLUSION
The defence industry in Italy has not received the same
attention devoted to major military industries in other countries.
This has occurred in spite of the fact that Italian military
production reached strikingly large dimensions in the 1970s and
1980s. It has been my aim to provide a picture of the dimensions
of military production in Italy since the Second World War: the
quantative features of the industry, the different types of
production carried out in the major sectors of aerospace,
shipbuilding and electronics, and the clients of Italian weaponry
who allowed the sector to become highly profitable. The
importance of the industry is indisputable: it was the fastest
growing sector of the Italian economy, and was linked to other
aspects of Italy's economic livelihood, including its access to oil
and to steady trading partners. Nonetheless, the military
industries remained poorly documented. In Italy, study was
restricted to a few specialists, and the arms trade received
decreasing coverage in national publications; in the English-
speaking world, the rise of Italy's arms trade went almost
completely unnoticed, as can be seen for instance from its
omission from a comprehensive Council on Foreign Relations
study in the early 1980s.
Italy's role as an arms seller received little attention in part
because so many features of modern Italian society make the
country an unlikely candidate for the status of a major producer of
war materiel. Thus besides giving an account of the size and
characteristics of the industry I have also sought to explain the
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sector's expansion through a study of the political, military and
economic background of Italy during the same period. It was a
political commitment which brought Italy into the fold of Western
countries in NATO, and Italian political leaders never failed to
reaffirm their solidarity with the Atlantic cause. But a commercial
drive was the most salient feature of Italian postwar activity; the
Italians' trade relations even brought them into unusually close
contact with the supposed adversaries of the NATO Alliance. For
Italy, the arms trade was primarily a commercial pursuit. This
reflected the Italians' desire to reap economic advantages out of
political and military alliances, since they were unable or
unwilling to exert strong leadership among their major allies.
The Italians maintained the image of a passive diplomatic
presence and a mediocre military power for most of the postwar
period. For these reasons, as well, a widespread trade in arms went
relatively unnoticed. Because of Italy's low profile, it did not have
political goals to contradict when it cultivated a robust trade in
arms with pariah nations; in addition the United States and other
countries targeted Italy as a suitably "out-of-the-way" stopover
point for the supply of arms or arms technology to Africa, Iran and
other destinations.
The presence of a large defence industry in Italy has eluded
many observers because politicians did not want to take public
responsibility for the industry as an extension of the state. A
powerful defence capability did not respond to general aspirations
of the public at large. When news of Italy's trade in arms did reach
newspapers and journals, the defence industries were accepted as
another example of secretive and even subversive activities of the
state which were commonplace in the postwar period. Despite the
sector's dynamism, profits usually went back into the hands of a
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small cluster of interests close to production: mostly the firms
themselves, and occasionally political and military leaders with
close connections to the industries. Military production did not
significantly alter employment figures, generate national
prosperity or foster scientific progress. The sector in fact reached its
peak when Italy was contributing a gradually decreasing part of its
national wealth to defence.
When the profitability of military production began to
decline, Italy was left with a string of companies with production
capacities overextended beyond national needs that were still
highly dependent on shrinking foreign markets. When the
survival of companies and jobs came into question, industrial and
political leaders examined the possibility of reconverting many of
the military industries. When most of Italy's defence firms were
faced with crisis, it was commercial, not strategic considerations,
which again determined the future course of the industry.
The effects beyond Italy of its widespread arms trade are more
difficult to measure. While it is generally clear that weapons sales
enhanced Italy's economic status more than its military or political
presence in the Third World, arms assistance had greater
significance for some of its clients. Italy aided some countries in
diversifying their sources of supply, notably India, South Africa,
and the Shah's Iran; this provided the means for these countries to
exert a more independent role in regional politics. In addition,
Italy certainly can be claimed responsible for fueling wars and
repressive movements by providing the material means for
continuing conflicts. Italy's weapons were usually sold not to the
sterile arsenals of NATO countries, but to Third World nations.
When the majority of Italian weapons were transferred, they were
put to use. Italy acted as a bridge between the industrialised world
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and the developing nations, over which Western countries
generally had little influence. Italians transferred equipment,
including some of the most advanced and lethal technology, with
little regard for its destination and possible uses. Most
importantly, they were willing to sell the ability to continue
making armaments, through licences and co-production, that
would allow a wide range of foreign countries to deploy the
systems long after the defence industries were abandoned in Italy
as economically unviable.
APPENDIX I
ASPECTS OF THE ITALIAN DEFENCE INDUSTRY
ItalianMilitary Expenditure as Percentage of GNP
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 19791
2.9 3.1 2.9 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.4
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1988 19892
2.1 2.1 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.4 2.3
sources: 1 SIPRI Yearbook 1981, p. 166.
2 SIPRI Yearbook 1989, p. 188.
Expenditure for Armaments in Italy 1975-1982
(excluding carabinieri)


















source: Cicciomessere (1982), p. 42.
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source: SIPR1 Yearbook 1985, p. 346.
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Exports of Italian Armaments By Area 1979-1983
destination $ million (current) % Italian arms expts.
Africa 1,485 31.9
Middle East 1,255 27.0
Latin America 1,090 23.5
Asia 410 8.8
Industrialised countries"' 410 8.8
"NATO, other European, Australia
source: Archivio Disarmo, Industria militare italiana: Esportazioni (1986).
Principal Importers of Italian Arms 1979-1983


















source: Archivio Disarmo, Industria militare italiana: Esportazioni (1986).
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Fincantieri - CNI 500
Oerlikon-Buhrle 480
source: Archivio Disarmo data base, 1988
Turnover of Defence-Industrial Sector in Italy 1968-1984
(billion lire)
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
274 314 380 468 582 759
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
917 1,248 1,804 2,180 2,655
source: Battistelli (1980), pp. 208-209
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
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